Martinez v. State of Nevada ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 8 * * * 9 DAVID MARTINEZ, Case No. 2:18-cv-01180-RFB-GWF 10 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER 11 v. 12 STATE OF NEVADA, 13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff, who is a prisoner in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections 16 (“NDOC”), has submitted a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has 17 filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1, 1-1). Plaintiff also has filed 18 a motion to compel the production of documents. (ECF No. 4). The Court now screens 19 Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and denies as moot the 20 motion to compel and the application to proceed in forma pauperis. 21 I. SCREENING STANDARD 22 Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 23 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 24 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 25 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 26 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 27 from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be 28 liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 1 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 2 (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and 3 (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. 4 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 5 In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, pursuant to the Prison 6 Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a federal court must dismiss a prisoner’s claim if “the 7 allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 8 claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 9 is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure 10 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil 11 Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under § 1915 when 12 reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a court 13 dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the 14 complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of 15 the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United 16 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 17 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See 18 Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure 19 to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in 20 support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 21 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the court takes as true all 22 allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the court construes them in the 23 light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th 24 Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than 25 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While 26 the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff 27 must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 28 / / / 1 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is 2 insufficient. Id. 3 Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] 4 that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption 5 of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can 6 provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” 7 Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity 8 and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. 9 “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context- 10 specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 11 common sense.” Id. 12 Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by a prisoner may therefore be dismissed 13 sua sponte if the prisoner’s claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This 14 includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against 15 defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which 16 clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., 17 fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); 18 see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 19 II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT 20 In the complaint, Plaintiff sues multiple defendants for events that took place while 21 he was incarcerated by the NDOC. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1). He sues the State of Nevada, 22 the Nevada Department of Corrections, the Offender Management Division, Warden 23 Brian Williams, and James Dzurenda. (Id. at 1-3). Plaintiff alleges two counts and seeks 24 monetary damages. (Id. at 5, 9). 25 Plaintiff’s two counts are based on two different convictions and sentences. (Id. at 26 4-5). For each sentence, Plaintiff alleges that the Nevada Department of Corrections did 27 not apply NRS § 209.4465(7)(b) to his minimum term. (Id.) That statute concerns the 28 application of statutory credits to determine the date when a person becomes eligible for 1 parole. Plaintiff alleges that the failure to apply NRS § 209.4465(7)(b) to his sentences 2 forced him to stay in prison longer. (Id.) He alleges that this violated his rights to due 3 process and equal protection in violation of NRS § 209.4465(7)(b). (Id.) 4 A. Heck Bar And Parole 5 As an initial matter, the Court must determine if Plaintiff’s claim is barred by Heck 6 v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that “in order to 7 recover damages for [an] allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for 8 other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 9 invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed 10 on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal 11 authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s 12 issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486-87. “A claim for 13 damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been . . . 14 invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 487. Thus, when a state prisoner 15 seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in 16 favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of the duration of his 17 confinement; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can 18 demonstrate that the period of confinement has already been invalidated. Id. 19 Accordingly, a prisoner usually may not use § 1983 to challenge the duration of 20 confinement by seeking a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a 21 speedier release from imprisonment. Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 841 (9th Cir. 22 2013). 23 A Plaintiff may only assert a Section 1983 due process claim (rather than a habeas 24 claim) in the parole context in very limited circumstances. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 25 74, 81-82 (2005) (explaining that a prisoner may challenge procedures used in parole 26 hearing under § 1983 provided he does not seek "immediate or speedier release" and 27 does not seek to invalidate the basis or duration of his confinement); see also Swarthout 28 v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011) (noting that a federal due process claim in parole 1 context requires only that prisoner be provided with an opportunity to be heard and a 2 statement of the reasons why parole was denied). 3 In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff is clearly challenging the duration of his 4 confinement. In both counts he alleges due process (and equal protection)1 claims arising 5 from the misapplication of Nevada statutes which led to him having to “stay in prison 6 longer.” He seeks monetary damages—and not prospective or injunctive relief—based 7 upon the “hardship” of the alleged improper extension of his period of confinement. 8 Plaintiff’s claims therefore clearly implicate the length of his confinement and success on 9 his claims would directly undermine the validity of the duration of his confinement. 10 Plaintiff’s prior conviction(s), which served as the basis for his confinement, have not been 11 overturned or invalidated. 12 13 III. CONCLUSION 14 For the foregoing reasons, 15 IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file the complaint (ECF No. 1-1) 16 and send Plaintiff a courtesy copy of the complaint. 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts I and II are barred under Heck and 18 dismissed. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 20 No. 1) is denied as moot. 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to compel (ECF No. 4) is denied as 22 moot. 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 27 28 1 Plaintiff alleges no basis for an equal protection claim. 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 3 4 DATED: August 13, 2019. 6 RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -6-