WildEarth Guardians v. N.M. Env't Improvement Bd. ( 2023 )

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1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 Opinion Number: _____________
3 Filing Date: December 4, 2023
4 No. A-1-CA-39522
5 WILDEARTH GUARDIANS,
6 Petitioner-Appellant,
7 v.
8 NEW MEXICO ENVIRONMENTAL
9 IMPROVEMENT BOARD,
10 Respondent-Appellee,
11 and
12 NEW MEXICO ENVIRONMENT
13 DEPARTMENT; XTO ENERGY INC.;
14 and 3 BEAR DELAWARE OPERATING
15 -- NM, LLC; SPUR ENERGY PARTNERS
16 LLC,
17 Intervenors-Appellees.
18 APPEAL FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT BOARD
19 Phoebe Suina, Board Chair
20 Daniel L. Timmons
21 Samantha Ruscavage-Barz
22 Tim Davis
23 Santa Fe, NM
24 for Appellant
1 Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
2 Karla J. Soloria, Assistant Attorney General
3 Emily Bowen, Assistant Attorney General
4 Santa Fe, NM
5 for Respondent-Appellee
6 Lara Katz, Special Assistant Attorney General
7 Chris Vigil, Assistant General Counsel
8 Santa Fe, NM
9 for Appellee New Mexico Environment Department
10 Montgomery & Andrews, PA
11 Louis W. Rose
12 Kari E. Olson
13 Santa Fe, NM
14 for Appellee XTO Energy Inc.
15 Beatty & Wozniak, P.C.
16 James Martin
17 Santa Fe, NM
18 Jobediah Rittenhouse
19 Chris Colclasure
20 Denver, CO
21 for Appellee 3 Bear Delaware Operating -- NM, LLC
22 Holland & Hart LLP
23 Adam G. Rankin
24 Santa Fe, NM
25 Jill H. Van Noord
26 Boulder, CO
27 Tina R. Van Bockem
28 Denver, CO
29 for Appellee Spur Energy Partners LLC
1 OPINION
2 BUSTAMANTE, Judge, retired, sitting by designation.
3 {1} We are presented with a technically and legally complex direct appeal
4 challenging the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board’s (the Board)
5 decision to affirm the New Mexico Environment Department’s (the Department)
6 grant of an air quality permit and three 20.2.72.220 NMAC general construction
7 permit registrations. WildEarth Guardians (WildEarth) argues that (1)
8 20.2.72.208(D) NMAC’s requirement that a facility’s emissions not “cause or
9 contribute to” a violation of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) does
10 not allow use of a de minimis standard—commonly called a significant impact level
11 (SIL); (2) the air quality permit and registrations at issue were improperly granted
12 because evidence demonstrates they will cause or contribute to a violation of the
13 NAAQS; and (3) the registrations at issue were improperly granted because they are
14 located in nonattainment areas, pursuant to 20.2.79.7(AA) NMAC (6/3/2011). We
15 conclude the use of a SIL is allowable when determining whether a facility causes
16 or contributes to an increase of the NAAQS, pursuant to 20.2.72.208(D) NMAC, the
17 evidence demonstrates the permit and the registration’s emissions do not cause or
18 contribute to an increase of the NAAQS, and the general construction permit
19 registrations are not located in a nonattainment zone. We affirm the grant of the
20 permits, but remand for redaction of paragraphs 102-105 of the Board’s final order.
1 BACKGROUND
2 {2} This appeal involves ozone emissions. Ozone causes irritation and
3 inflammation in the respiratory system and tissue damage to vegetation. Ozone is
4 beneficial in the stratosphere because it blocks harmful light radiation, but is harmful
5 when it is present in the lower troposphere, where we live and breathe. Ozone is a
6 secondary pollutant, meaning ozone is not emitted on its own, but rather is formed
7 by the chemical reaction between nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions and volatile
8 organic compounds (VOCs) in sunlight. This makes it difficult and expensive to
9 calculate ozone quantities and to parse out the source of the NOx and VOCs
10 contributing to them.
11 {3} The Clean Air Act’s primary tool to combat pollution relies on National
12 Ambient Air Quality Standards (as previously noted, NAAQS). 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a);
13 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1). NAAQS establish standards for six criteria pollutants,
14 including ozone, which must be met by all the states. 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2023). The
15 Clean Air Act is implemented through so-called cooperative federalism—meaning
16 the Federal government sets national standards intended to protect the air, while the
17 states implement those standards. 3 L. of Envtl. Prot. § 29:130 (2023), Westlaw
18 (database updated April 2023). The Clean Air Act is thus administered by the
19 Environmental Protection Agency (the EPA) in coordination with state, local, and
20 tribal governments. Id. New Mexico implements the Clean Air Act through the Air
2
1 Quality Control Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 74-2-1 to -17 (1967, as amended through
2 2021), 1 and a preconstruction permitting program. The Air Quality Control Act
3 provides two relevant ways to procure air quality control permits, through general
4 construction permits for individual sources, § 74-2-7, and through registrations of
5 individual sources pursuant to 20.2.72.220 NMAC.
6 {4} The Department granted revisions to an air quality construction permit (the 3
7 Bear Permit) to 3 Bear Delaware Operating – NM, LLC (3 Bear), for its Libby Gas
8 Plant (the Libby Plant) in Lea County, New Mexico. The Department also approved
9 three registrations under a 20.2.72.220 NMAC general permit. The registrations
10 were filed under the April 2018 General Construction Permit for Oil and Gas
11 Facilities (the General Permit) by XTO Energy Co. (XTO) for its Corral Canyon 23
12 and Big Eddy Unit DI 38 facilities, and by Spur Energy Partners LLC (Spur) for its
13 Dorami 2H, 4H and 9H Federal Oil Tank Battery (collectively, the Registrations),
14 all of which are located in Eddy County, New Mexico. WildEarth appealed the
15 Department’s approval of the 3 Bear Permit and the Registrations to the Board. The
16 appeals were consolidated in front of the Board.
17 {5} Prior to the online hearing on WildEarth’s appeal, each party filed written
18 direct and rebuttal expert technical testimony. The nine expert witnesses elaborated
All citations throughout this opinion to Sections 74-2-1 to -17 are to the 2019
1
version of the Air Quality Control Act, unless otherwise indicated.
