Hampton v. Spring Mountain Treatment Center ( 2019 )

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * * 4 SHIRLEY HAMPTON, Case No.: 2:19-cv-01385-JAD-EJY 5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v. 7 SPRING MOUNTAIN TREATMENT CENTER et al., 8 Defendants. 9 10 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Shirley Hampton’s Application to Proceed In Forma 11 Pauperis (ECF No. 2), attached to which was a Complaint for Employment Discrimination (ECF 12 No. 2-1) pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 13 2000e-17, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), as codified, 29 14 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634. 15 I. In Forma Pauperis Application 16 Plaintiff submitted the declaration required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing an inability to 17 prepay fees and costs or give security for them. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma 18 pauperis will be granted. 19 II. Screening the Complaint 20 Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint 21 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims 22 and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, file to state a claim on which relief may be granted, 23 or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 24 Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard for failure to state 25 a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 26 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, 27 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 1 “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 2 would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 3 556 U.S. at 678). 4 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of material 5 fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler Summit P’ship 6 v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although the 7 standard under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual 8 allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 9 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is 10 insufficient. Id. Unless it is clear the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through 11 amendment, a pro se plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding 12 the complaint’s deficiencies. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 13 III. Federal Question Jurisdiction 14 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that power authorized by 15 the Constitution and statute. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 16 1331, federal courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 17 laws, or treaties of the United States.” Cases “arise under” federal law either when federal law 18 creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turns on 19 the construction of federal law. Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 20 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether federal-question jurisdiction exists is based on the “well-pleaded complaint 21 rule,” which provides that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on 22 the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 23 392 (1987). 24 Plaintiff’s complaint asserts employment discrimination and retaliation claims under Title 25 VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. See 26 ECF No. 2-1 at 4. Claims under both statutes invoke the Court’s federal jurisdiction. 27 1 IV. Plaintiff’s Claims 2 Having determined that federal-question jurisdiction exists under the well-pleaded complaint 3 rule, the Court now turns to the sufficiency of the factual allegations to state a claim. Plaintiff brings 4 claims for racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See 5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Title VII allows persons to sue an employer for discrimination on the 6 basis of race, color, religion, gender or national origin if he or she has exhausted state or federal 7 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) administrative procedures. If the EEOC 8 decides not to sue, and if there is no settlement that is satisfactory to plaintiff, the EEOC will issue 9 plaintiff a right-to-sue letter and plaintiff will have exhausted his remedies with the EEOC. 42 10 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Here, Plaintiff attached a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC to her complaint. 11 ECF No. 2-1 at 9. Thus, it appears Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies. 12 Within 90 days of receipt of the dismissal and right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, an 13 individual may file a lawsuit against the respondent under federal law based on Title VII in federal 14 or state court. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e)(1). On May 15, 2019, the U.S. Equal Employment 15 Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued a Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue letter to Plaintiff. 16 ECF No. 2-1 at 9. Plaintiff received the right to sue letter on May 18, 2019, and subsequently filed 17 the instant action on August 12, 2019. Id. at 6. Therefore, Plaintiff’s employment discrimination 18 complaint pursuant to Title VII is timely. 19 Upon 60 days of filing a charge with the EEOC, but no later than 90 days after one receives 20 notice that the EEOC’s investigation is concluded, one may file a lawsuit in court pursuant to ADEA. 21 Plaintiff noted that 60 days or more have elapsed since filing her charge of age discrimination with 22 the EEOC regarding the defendants’ alleged discriminatory conduct. ECF No. 2-1 at 6. For the 23 reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s employment discrimination complaint pursuant to ADEA is timely. 24 To sufficiently allege a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title VII to survive 25 a § 1915 screening, Plaintiff must allege: (1) she belonged to a protected class; (2) she was qualified 26 for her job; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated 27 employees not in her protected class received more favorable treatment. See Shepard v. Marathon 1 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2006)). In screening Plaintiff’s complaint and construing it liberally, the 2 Court looks in part to the attachments provided. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th 3 Cir. 2007) (courts may generally consider allegations contained in pleadings, as well as exhibits 4 attached to the complaint). 5 As stated above, Plaintiff Shirley Hampton’s in forma pauperis application was accompanied 6 by a complaint for employment discrimination, which appears to allege race, religion, and age 7 discrimination against Defendants Spring Mountain Treatment Center, Universal Health Services, 8 “Case Manager Supervisor Kelsey,” “Case Manager Diana,” “Case Manager Shavonne,” “Ronneka, 9 RN,” “Patina,” “James, RN,” “Case Manager Shannon,” and “Case Manager Sarah.” See ECF No. 10 2-1 at 1–3. 11 There is no individual liability for discrimination or harassment under federal or Nevada state 12 law. Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern. Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding individual defendants 13 cannot be liable for damages under Title VII and ADEA); see also U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Entm’t, 14 2006 WL 1168840, *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 25, 2006) (“[T]he court sees no meaningful distinction between 15 Title VII and Nevada’s statutory scheme in relation to the reasoning used in Miller. Therefore, it 16 appears to this court that the Nevada Supreme Court would find that there is no liability for an 17 individual pursuant to [Nevada’s anti-discrimination statutes].”