Hill v. Williams ( 2021 )

2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 Rickie Hill, Case No. 2:21-cv-01878-GMN-NJK 7 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER v. 8 D. Williams, 9 Defendant. 10 11 Plaintiff Rickie Hill, who is incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada Department 12 of Corrections (“NDOC”), has submitted a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 13 and filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF Nos. 1, 1-1). The matter of the 14 filing fee will be temporarily deferred. The Court now screens Hill’s civil-rights complaint 15 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 16 I. SCREENING STANDARD 17 Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which an 18 incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of 19 a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify 20 any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a 21 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 22 immune from such relief. See id. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must 23 be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 24 1990). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 25 elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 26 States; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color 27 of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 28 /// 2 Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a federal court must dismiss an incarcerated person’s 3 claim if “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails 4 to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a 5 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a 6 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court applies the same standard under 8 § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a 9 court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend 10 the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face 11 of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. 12 United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 13 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See 14 Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to 15 state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in 16 support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 17 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the Court takes as true all 18 allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the Court construes them in the 19 light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th 20 Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than 21 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While 22 the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff 23 must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 24 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is 25 insufficient. See id. 26 Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] 27 that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption 28 of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide 2 there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 3 determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining 4 whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that 5 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 6 Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by an incarcerated person may be dismissed 7 sua sponte if that person’s claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This 8 includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against 9 defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which 10 clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., 11 fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989); 12 see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 13 II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT 14 In his Complaint, Hill sues a single Defendant for events that took place while he 15 was incarcerated at High Desert State Prison. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1–2). Hill sues Defendant 16 D. Williams. (Id. at 2). Williams is sued in his official and individual capacities. (Id.) Hill 17 brings one claim and seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (Id. at 4, 9). 18 Plaintiff alleges the following. At 1:20 p.m. on July 1, 2020, correctional officer 19 Williams approached Hill’s cell with his mail and threatened to give it to another prisoner 20 unless Hill let Williams perform fellatio on him. (Id. at 4). Williams also threatened to make 21 sure that hill did not get fed unless he complied. (Id.) Hill unwillingly complied because he 22 did not want to go hungry and feared that another prisoner would get his family members’ 23 home addresses and threaten their safety. (Id.) Hill has had weekly nightmares because 24 of the incident. (Id.) Hill tried to file grievances about this incident but was denied. (Id.) Hill 25 sought counseling and medical attention for this incident but was denied. (Id.) The Court 26 construes these allegations as asserting a claim under the Eighth Amendment for sexual 27 assault, abuse, or harassment. 28 2 “The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment in penal 3 institutions.” Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). Whether a specific 4 act constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is measured by “the evolving standards of 5 decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 8 (1992). “Sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer is a violation 7 of the Eighth Amendment.” Wood, 692 F.3d at 1046 (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 8 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000)). In evaluating a prisoner’s claim, courts consider whether “the 9 officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind” and if the alleged wrongdoing 10 was objectively “harmful enough” to establish a constitutional violation. Id. (quoting 11 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8). 