3
1 on different aspects of what ozone is and how it forms, measuring ozone through
2 modeling, the cooperative scheme between the Clean Air Act and the Air Quality
3 Control Act, the air quality permitting process, and the specifics of the 3 Bear Permit
4 and the Registrations. The parties then went before the Board for a two-day remote
5 hearing where the experts provided testimony and were cross-examined. The
6 members of the Board were able to ask clarifying questions. The Board also provided
7 the opportunity for public comment. The hearing officer provided a recommendation
8 that the Board affirm the grant of the 3 Bear Permit and the Registrations, and
9 provided the Board a proposed form final order. The Board adopted the hearing
10 officer’s recommendation and the hearing officer’s form of final order verbatim.
11 {6} The Board’s final order was thirty-five pages. It reviewed ozone formation,
12 the NAAQS, the nonattainment process and how it relates to New Mexico, ozone
13 regulation in New Mexico, and the public comment. It then reviewed the 3 Bear
14 Permit and the Registrations separately.
15 {7} For the 3 Bear Permit, the Board determined that the Department could use a
16 SIL—significant impact level—when determining whether permits such as the 3
17 Bear Permit cause or contribute to emissions that would violate the NAAQS. The
18 Board then concluded that any minor source of ozone will always be below the SIL
19 and by definition is not considered to cause or contribute to ozone levels in violation
20 of the NAAQS. Thus, because the 3 Bear Permit involved a minor source, the Board
4
1 determined it was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law for the
2 Department to determine the 3 Bear Permit would not cause or contribute to
3 concentrations of pollutant in excess of the NAAQS.
4 {8} For the Registrations, the Board addressed the nonattainment requirements of
5 the General Permit. The Board concluded that nonattainment is a status designated
6 by the EPA and, to the extent the regulatory definition used in the General Permit
7 conflicted, the formal designation process takes precedence. Based on that
8 conclusion, the Board determined that it was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to
9 law to determine the Registrations’ facilities were not located in nonattainment
10 areas.
11 {9} WildEarth appeals the Board’s decision. See § 74-2-9(A) (“Any person
12 adversely affected by an administrative action taken by the environmental
13 improvement board, the local board, the secretary or the director may appeal to the
14 court of appeals.”).
15 DISCUSSION
16 {10} We begin by addressing the statutory and regulatory frameworks required of
17 the Clean Air Act and the Air Quality Control Act. We then address WildEarth’s
18 arguments that the Department’s use of SILs is improper and that the effect on the
19 3 Bear Permit and the Registrations requires reversal because they cause or
20 contribute to a violation of the NAAQS. Finally, we turn to WildEarth’s argument
5
1 that the Registrations were improperly approved because the data shows facilities
2 were located in a nonattainment area.
3 I. Standard of Review
4 {11} Under the Air Quality Control Act, an action of the Board may be set aside by
5 this Court if it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion; (2) not supported
6 by substantial evidence in the record; or (3) otherwise not in accordance with law.”
7 Section 74-2-9(C). “A ruling by an administrative agency is arbitrary and capricious
8 if it is unreasonable or without a rational basis, when viewed in light of the whole
9 record.” Rio Grande Chapter of Sierra Club v. N.M. Mining Comm’n, 2003-NMSC-
10 005, ¶ 17, 133 N.M. 97, 61 P.3d 806. When reviewing whether the decision is not
11 supported by substantial evidence under the whole record standard of review, our
12 Supreme Court has instructed that “we look not only at the evidence that is favorable,
13 but also evidence that is unfavorable to the agency’s determination.” Fitzhugh v.
14 N.M. Dep’t of Labor, 1996-NMSC-044, ¶ 23, 122 N.M. 173, 922 P.2d 555.
15 {12} “The canons of statutory construction guide our interpretation of
16 administrative regulations.” Albuquerque Bernalillo Cnty. Water Util. Auth. v. N.M.
17 Pub. Regul. Comm’n, 2010-NMSC-013, ¶ 51, 148 N.M. 21, 229 P.3d 494. We
18 review statutes and regulations de novo to give effect to the intent of the Legislature,
19 looking to the plain language of the statute, and construing the entire statutory
20 scheme as a whole. Lujan Grisham v. Romero, 2021-NMSC-009, ¶ 23, 483 P.3d
61 545; Pirtle v. Legis. Council Comm’n, 2021-NMSC-026, ¶ 14, 492 P.3d 586. “When
2 an agency that is governed by a particular statute construes or applies that statute,
3 the [C]ourt will begin by according some deference to the agency’s interpretation.”
4 Morningstar Water Users Ass’n v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 1995-NMSC-062, ¶ 11,
5 120 N.M. 579, 904 P.2d 28. Although not bound by the agency’s interpretation,
6 “[t]he [C]ourt will confer a heightened degree of deference to legal questions that
7 implicate special agency expertise or the determination of fundamental policies
8 within the scope of the agency’s statutory function.” Id. (internal quotation marks
9 and citation omitted). “However, the [C]ourt is not bound by the agency’s
10 interpretation and may substitute its own independent judgment for that of the
11 agency because it is the function of the courts to interpret the law.” N.M. Indus.
12 Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regul. Comm’n, 2007-NMSC-053, ¶ 19, 142 N.M.
13 533, 168 P.3d 105 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
14 II. The Clean Air Act
15 {13} Congress enacted the Clean Air Amendments of the Clean Air Act in 1970 as
16 “a comprehensive national program that made the [s]tates and the [f]ederal
17 [g]overnment partners in the struggle against air pollution.” Gen. Motors Corp. v.
18 United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990). The amendments require the EPA to
19 designate pollutants that “cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably
20 be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” and then issue air quality
7
1 criteria, the NAAQS—national ambient air quality standards. § 7408(a)(1)(A),
2 (a)(2); § 7409(a)(1). The NAAQS are in the form of maximum allowable
3 concentrations in the ambient air during a specified time period. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.2(b),
4 50.3. For each pollutant, primary and secondary standards must be set at levels
5 “requisite to protect the public health” and “the public or welfare,” respectively.
6 § 7409(b)(1); § 7408(a)(1)(A).