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims 18 against “Case Manager Supervisor Kelsey,” “Case Manager Diana,” “Case Manager Shavonne,” 19 “Ronneka, RN,” “Patina,” “James, RN,” “Case Manager Shannon,” and “Case Manager Sarah” fail 20 to state claims upon which relief may be granted. 21 Plaintiff states that, to the best of her recollection, the alleged discriminatory acts occurred 22 on May 18, 2018 through June 1, 2018. See ECF No. 2-1 at 5. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants: 23 [A]llowed a younger white female . . . to complete her 90 day probationary period and terminated plaintiff’s probationary period before 30 days or before the 90 day 24 probationary period. Defendants retaliatted [sic] against plainiff’s [sic] when she reported acts of discrimination & sexual harassment by aborting her employment 25 and terminating her. Defendants all created extremely hostile work environment for plaintiff. 26 Id. at 6. 27 1 The Court finds Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim fails to sufficiently allege facts upon 2 which relief may be granted pursuant to the standards established in Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. That is, 3 Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of 4 misconduct.” Id. Further, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 5 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 6 alleged.” Id. at 678. Plaintiff has not alleged to what protected class she belonged and, therefore, 7 has not alleged that similarly situated employees not in her protected class received more favorable 8 treatment. The Court will therefore dismiss Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim with leave to 9 amend. 10 The Court finds Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim fails to sufficiently allege facts 11 upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the standards established in Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697. 12 Plaintiff checked a box on her complaint indicating that Defendants discriminated against her based 13 on her religion (ECF No. 2-1 at 5). Notwithstanding, Plaintiff offered no facts to support her 14 religious discrimination claim. Plaintiff has failed to properly plead a claim for religious 15 discrimination, but the Court cannot conclude that she could never properly plead this claim. The 16 Court will therefore dismiss Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim with leave to amend. 17 To sufficiently allege a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of Title VII to survive a § 18 1915 screening, Plaintiff must allege: (1) that he or she committed a protected act, such as 19 complaining about discriminatory practices; (2) that the employee suffered some sort of adverse 20 employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the employee’s action and the adverse act. 21 See Jenkins v. Lab. Corp. Of Am., 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 118008, *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 2013) (citing 22 Davis v. Team Elec Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2008)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that she 23 complained of discriminatory treatment, that her employment was thereafter terminated, and that the 24 termination was retaliation for engaging in protected activity. See ECF No. 1-1 at 3–4. Plaintiff has, 25 therefore, stated a retaliation claim against her employer. 26 To sufficiently allege a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of ADEA to survive 27 a § 1915 screening, Plaintiff must show that (1) she is at least 40 years of age; (2) she was performing 1 with equal or inferior qualifications or discharged under circumstances that give rise to an inference 2 of age discrimination. Guinn v. Yellow Checker Star, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00344-APG-GWF, 2015 3 WL 4092080, *3 (D. Nev. July 7, 2015). Plaintiff states that she was born in 1960, and therefore, 4 she is at least 40 years of age. ECF No. 2-1 at 5. As noted above, the Plaintiff does not discuss her 5 own job performance. Id. Further, Plaintiff does allege that she was fired, but does not make clear 6 whether a younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications replaced her, or if Defendants 7 simply allowed the replacing party to complete her 90 day probationary period. Id. at 6. Plaintiff 8 has failed to properly plead a claim for age discrimination, but the Court cannot conclude that she 9 could never properly plead this claim. The Court will therefore dismiss Plaintiff’s age discrimination 10 claim with leave to amend. 11 Hence, construing Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, she has failed to state a claim for race, 12 religious, or age discrimination. The Court therefore will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint without 13 prejudice for the Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. 14 Accordingly, 15 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma 16 Pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. Plaintiff will not be required to pay the filing fee in this action. 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is permitted to maintain this action to conclusion 18 without the necessity of prepayment of any additional fees or costs or the giving of a security for 19 fees or costs. This Order granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis does not extend to the issuance 20 of subpoenas at government expense. 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed without prejudice with 22 leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint 23 correcting the noted deficiencies. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, the document 24 must be titled “Amended Complaint.” The amended complaint must contain a short and plain 25 statement of the grounds for the Court’s jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). Additionally, the 26 amended complaint must contain a short and plain statement describing the underlying case and 27 Defendants’ conduct that constitutes discrimination. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the 1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading standard, Plaintiff still must give the 2 Defendants fair notice of the Plaintiff’s claims against them and Plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. 3 Additionally, Plaintiff is advised that if she files an amended complaint, the original 4 complaint (ECF No. 2-1) no longer serves any function in this case. As such, the amended complaint 5 must be complete in and of itself without reference to prior pleadings or other documents. The Court 6 cannot refer to a prior pleading or other documents to make Plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. 7 If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff must file the amended complaint within 8 30 days from the date of this Order. Failure to comply with this Order may result in a 9 recommendation that this action be dismissed. 10 11 DATED THIS 19th day of August, 2019. 12 13 14 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27