12 Where there is no legitimate penological purpose for a prison official’s conduct, 13 courts presume malicious and sadistic intent. Id. at 1050. Sexual contact between a 14 prisoner and a prison guard serves no legitimate role and “is simply not ‘part of the penalty 15 that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. 16 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). In sexual contact cases, there is no lasting physical 17 injury requirement because the only requirement is that the officer’s actions be offensive 18 to human dignity. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1196. But the Eighth Amendment’s protections 19 do not generally extend to mere verbal sexual harassment. Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 20 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). A “prisoner presents a viable Eighth Amendment claim where 21 he or she proves that a prison staff member, acting under color of law and without 22 legitimate penological justification, touched the prisoner in a sexual manner or otherwise 23 engaged in sexual conduct for the staff member’s own sexual gratification, or for the 24 purpose of humiliating, degrading, or demeaning the prisoner.” Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 25 F.3d 1130, 1144 (9th Cir. 2020). 26 Hill alleges that Williams threatened to withhold food and his mail and give his mail 27 to other prisoners—thereby giving other prisoners his family members’ addresses—if Hill 28 did not let Williams perform fellatio on him. Hill unwillingly complied because he did not 2 these allegations are sufficiently harmful to state a colorable claim for sexual assault, 3 abuse, or harassment under the Eighth Amendment for screening purposes. So Claim 1, 4 Eighth Amendment sexual abuse, assault, or harassment against Williams can proceed. 5 But the Court notes that Hill’s allegations appear to describe fantastical or 6 delusional scenarios and this case might be malicious. The Court does not make this 7 statement lightly; sexual assault, abuse, and harassment of prisoners is abhorrent. And 8 court intervention is often needed to protect the prisoners who are subject to such abuse. 9 But the Court has presided over several of Hill’s cases against NDOC employees, and it 10 is aware that Hill has alleged a fact pattern like this before, swapping only the date and 11 targets of the claim.1 So the Court cautions Hill that it is authorized under 28 U.S.C. 12 § 1915(d)(2)(B)(i) to dismiss a case if at any time it determines that the case is “frivolous 13 or malicious,” and that such a finding will count as a “strike” against Hill under the Prison 14 Litigation Reform Act.2 15 B. This case will not be referred to the Inmate Early Mediation Program 16 Unique to the District of Nevada is the Inmate Early Mediation Program, which is 17 designed to attempt to save resources by referring the parties in some prisoner civil-rights 18 cases to mediation. Of course, defendants in such cases have the right not to make any 19 settlement offers, and plaintiffs have the right not to accept settlement offers. And the 20 court may choose not to refer a case to mediation to preserve limited judicial resources. 21 Hill, who has filed many cases against employees of the NDOC, recently attended 22 multiple inmate mediations with representatives of the Office of the Attorney General.3 23 Hill also has at least one more mediation scheduled with a representative of the Office of 24 25 1 See, e.g., Hill v. J. Pope, Case No. 2:21-cv-01371-APG-EJY, ECF No. 1-1 (D. 26 Nev. July 21, 2021); Hill v. Array, Case No. 2:21-cv-01677-APG-BNW, ECF No. 1-1 (D. Nev. Sept. 13, 2021); Hill v. M. Stewart, Case No. 2:21-cv-01760-JAD-EJY (D. Nev. Sept. 27 23, 2021). 2 See Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (defining frivolous and 28 malicious cases). 3 See, e.g., 3:20-cv-00495-MMD-WGC; 2:20-cv-01655-KJD-DJA; 2:20-cv-01659- 2 limited resources, and the fact that these parties have already engaged in numerous 3 mediation sessions, the Court has determined that it would not be a productive use of the 4 court’s resources to set this case for a mediation session. 5 The Court, however, will stay this case for 60 days so that the parties can engage 6 in settlement discussions before the $350.00 filing fee is paid, an answer is filed, or the 7 discovery process begins. During these 60 days, the parties are free to discuss settling 8 this case privately or during a currently scheduled mediation session, but they are not 9 required to do so. If the parties have not reached a settlement within 60 days, the Court 10 will assess the filing fee and put this case on a standard litigation track. 11 III. CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, it is therefore ordered that a decision on the application 13 to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) is deferred. 14 It is further ordered that the Clerk of the Court shall file the complaint (ECF No. 1- 15 1) and send Hill a courtesy copy. 16 It is further ordered that Claim 1, Eighth Amendment sexual assault, abuse, or 17 harassment, may proceed against Defendant D. Williams. 18 It is further ordered that this case is not referred to the Inmate Early Mediation 19 Program. 20 It is further ordered that, given the nature of the claim that the Court has permitted 21 to proceed, this case is stayed for 60 days to allow the parties an opportunity to settle 22 their dispute before the $350.00 filing fee is paid, an answer is filed, or the discovery 23 process begins. 24 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 4 See 2:20-cv-01745-KJD-BNW, at ECF No. 12 (scheduling mediation for January 2 order and the complaint (ECF No. 1-1) on the Office of the Attorney General of the State 3 of Nevada, by adding the Attorney General of the State of Nevada to the docket sheet. 4 This does not indicate acceptance of service. 5 It is further ordered that if this case is not settled in 60 days, the court will assess 6 the filing fee and place this case on a standard litigation track. 7 8 DATED THIS 27 day of December 2021. 9 10 ___ GLORIA M. NAVARRO 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28