7 {14} The NAAQS for ozone are determined “when the 3-year average of the annual
8 fourth-highest daily maximum 8-hour average [ozone] concentration is less than or
9 equal to 0.075 [parts per million (ppm)].” 40 C.F.R. § 50.15(b). Estimating quantities
10 of ozone that a proposed facility will emit is complicated by the fact that ozone is
11 not a direct emission. As we noted above, ozone is created when NOx and VOCs
12 mix in the atmosphere and are acted upon by sunlight, thus it is expensive and
13 difficult to quantify.
14 {15} Once a NAAQS designation—for any pollutant, not just ozone—is made, the
15 EPA designates areas as “attainment,” “nonattainment,” or “unclassifiable” based
16 on the area’s compliance with the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). If the
17 air quality in the area is within the NAAQS, it is designated “attainment.”
18 § 7407(d)(1)(A)(ii). If the air quality in the area is not within the NAAQS, it is
19 designated “nonattainment.” § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i). Once an area is designated as
20 “nonattainment,” it is then designated as a marginal, moderate, serious, severe, or
8
1 extreme area. 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a)-(c). If an area is designated “nonattainment,” it is
2 subject to stricter permitting requirements. This is a formal designation process and
3 the designations remain in effect until the EPA formally redesignates the area.
4 § 7407(d)(1)(B)(iv), (d)(3).
5 {16} The states are primarily responsible for implementing the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C.
6 § 7410. Each state must develop a state implementation plan (SIP) that gives
7 information that satisfies the state’s obligations to achieve and maintain the NAAQS.
8 § 7410(a). SIPs must be approved by the EPA. § 4710(a)(3)(B). New Mexico’s SIP
9 was approved by the EPA and codified at 40 C.F.R. § 52.1620 (2023).
10 {17} Per the Clean Air Act, SIPs must include a program to regulate the
11 construction or modification of “any stationary source . . . as necessary to assure [the
12 NAAQS] are achieved, including a permit program.” § 7410(a)(2)(C). A major
13 source is a stationary source that emits or has the potential to emit any pollutant over
14 specified annual thresholds, which are 100 tons per year (tpy) or 250 tpy depending
15 on the type of source. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). A stationary source is a major source of
16 ozone if it emits 250 or more tpy because ozone is not specifically listed in the
17 statute. Id. Major sources are significant to our analysis in that they require more
18 stringent requirements than nonmajor (minor) sources. Major sources must obtain a
19 preconstruction permit. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1). A permit for a major source cannot
20 be granted unless “construction or operation of such facility will not cause, or
9
1 contribute to, air pollution in excess of any . . . [NAAQS] in any air quality control
2 region.” § 7475(a)(3).
3 {18} The preconstruction permitting program for attainment areas is called the
4 Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program (PSD). 42 U.S.C. § 7470; 40 C.F.R.
5 § 51.166(b)(42) (2023); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(i) (2023). EPA regulations require
6 each state’s SIP to set forth “legally enforceable procedures that enable the [s]tate or
7 local agency to determine whether the construction or modification of a facility, . . .
8 will result in . . . [i]nterference with attainment or maintenance of [the NAAQS].”
9 40 C.F.R. § 51.160(a)(2) (2023). “The procedures must discuss the air quality data
10 and the dispersion or other air quality modeling used to meet the requirements of
11 this subpart.” 40 C.F.R. § 51.160(f).
12 III. New Mexico’s Air Quality Control Act
13 {19} The Air Quality Control Act, §§ 74-2-1 to -17, is our state’s response to the
14 requirements of the Clean Air Act. Section 74-2-5(C)(1)(a) states that the rules
15 adopted by the Board may “include rules . . . to prevent significant deterioration of
16 air quality[,] and to achieve [NAAQS] in nonattainment areas: . . . [and] shall be no
17 more stringent than but at least as stringent as required by the federal act and federal
18 regulations . . . pertaining to prevention of significant deterioration and pertaining to
19 nonattainment areas.”
10
1 {20} The Air Quality Control Act requires any “person intending to construct or
2 modify any source,” to obtain an air quality construction permit. Section 74-2-
3 7(A)(1). New Mexico has regulations that apply to all construction permits,
4 20.2.72.2 NMAC, regulations that apply to major source permits in attainment areas,
5 20.2.74.2 NMAC, and regulations that apply to permits in nonattainment areas.
6 20.2.79.6 NMAC. Like the Clean Air Act, § 7479(1), the Air Quality Control Act
7 defines a major source of ozone as one, which emits 250 tpy or more of pollutant—
8 which means that minor sources of ozone emit less than 250 tpy of pollutants.
9 20.2.74.7(AG)(2) NMAC; 20.2.74.501 NMAC. Per our regulations, NMED “shall
10 deny any application for a permit,” whether it be for a minor or major source, if
11 “[t]he construction, modification, or permit revision will cause or contribute to air
12 contaminant levels in excess of any [NAAQS] . . . unless the ambient air impact is
13 offset by meeting the requirements of either 20.2.79 NMAC or 20.2.72.216 NMAC,
14 whichever is applicable.” 20.2.72.208(D) NMAC (emphasis added).
15 {21} Outside of the regular construction permitting process, the Board’s
16 regulations grant the Department the authority to issue general construction permits.
17 Regulation 20.2.72.220(A)(1) of the New Mexico Administrative Code states:
18 The department may, after notice under Subsections A and B of
19 20.2.72.206 NMAC and a public hearing with opportunity for public
20 participation under Subsection C of 20.2.72.206 NMAC issue one or
21 more general construction permits, each covering numerous similar
22 sources. Sources registered for coverage under a general permit shall
23 be generally homogeneous in terms of operations, processes and
11
1 emissions, subject to the same or substantially similar requirements,
2 and not subject to case-by-case standards or requirements.
3 The Department is thus authorized to issue general construction permits that cover
4 numerous similar sources—what the Department individually calls registrations—
5 so long as the Board follows the regulatory scheme. 20.2.72.220 NMAC. The
6 requirements for general construction permits are at 20.2.72.220 NMAC. The
7 regulation requires all sources registered under general permits to include terms and
8 conditions assuring that the registration “will not cause or contribute to air
9 containment levels in excess of any national or New Mexico ambient air quality
10 standard.” 20.2.72.220(A)(2)(c)(i) NMAC.
11 {22} The Department spent a significant amount of time in their technical written
12 expert testimony, proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law, briefing to this
13 Court, and in oral argument describing efforts the Department is making to curb
14 ozone pollution outside of the permitting process. These ozone initiatives are
15 separate from the permitting issues at hand. We need not review them.
16 IV. Significant Impact Levels
17 {23} Noting that air quality monitor readings in Lea and Eddy counties are already
18 measuring ozone levels above the NAAQS, WildEarth argues that the Board erred
19 as a matter of law when it concluded that the Air Quality Control Act and the Board’s
20 regulations do not impose a zero-tolerance standard for emissions from sources
21 located in areas with ozone levels measuring air quality in violation of the NAAQS.
12
1 3 Bear, Spur, and XTO (collectively, the Permittees) and the Department responded
2 that the Air Quality Control Act and the Board’s regulations allow the use of a SIL,
3 a de minimis increase of air contaminant levels that does not violate the “cause or
4 contribute to” standard of the NAAQS. Thus, the meaning of “cause or contribute
5 to” is at the core of this appeal. We agree with the Department and the Permittees.
6 {24} Per the Air Quality Control Act, an application for a permit may be denied if
7 the construction “will cause or contribute to air contaminant levels in excess of a
8 national or state standard.” Section 74-2-7(C)(1)(b). According to the Board’s
9 regulations, an application for a permit shall be denied if “[t]he construction,
10 modification, or permit revision will cause or contribute to air contaminant levels in
11 excess of any [NAAQS] or New Mexico ambient air quality standard unless the
12 ambient air impact is offset by meeting the requirements of either 20.2.79 NMAC or
13 20.2.72.216 NMAC, whichever is applicable.” 20.2.72.208(D) NMAC (emphasis
14 added).
15 {25} There is no disagreement among the parties that the wording “cause or
16 contribute to” is based on language in the Clean Air Act addressing permitting
17 requirements for major sources of emissions. § 7475(a)(3). We are aware that while
18 the State’s minor source permitting rules must be approved by the EPA, the Clean
19 Air Act does not dictate specific elements for minor source permitting programs.
20 § 7410(a)(2)(C). Despite the lack of specific federal direction, we conclude that
13
1 authorities construing the Clean Air Act and the EPA’s regulations and interpretation
2 of the language are instructive for our analysis of New Mexico’s identical wording.
3 See State v. Chavez, 2023-NMCA-071, ¶ 30, 535 P.3d 736 (relying on federal
4 authority as persuasive authority when the federal rule was substantially similar to
5 the state rule).
6 {26} There also appears to be no disagreement among the parties that the EPA has
7 historically interpreted the “cause or contribute to” language to connote that
8 emissions from a source must have a significant impact on air quality in order to
9 result in a denial of a permit. As 3 Bear’s expert witness testified, the EPA has been
10 using SILs since at least 1990 when it issued the New Source Review Workshop
11 Manual—Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment Area Permitting
12 (Oct. 1990) (1990 NSR Workshop Manual), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-
13 07/documents/1990wman.pdf. Though it is guidance for the PSD program—the
14 permitting program for major sources in attainment areas—the 1990 NSR Workshop
15 Manual included a SIL. 1990 NSR Workshop Manual, ch. A, § I. at A.1; § II.C.2 at
16 A.24-25. The EPA’s longstanding approval of the use of a SIL when assessing
17 whether emissions cause or contribute to air contaminant levels in excess of the
18 NAAQS is therefore demonstrated by the EPA’s historical guidelines.
19 {27} The EPA’s interpretation has been examined in a number of cases. For
20 example, in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 404-05 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
14
1 the court disapproved of the EPA’s regulatory approach to implementing the idea
2 that de minimis effect may be administratively recognized and dealt with by
3 reducing the burden of proof imposed on significant sources. Id. at 405. But, the
4 court recognized and approved of the idea of defining de minimis standards and
5 applying them to reduce administrative burdens on the EPA. Id. Similarly in Sur
6 Contra La Contaminacion v. Environmental Protection Agency, 202 F.3d 443, 446-
7 47 (1st Cir. 2000), the EPA had allowed a permit applicant to forgo a “full impact
8 analysis” of its potential sulfur dioxide emissions. The EPA relied on a provision in
9 the PSD permit process that allowed skipping a full analysis if the air quality
10 modeling technique indicated that emissions “would not increase ambient
11 concentrations by more than prescribed significant ambient levels.” Id. at 446. And,
12 in WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, 870 F. Supp. 2d 847, 850-51 (N.D. Cal. 2012),
13 the court specifically approved of the EPA’s adoption of “de minimis thresholds
14 which set specific values, in relation to each pollutant’s NAAQS, below which the
15 pollutant is not considered to cause or contribute to a violation of the NAAQS.”
16 {28} In re Prairie State Generating Co., 13 E.A.D. 1, 4-5 (Aug. 2006) (order denying review),
17 https://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/eab_web_docket.nsf/CAA~Decisions/7414685644289CEB8525
18 71D4006785E2/$File/Prairie%20State.pdf, involved a challenge to the EPA’s
19 environmental appeals board from a permit issued by the state of Illinois for a 1500-
20 megawatt pulverized coal-fuel powered electricity generating plant. Among many
15
1 other issues, the appellants challenged the use of SILs, arguing—as WildEarth does
2 here—that the Clean Air Act “does not use the term ‘significant’” and that it was
3 error to read the term into the statute. Id. at 100-01. Noting the EPA’s longtime use
4 of SILs, the Board rejected the argument, observing that “Read in context, the
5 requirement of an owner . . . to demonstrate that emissions from a proposed facility
6 will not ‘cause, or contribute to’ air pollution in excess of a NAAQS standard must
7 mean that some non-zero emission . . . is permissible, otherwise such a
8 demonstration could not be made.” Id. at 104; see also Blue Skies All. v. Tex.
9 Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 283 S.W.3d 525, 531 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting the
10 argument that there is no de minimis level for ozone and holding that an
11 interpretation of “cause or contribute to” that allows extremely low levels of ozone
12 precursors without legally violating the standard is “reasonable, consistent, and
13 strikes an appropriate balance between protecting air quality and encouraging
14 economic growth”).
15 {29} The New Mexico Air Quality Bureau published, Sufi Mustafa, et al., Air
16 Dispersion Modeling Guidelines (June 6, 2019) (NM Dispersion Guidelines),
17 https://www-archive.env.nm.gov/wp-
18 content/uploads/sites/2/2017/01/NM_AirDispersionModelingGuidelines_6June2019.pdf
19 in June 2016. The NM Dispersion Guidelines include SILs that it defines as
20 “thresholds below which the source is not considered to contribute to any predicted
16
1 exceedance of air quality standards.” NM Dispersion Guidelines, 2.4.1 at 17. If the
2 source contributes less than that level, the NM Dispersion Guidelines determine that
3 it does not “cause or contribute to” levels in excess of the NAAQS. Id. The ozone
4 SIL is 1.0 part per billion (ppb), which is equivalent to 1.96 milligrams per cubic
5 meters (µg/m3). NM Dispersion Guidelines, § 2.6.5 at 24.
6 {30} The SIL used in the NM Dispersion Guidelines is based on guidance from the
7 EPA on SILs for ozone. Id. (citing Memorandum from Peter Tsirigotis, Director,
8 U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, to Regional Air Division Directors, Regions 1-10 (April
9 17, 2018) (EPA SIL Guidelines), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2018-
10 04/documents/sils_guidance_2018.pdf).
11 {31} While we review an administrative agency’s legal conclusions for errors of
12 law, Rio Grande Chapter of the Sierra Club, 2003-NMSC-005, ¶ 17, we defer to the
13 Department’s interpretation of the Board’s rules unless that interpretation is plainly
14 erroneous or inconsistent. Morningstar Water Users Ass’n, 1995-NMSC-062, ¶ 11.
15 Interpreting the cause and contribute standard to include a SIL—though it is not in
16 the plain language of the regulation—is reasonable and consistent with the Board’s
17 guidelines and the EPA’s interpretation of the standard. See N.M. Real Estate
18 Comm’n v. Barger, 2012-NMCA-081, ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 1112 (“[W]here the language
19 of the legislative act is doubtful or an adherence to the literal use of words would
20 lead to injustice, absurdity or contradiction, the statute will be construed according
17
1 to its obvious spirit or reason, even though this requires the rejection of words or the
2 substitution of others.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
3 {32} Given these authorities, we conclude that the use of SILs in the administration
4 of the Air Quality Control Act and the Board’s identical regulatory language is
5 allowable and the Board did not commit a legal error in so holding. The issue then
6 becomes whether the Board used the SIL concept appropriately. We thus turn to the
7 specific circumstances of this case.
8 A. The 3 Bear Permit Was Not Improperly Granted
9 {33} WildEarth argues that even if using a SIL is permissible, the SIL was not used
10 appropriately when assessing the 3 Bear Permit. First, it argues the Department
11 failed to follow the EPA SIL Guidelines by not justifying why it was using the SIL.
12 Second, WildEarth argues that the Department erred when it automatically assumed
13 any ambient impact below the SIL did not “cause or contribute to” ozone NAAQS
14 exceedances. Third, it argues substantial evidence does not support the finding that
15 minor source emissions are necessarily below the SIL.
16 {34} We start by noting that the EPA SIL Guidelines are designed to be used as a
17 tool for assessing emissions from major sources in attainment areas. EPA SIL
18 Guidelines (memo). The 3 Bear Permit involves a minor source in a designated
19 attainment area. Permitting requirements are more stringent for major sources.
20 Further, the EPA SIL Guidelines are clear that they “are not final agency actions and
18
1 do not create any binding requirements on permitting authorities, permit applicants
2 or the public.” EPA SIL Guidelines (memo). The EPA SIL Guidelines’ suggestion
3 that “permitting authorities use their discretion to apply and justify the application
4 of the SIL values . . . on a case-by-case basis in the context of individual permitting
5 decisions,” id., attach. at 2, is not binding on this Court’s assessment of the 3 Bear
6 Permit.
7 {35} The Department did explain its decision to apply the EPA’s ozone
8 significance impact level to its minor source permitting process. The Department’s
9 witnesses explained the complexity and prohibitive cost of full scale modeling for
10 ozone creation, as well as the fact that such modeling is normally done on a regional
11 basis. The Department’s and Permittees’ expert witnesses also justified that
12 hypothetical ozone concentration levels from minor source emissions using the
13 EPA’s Modeled Emission Rates for Precursors (MERPs) tool demonstrated that they
14 would not exceed the 1.0 ppb SIL for ozone. This testimony is sufficient to support
15 the Department’s use of SILs.
16 {36} The more fundamental issue is whether the Department—or the Board—
17 improperly created and applied a presumption that no minor source could ever
18 potentially exceed the ozone SIL.
19 {37} As noted above, the Department’s witnesses explained why application of the
20 EPA’s ozone SIL was appropriate. But, no witnesses alluded to any formal—or
19
1 informal—internal procedure consciously adopted by the Department
2 memorializing the conclusion that minor sources cannot “cause or contribute to” a
3 violation of the ozone NAAQS. The testimony was only that there was a “general
4 awareness” on the part of the staff. It thus appears at best to be a rule of practice or
5 thumb within the Department. Nevertheless, the Board’s final order concluded as a
6 matter of law that
7 102. Pursuant to EPA guidance, NMED guidance, and the
8 Board’s permitting regulations at 20.2.72 and 20.2.74 NMAC, a permit
9 applicant for a minor source is not required to make an individual
10 demonstration of its impacts on ambient ozone concentrations.
11 103. Application of EPA modeling guidance establishes that
12 sources in Lea and Eddy County whose emissions of ozone precursor
13 pollutants are below 250 tpy will be below the [SIL] for ozone.
14 104. Because their impacts are below the SIL for ozone, minor
15 sources by definition do not “cause or contribute to” ozone
16 concentrations in excess of the NAAQS.
17 105. The Department does not have authority or discretion to
18 deny a permit or require offsets for an individual new or modified minor
19 source in a designated attainment area on the basis that the facility will
20 “cause or contribute” to ozone levels above the NAAQS.
21 {38} These conclusions of law create an apparent irrebuttable presumption that no
22 minor source of ozone precursor emissions can cause or contribute to a violation.
23 We determine that the Board erred because there is no substantial evidence
24 supporting its order in this regard and because they run against the grain of case law
25 addressing the proper use of SILs.
20
1 {39} First, we agree with WildEarth that the testimony provided by the
2 Department’s witnesses was too conclusory to support the Board’s conclusion of
3 law. The testimony from the Department’s witnesses concerning the complexity and
4 cost of full-scale modeling was sufficient to support the use of the SILs. But, the
5 witnesses did not provide any detail concerning the results or methodology of the
6 pro forma hypothetical modeling they relied on to assert that minor sources could
7 not cause or contribute to violations. When asked whether it is the “Department’s
8 position that a minor source will never be considered as contributing to an ozone
9 violation,” the Department’s witness Bisbey-Kuehn responded, “We don’t know the
10 answer to that question. The—there are—EPA has issued guidance on how to
11 estimate individual source impacts from major sources of air pollution. They have
12 not provided that guidance to any regulatory agency on how to estimate those
13 impacts from individual minor source facilities.” If the answer to the question is
14 unknown to the EPA and the Department, we fail to see how the Board could
15 conclude as a matter of law that minor sources “by definition” do not cause or
16 contribute to concentrations in excess of the NAAQS.
17 {40} It is even more problematic for the Board to conclude as a matter of law that
18 the Department “does not have authority or discretion to deny a permit . . . for an
19 individual new or modified minor source in a designated attainment area on the basis
20 that the facility will ‘cause or contribute’ to ozone levels above the NAAQS.” The
21
1 Department maintained at oral argument that this finding dealt only with the lack of
2 “discretion of the Department to apply nonattainment permitting requirements to
3 sources that are located in a designated attainment area.” If taken at face value,
4 however, as WildEarth argues, this decision would act as an exemption from
5 regulation and would allow the Department and permit applicants to stop
6 considering ozone minor source issues entirely.
7 {41} The ruling is reminiscent of the approach the EPA took to SILs in the first
8 iteration of the EPA SIL Guidelines. In Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection
9 Agency, 705 F.3d 458, 459-60 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the court construed an EPA
10 regulation establishing a SIL for particulate matter. As part of its regulation, the EPA
11 provided that a source that did not exceed the SIL at its locations would not be
12 “required to conduct more extensive air quality analysis or modeling to demonstrate
13 that its emissions, in combination with the emissions of other sources in the vicinity,
14 will not cause or contribute to a violation of the NAAQS at that location.” Id. at 461
15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As part of the litigation on appeal,
16 the EPA conceded that it had gone too far in creating an exemption from “certain
17 requirements under § 165 of the [Clean Air] Act.” Sierra Club, 705 F.3d at 459-60.
18 The court held that the EPA did not have authority to exempt a source from
19 regulation simply because the source’s emissions were below a predetermined level.
20 Id. at 466, 468.
22
1 {42} The Board’s ruling with regard to ozone minor source precursors has the same
2 effect and is improper for the same reason. We thus disapprove of and vacate
3 paragraphs 102, 103, 104, and 105 of the Board’s final order. We emphasize,
4 however, that this does not mean that minor source applications will be required to
5 do modeling equivalent to major sources. It does mean that the Department and
6 permit applicants will be required to perform at least pro forma or hypothetical
7 calculations using the MERPs tool and the Department’s own NM Dispersion
8 Guidelines or some other tool that similarly hypothesizes emissions. We note that
9 the Department’s expert Mustafa concluded that the Department had not performed
10 this otherwise routine analysis when it considered the 3 Bear Permit.
11 {43} The question remains whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s
12 finding that the 3 Bear Permit was properly issued. As WildEarth acknowledged at
13 oral argument, the NM Dispersion Guidelines do not require full-scale modeling
14 analysis for minor sources. NM Dispersion Guidelines, 2.1.2 at 10; 2.2 at 12; 2.6.5
15 at 24. However, not requiring modeling does not absolve the Department and 3 Bear
16 from demonstrating that the 3 Bear Permit’s emissions would be below the SIL.
17 {44} To demonstrate the 3 Bear Permit’s emissions are below the SIL for ozone,
18 the Board relied on the application of the Department’s MERPs tool. The
19 Department’s expert Mustafa testified that the MERPs “uses a complex
20 photochemical modeling of a hypothetical facility and applies the results to estimate
23
1 the impacts of emissions from a proposed facility.” The Board relied on testimony
2 from the Department’s expert Bisbey-Keuhn during her written rebuttal testimony
3 when she testified
4 MERP[s] are applied to facility emissions of NOx and VOCs as
5 multiplicative factors to estimate the facility ozone impacts. Because
6 ozone formation chemistry is highly sensitive to local atmospheric
7 conditions and concentrations of atmospheric species, these
8 multiplicative factors were produced by EPA for several “hypothetical
9 sources” modeled across the country. The multiplicative factors for the
10 three “hypothetical sources” closest to the facilities at issue in these
11 appeals require that over 250 [tpy] of NOx or VOCs be emitted from a
12 facility before the ozone impacts from the facility are considered to be
13 above the [SIL] for ozone. The permits at issue in these appeals are all
14 are minor sources; none of those facilities emit NOx or VOC[s] above
15 250 [tpy] each. Therefore, under the approach advocated by
16 [WildEarth’s expert witness], these sources cannot be considered to
17 significantly contribute to ozone concentrations.
18 This is also the evidence the Department referenced in oral arguments when it was
19 asked for evidence to support the Board’s finding.
20 {45} This testimony is not sufficient by itself to demonstrate that all minor source
21 emissions of ozone will be below the SIL. A minor source is measured in tons per
22 year, which demonstrates the amount of ozone precursor a facility will emit. The
23 SIL is measured in parts per billion, which demonstrates the increase in the
24 concentrations of pollutant in the ambient air. The Department fails to link the two
25 measurements other than through conclusory testimony. The Department also
26 presents no evidence of what the hypothetical sources are, their emission rates, or
27 what calculations were used to establish that all minor sources will lead to emission
24
1 rates below the SIL. In fact, the 3 Bear experts testified that “[u]sing the MERPs
2 guidance for all theoretical sources in the Continental United States, the minimum
3 level of NOx emissions with a significant impact is 125 tpy and the minimum level
4 of VOC[s] emissions with a significant impact is 1,039 tpy.” This testimony, in
5 contrast to the Department’s assertions, though similarly conclusory, demonstrates
6 that at least within the Continental United States, the MERPs modeling shows that
7 some minor sources of NOx—those between 125 tpy (the MERP measurement) and
8 250 tpy (the threshold for a major source)—may result in an increase in emissions
9 above the SIL. See Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. Mosaic Potash Carlsbad Inc., 2010-
10 NMCA-065, ¶ 28, 148 N.M. 516, 238 P.3d 885 (noting that for substantial evidence
11 whole record review, “favorable evidence is not viewed in a vacuum that disregards
12 contravening evidence”). We will not rely on the Department’s expert testimony that
13 all minor sources of ozone result in emissions below the SIL when the experts do
14 not—for lack of a better term—show their work. See Herman v. Miners’ Hosp.,
15 1991-NMSC-021, ¶ 6, 111 N.M. 550, 807 P.2d 734 (“To determine whether a
16 finding of fact is amply supported by the whole record, we do not rely solely on one
17 part of the evidence if to do so would be unreasonable. We must find evidence that
18 is credible in light of the whole record and that is sufficient for a reasonable mind to
19 accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached by the agency.” (internal
20 quotation marks and citation omitted)).
25
1 {46} However, 3 Bear’s experts did show their work by tying their measurements
2 to their conclusion through use of reported data. In their written rebuttal testimony,
3 the 3 Bear experts Bennett and Marquez used the hypothetical source in Terry
4 County, Texas, which was “most representative” of Lea and Eddy counties. They
5 explained that they considered using a hypothetical source in New Mexico but chose
6 not to because the source they used was closer to the Libby Plant and had a similar
7 elevation. Using this representative source in Terry County within the Permian
8 Basin, they used the MERPs calculation, and demonstrated that the estimated
9 impacts of the 3 Bear Permit were 5 percent of the SIL. Since the hypothetical
10 modeling demonstrates that the 3 Bear Permit’s ozone emissions are below the SIL,
11 substantial evidence demonstrates that the 3 Bear Permit will not cause or contribute
12 to an increase in the ozone NAAQS.
13 B. The Registrations Were Not Improperly Granted
14 {47} WildEarth asserts that the General Permit requires the Department to deny the
15 registrations if the construction will lead to an exceedance of the NAAQS. It argues
16 that since no evidence was presented regarding the Registrations’ emissions, it was
17 err to grant the Registrations.
18 {48} We reiterate that the General Permit is a general construction permit. The
19 General Permit, as a general construction permit, allows similar sources to register
20 under it in lieu of applying for a general construction permit so long as the Board
26
1 follows the regulatory scheme. See 20.2.72.220 NMAC. Registrations under the
2 General Permit must meet the requirements of the Air Quality Control Act and “not
3 cause or contribute to air containment levels in excess of any national or New
4 Mexico ambient air quality standard.” See 20.2.72.220(A)(2)(c)(i) NMAC. In order
5 to apply for a registration under the General Permit, the maximum possible emission
6 rates are 95 tpy of each NOx and VOCs. The General Permit states, “The
7 Department shall deny a [r]egistration [f]orm if: . . . [a]ny criteria listed in
8 20.2.72.208 NMAC is applicable.” It goes on to state, “The permittee shall comply
9 with all applicable sections of the requirements listed in Table 103,” and Table 103
10 includes the “20.2.72 NMAC Construction Permit.”
11 {49} Section B100 of the General Permit also states,
12 The Department has determined that all facilities registered under and
13 operating in accordance with this permit will meet all applicable
14 requirements under the federal Clean Air Act, the New Mexico Air
15 Quality Control Act, and Title 20, Chapter 2 NMAC, including 20.2.74
16 NMAC (Prevention of Significant Deterioration), 20.2.77 NMAC
17 (New Source Performance Standards), 20.2.78 (Emission Standards for
18 Hazardous Air Pollutants), 20.2.82 NMAC (Maximum Achievable
19 Control Technology Standards for Source Categories of Hazardous Air
20 Pollutants), and will not cause or contribute to air contaminant levels
21 in excess of any national or New Mexico ambient air quality standard.
22 (Emphasis added.)
23 {50} The language of the General Permit has two sections that can be read to be at
24 odds with each other. One requires compliance with the NAAQS, while the other
25 seems to establish as fact that any registration under the General Permit complies
27
1 with the NAAQS. The Department failed to include anything in the record proper or
2 make argument to this Court that addresses this seeming contradiction, explains what
3 was presented during the process to establish the factual assertions that were made
4 in the General Permit, or demonstrates the approval process for the General Permit.
5 As such, our review is inhibited. This is not to say that including this information
6 would make it possible for WildEarth or another party to challenge the General
7 Permit. See 20.2.72.220(C)(5) NMAC (“[A]dministrative review of a registration
8 for coverage under a general construction permit shall not extend to administrative
9 review of the general permit itself. Administrative review of the general construction
10 permit shall be available under Section 74-2-7[(H)-(L)] only upon issuance or
11 revision of the general permit as a permitting action.”). However, providing context
12 would have aided this Court in assessing the validity of WildEarth’s claims.
13 {51} But we digress. The evidence in the record demonstrates—and WildEarth
14 does not dispute—that the Registrations were for emissions of NOx and VOCs that
15 were 95 tpy or less. In the technical rebuttal testimony of Spur’s expert witness, the
16 expert explained and demonstrated that inputting the max NOx and VOCs rates
17 permitted under the General Permit—95 tpy—into the ozone concentration equation
18 increased the ambient air concentration 1.19 µg/m3, which is under the NM
19 Dispersion Guidelines’ 1.96 µg/m3 SIL for ozone. See NM Dispersion Guidelines,
20 2.65 at 24. Thus, evidence in the record demonstrates that the emissions of NOx and
28
1 VOCs from the Registrations provides a change in air quality below the SIL—and
2 do not cause or contribute to air contaminant levels in excess of the NAAQS, as we
3 determined above. Such evidence also contradicts WildEarth’s assertion that no
4 evidence in the record addresses the General Permit’s 20.2.72.208(D) NMAC
5 requirements. Based on that, we need not address any conflict within the General
6 Permit in reference to compliance with the NAAQS.
7 V. The Registrations Are Not Located in a Nonattainment Area
8 {52} WildEarth’s final argument is that the General Permit does not allow
9 registrations for facilities located in areas of nonattainment. The parties agree that
10 monitor readings at the time reflected ozone levels exceeding the NAAQS.
11 WildEarth argues that these reflect that the area is in “actual” nonattainment and thus
12 the Registrations were improperly approved. The Department argues that the
13 regulatory definition of nonattainment used in the General Permit is at odds with the
14 statutory definition of nonattainment and cannot be enforced. They also argue that
15 “nonattainment” is a formal designation made by the EPA that can only be changed
16 by the EPA. We agree with the Department and the Permittees.
17 {53} The General Permit states that a registration shall be denied if “[t]he Facility
18 is located in a nonattainment area [defined by 20.2.72.216 and 20.2.79 NMAC
19 (6/3/2011)].” A nonattainment area as defined by 20.2.79.7(AA) NMAC (6/3/2011)
20 “means, for any air pollutant an area which is shown by monitored data or which is
29
1 calculated by air quality modeling (or other methods determined by the administrator
2 to be reliable) to exceed any [NAAQS] for such pollutant. Such term includes any
3 areas identified under Subparagraphs (A) through (C) of § 107(d)(1) of the . . . Clean
4 Air Act.” We note that this definition of nonattainment is consistent with the Clean
5 Air Act’s definition of nonattainment before the Clean Air Act underwent significant
6 amendments in 1990. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,
7 § 171(2), 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7501). We cannot simply
8 apply the plain language of the regulation, however, without addressing more recent
9 amendments to the federal and state statutory scheme. See Martinez v. Cornejo,
10 2009-NMCA-011, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 223, 208 P.3d 443 (recognizing that our courts
11 may depart from the plain meaning rule to avoid a formalistic and mechanical
12 statutory construction that would be absurd, unreasonable, or contrary to the spirit
13 of the statute).
14 {54} As we noted above, once a NAAQS designation is made, the EPA designates
15 an area as “attainment” or “nonattainment.” § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). Once an area is
16 designated as “nonattainment” for ozone, it is designated as marginal, moderate,
17 serious, severe, or extreme. § 7511(a)-(c). The Air Quality Control Act defines
18 nonattainment as “an area that is designated ‘nonattainment’ with respect to that
19 contaminant within the meaning of Section 107(d) of the federal act.” Section 74-2-
20 2(N). Further, Section 74-2-5(C)(1)(a) requires that the rules for the prevention of
30
1 significant deterioration of air quality and to achieve NAAQS in nonattainment areas
2 be “no more stringent than but at least as stringent as required by the federal act and
3 federal regulations.”
4 {55} Reading the Clean Air Act together with the Air Quality Control Act, it is
5 evident that designating an area as attainment or nonattainment is a formal
6 designation process implemented by the EPA. See High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture
7 v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599 (noting
8 that when “several sections of a statute are involved, they must be read together so
9 that all parts are given effect”). It is also apparent that the Legislature intended to
10 follow the EPA’s designation process. Thus, any reference in the Board’s regulation
11 at 20.2.79.7(AA) NMAC (6/3/2011) to nonattainment being defined by monitored
12 data is inconsistent with the federal statute. Pickett Ranch, LLC v. Curry, 2006-
13 NMCA-082, ¶ 10, 140 N.M. 49, 139 P.3d 209 (“Where a statute and a regulation are
14 inconsistent, the statute will prevail.”); N.M. Bd. of Pharmacy v. N.M. Bd. of
15 Osteopathic Med. Exam’rs, 1981-NMCA-034, ¶ 8, 95 N.M. 780, 626 P.2d 854 (“An
16 administrative agency has no power to create a rule or regulation that is not in
17 harmony with its statutory authority.”).
18 {56} WildEarth argues that the Board’s regulations take into account that the
19 regulatory nonattainment definition is broader than the statutory definition of
20 nonattainment because the permitting requirements do not use the broader
31
1 nonattainment definition, so “applying the [Board]’s expansive regulatory definition
2 does not result in any substantive outcome inconsistent with statutory requirements.”
3 In doing so, WildEarth acknowledges that the regulatory definition of nonattainment
4 is broader than the statutory definition. However, it argues that because the
5 regulatory definition is not used in the major source permitting process that directly
6 references federal law, we can simply ignore the Board’s exertion of power it does
7 not have. This we cannot do. See N.M. Bd. of Pharmacy, 1981-NMCA-034, ¶ 8. As
8 the Board had no authority to define nonattainment more broadly than the statute’s
9 definition, it had no authority to enforce the General Permit’s requirement that a
10 registration not be permitted in an area that is “shown by monitored data or which is
11 calculated by air quality modeling . . . to exceed any [NAAQS].” See 20.2.79.7(AA)
12 NMAC (6/3/2011).
13 {57} WildEarth argues that the Board’s failure to follow the plain language of the
14 nonattainment definition in 20.2.79.7(AA) NMAC (6/3/2011), amended the General
15 Permit without following the proper administrative procedure. WildEarth also
16 argues that it is not challenging the regulatory definition or its application, but the
17 Board’s approval of specific registrations in an area where, by the terms of the
18 General permit, such permits are unavailable. Both of these arguments are undercut
19 by the fact that, as we determined above, the Board did not have authority to enforce
20 such a definition. See N.M. Bd. of Pharmacy, 1981-NMCA-034, ¶ 8.
32
1 CONCLUSION
2 {58} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board’s approval of the 3 Bear Permit
3 and the Registrations. We disapprove of paragraphs 102-105 of the Board’s final
4 order and remand the matter with instructions that they be redacted from the order.
5 {59} IT IS SO ORDERED.
6 __________________________________
7 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge,
8 retired, Sitting by designation
9 WE CONCUR:
10 _____________________________
11 MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge
12 _____________________________
13 KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge
33