Shahrokhi v. Boutos ( 2024 )

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Ali Shahrokhi, Case No. 2:23-cv-00671-CDS-DJA 5 Plaintiff Omnibus Order Resolving Pending Motions 6 v. 7 Nicholas B. Boutos, et al., [ECF Nos. 23, 29, 30, 39, 47, 57, 61, 62, 69, 72] 8 Defendants 9 10 This is a § 1983 action brought by pro se plaintiff Ali Shahrokhi, his eleventh action1 in 11 this court related to his ongoing dispute with two cases in the Family Division of the Eighth 12 Judicial District Court. Here, unlike Shahrokhi’s prior issues where he challenged the judicial 13 officers or the paternity determination or child support order, these claims arise out of his arrest 14 for failing to pay child support. Defendants Kenneth Bourne, Nicholas B. Boutos, Clark County, 15 Nevada, Karen S. Cliffe, and Elizabeth Inskeep move to dismiss the second amended complaint 16 for failing to state a claim. ECF No. 62. Also pending before the court are several other motions 17 and requests for judicial notice. ECF Nos. 23, 29, 30, 39, 47, 57, 61, 62, 69, 72. Because I am 18 dismissing the second amended complaint, I deny all other motions and requests for judicial 19 notice as moot. 20 I. Legal standard 21 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court must dismiss a complaint if it 22 fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In considering a 23 motion to dismiss, “all well-pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed 24 1 District Judge Jennifer Dorsey declared Shahrokhi a vexatious litigant on July 18, 2022. See 2:22-cv- 25 00001-JAD-VCF at ECF No. 21. That order remains active. His other filings include: Shahrokhi v. Hardesty, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-02251-RFB-VCF; Shahrokhi v. Harter, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-01126-RFB-NJK; Shahrokhi 26 v. Harter, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-00557-APG-BNW; Phillips, et al. v. Ochoa, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-00483- APG-NJK; Phillips, et al. v. Truby, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-00358-KJD-EJY; Shahrokhi v. Tao, et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-02346-GMN-VCF; Phillips, et al. v. Duckworth, et al., 2:20-cv-02345-RFB-NJK; Shahrokhi v. Harter, et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-01623-JAD-NJK; Shahrokhi v. Harter, et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-01019-APG-VCF. 1 in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Wyler Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 2 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). However, legal conclusions are not awarded this same 3 presumption just because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 4 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A plaintiff must make sufficient factual allegations to establish a 5 plausible entitlement to relief. Id. at 556. And if the court grants a motion to dismiss, the court 6 should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend is made unless it determines that the 7 pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 8 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 9 If the court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should 10 be granted unless the deficiencies of the complaint clearly cannot be cured by amendment. 11 DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). Under Federal Rule of Civil 12 Procedure (FRCP) 15(a), a court should “freely” give leave to amend “when justice so requires,” 13 and in the absence of a reason such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive of the part of 14 the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue 15 prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the 16 amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 17 At the motion to dismiss stage, the court only considers the well-pleaded allegations in 18 the plaintiff’s complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Typically, when a party submits evidence 19 outside the pleadings in a motion to dismiss, the court converts the motion to a motion for 20 summary judgment and imposes FRCP 56’s standard. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 21 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). However, there are exceptions to the conversion rule, one of which 22 being that the court can consider matters of public record or materials properly submitted as 23 part of the complaint for judicial notice. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). 24 II. Relevant procedural history 25 Shahrokhi initiated this action in April of 2023. ECF No. 1. Six days later, Shahrokhi filed 26 a first amended complaint (FAC). ECF No. 7. Shahrokhi alleged violations of the 4th, 8th, and 1 14th Amendments, and related state claims, as well as a conspiracy and Monell violations against 2 defendants Nicholas B. Boutos (in his personal capacity), Kenneth Bourne (in his personal 3 capacity), Elizabeth Inskeep (in her personal capacity), and Karen S. Cliffe (in her personal 4 capacity).2 Id. at 2. All defendants work for the Clark County District Attorney’s Office, Family 5 Support Division. Id. at 4–5. Boutos and Bourne are identified as investigators. Id. at 4. Inskeep 6 works as a case manager in the same office. Id. at 5. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 7 amended complaint (ECF No. 23), which Shahrokhi opposed (ECF No. 27). 8 On August 14, 2023, Shahrokhi filed both a motion for partial summary judgment (ECF 9 No. 29) and a motion to strike Exhibit B that was attached to the defendants’ motion to dismiss 10 (ECF No. 30). Defendants opposed both motions. ECF Nos. 32, 35. On October 5, 2023, 11 defendants filed a motion to strike Shahrokhi’s reply to his partial summary judgment motion 12 for violating the local rules. See ECF No. 47. Shahrokhi filed an opposition to the motion. ECF 13 No. 51. 14 On September 22, 2023, defendants filed a motion to stay discovery. ECF No. 42. 15 Shahrokhi opposed the motion on September 27, 2023. ECF No. 45. On October 18, 2023, 16 Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Albregts issued a minute order directing defendants to file 17 supplemental briefing by October 27, 2023, regarding the motion to stay as neither party 18 addressed the “good cause” test employed by the court in resolving motions to stay. See Min. 19 Order, ECF No. 50. Defendants complied with Judge Albregts’ order and filed a supplement on 20 October 26, 2023. ECF No. 53. Shahrokhi filed a timely3 response to the supplemental brief on 21 November 2, 2023. ECF No. 55. However, without leave of court, on November 6, 2023, 22 Shahrokhi filed a motion to strike the exhibits attached to defendants’ supplemental briefing. 23 24 2 The original complaint and first amended complaint named two additional defendants: Jimmy L. Nguyen and the Clark County District Attorney’s Family Support Division. ECF Nos. 1-1, 7. They were 25 not named in the second amended complaint and were therefore dismissed from this action. ECF No. 59; see Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 565–66 (9th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, 26 Shahrokhi’s motion to dismiss defendant Nguyen (ECF No. 39) is denied as moot. 3 Judge Albregts ordered that Shahrokhi’s response to the supplemental briefing must be filed on or before November 3, 2023. See ECF No. 50. 1 ECF No. 57. The motion failed to address why the request to strike was not incorporated in 2 Shahrokhi’s response to the motion, nor did it set forth good cause for Shahrokhi’s failure to 3 timely file it. On November 8, 2023, Judge Albregts granted defendants’ motion to stay 4 discovery. See ECF No. 58.4 5 In the same order on November 8, 2023, Judge Albregts also granted Shahrokhi’s motion 6 for leave to amend the complaint. ECF No. 58. Two days later, Shahrokhi filed a second amended 7 complaint (SAC). ECF No. 59. The SAC brings allegations against the same defendants as set 8 forth in the FAC (Boutos, Bourne, Inskeep, and Cliffe, who work for the Clark County District 9 Attorney’s Office, Family Support Division) but also names Clark County as a defendant. Id. at 10 3–5. Boutos and Bourne are identified as investigators. Id. Inskeep works as a case manager in the 11 same office. Id. Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC on November 27, 2023 (ECF No. 62), 12 which Shahrokhi opposes (ECF No. 66). 13 On November 20, 2023, Shahrokhi filed a motion for reconsideration of Judge Albregts’ 14 decision granting defendants’ motion to stay discovery. ECF No. 61. Defendants oppose the 15 motion. ECF No. 65. Also pending before the court are two requests for judicial notice filed by 16 Shahrokhi. ECF Nos. 69, 72. 17 III. Background information 18 This case stems from Shahrokhi’s 2018 custody battle,5 which he lost, in the Family 19 Division of the Eighth Judicial District Court.6 As part of that custody case, Shahrokhi was 20 ordered to pay child support. A related child support enforcement action was initiated against 21 4 While Shahrokhi’s motion to strike defendants’ exhibits to the supplemental brief could have been 22 stricken as untimely and for failing to set forth good cause for filing it late, Judge Albregts granting the motion to stay rendered the motion to strike moot. Accordingly, Shahrokhi’s motion to strike (ECF No. 23 57) is denied as moot. 24 5 I take judicial notice of the dockets related to Shahrokhi’s 2018 paternity and custody dispute (case number D-18-581208-P) and his 2021 child support enforcement action (case number R-21-218156-R). See 25 Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 750 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (A court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record). 26 6 Shahrokhi appealed the Family Court’s decision and lost. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s custody determination in May 2022 in Shahrokhi v. Burrow, Case Nos. 81978, 82245, and 83726. See Order of Affirm., 2:20-cv-01623-JAD-NJK at ECF No. 153-1. 1 Shahrokhi in November of 2021. On October 3, 2022, continued proceedings on an order to show 2 cause were held regarding Shahrokhi’s failure to pay child support. See Order Adopting Report 3 and Recommendation (R&R), ECF No. 62-2 at 1 (procedural background), 4 (detailing 4 Shahrokhi’s failure to make child support payments).7 Shahrokhi failed to appear for the 5 hearing, so a no-bail bench warrant was issued. See Bench Warrant, Defs.’ Ex. A, ECF No. 62-1. 6 On October 6, 2022, Shahrokhi filed a motion to quash the bench warrant; the motion was set 7 for hearing on December 27, 2022. Order approving R&R, ECF No. 62-2 at 3. That hearing was 8 later vacated because Shahrokhi initially did not indicate an inability to pay the contempt purge 9 amount. Id. at 7. The R&R advised Shahrokhi that if he was going to assert an inability to pay, he 10 would have to file a new Motion for Order Shortening Time asserting his inability to pay and 11 that he would have to provide a financial disclosure form to support his position. Id. The R&R 12 was adopted by Eighth Judicial District Court Judge Bill Henderson on November 3, 2022. Id. at 13 2. There is no information before the court showing that Shahrokhi filed a new Motion for Order 14 Shortening Time asserting his inability to pay, nor that he submitted a financial disclosure form. 15 On March 14, 2023, defendants Boutos and Bourne executed the bench warrant and 16 arrested Shahrokhi outside his home. Bench Warrant, Defs.’ Ex. A, ECF No. 62-1. Shahrokhi now 17 brings this civil rights action, alleging that the bench warrant that was issued, and ultimately 18 resulted in his arrest, was “invalid,” and as a result, that defendants Boutos and Bourne violated 19 his Fourth Amendment rights when they arrested him. See generally SAC, ECF No. 59. 20 Shahrokhi’s prayer for relief seeks several types of monetary damages as well as equitable relief. 21 Id. at 38–40. 22 23 24 7 The R&R noted that at a prior hearing in November of 2021, Shahrokhi declined to be sworn in or give testimony for the child support hearing. See Order Adopting R&R, ECF No. 62-2 at 5. At the same 25 hearing, it was recommended that Shahrokhi be held in contempt and be given a five-day suspended jail 26 sentence for his willful failure to pay child support. Id. at 4. Shahrokhi was given specific instructions in that order to purge the contempt order but failed to comply; part of that order including appearing at all future hearings, which Shahrokhi failed to abide by. Id. at 4–5. Shahrokhi appealed the decision and lost. See Order Den. Shahrokhi’s Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, or Prohibition, ECF No. 62-3. 1 IV. Summary of the pleadings 2 Defendants seek dismissal of the SAC on several grounds. First, defendants argue that 3 Shahrokhi fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the entirety of the case 4 rises and falls on his assertion that the bench warrant issued for his arrest was “invalid.” See 5 generally, ECF No. 62 at 5–8. Defendants further argue that Shahrokhi misapprehends the scope 6 and power of a hearing master. See generally id. at 5–7. Defendants further contend that this court 7 lacks jurisdiction over this action based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Id. at 12–13. 8 Additionally, defendants argue that even if the complaint does set forth a viable claim, they are 9 entitled to both qualified and absolute immunity. Id. at 8–12. Defendants argue the complaint 10 fails to state a viable Monell claim, and that the claims alleging conspiracy, false imprisonment, an 11 8th Amendment violation, procedural and substance due process, and retaliation, fail for various 12 reasons. See generally id. at 14–23. 13 In opposition to the motion, Shahrokhi argues that defendants’ motion is meritless. ECF 14 No. 66 at 2. He confirms that the complaint is based on his belief that the bench warrant issued 15 for his arrested was “invalid.” See id. at 2 (“Defendants…[executed] an invalid bench warrant.”); 16 see also id. at 3 (“an invalid bench warrant that does not meet the Fourth Amendment standards 17 for private home entries” and “[d]efendants . . . . fail to specify that the hearing master was not a 18 neutral and detached magistrate authorized to issue a bench warrant.”). He argues that the 19 invalidity of the warrant defeats defendants’ immunity claims; that the Younger abstention 20 doctrine is inapplicable here; and without proving supporting authority, claims that Younger is 21 “outdated.” Id. at 2; 16–18. Shahrokhi also argues that Nevada is a “notice-pleading” state8 and 22 that he has met the notice pleading standard. Id. at 20. The remainder of the opposition 23 reiterates Shahrokhi’s position that the bench warrant was invalid, causing him to be deprived 24 25 8 The court notes that Shahrokhi is correct—the state of Nevada is a notice-pleading state. W. States Const., 26 Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Nev. 1992) (“Nevada is a notice-pleading state”). But this action was brought in federal court, so any complaint is subject to the pleading requirements set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Iqbal/Twombly. 1 of his constitutional rights. See generally id. at 21–29. He makes conclusory arguments in support 2 of his claims. See generally id. 3 In reply, defendants reiterate that this case is improperly based on Shahrokhi’s ongoing 4 challenges to the child support order issued against him, and further on his erroneous insistence 5 that the bench warrant issued for his arrest was invalid. See generally ECF No. 68. Defendants 6 further contend that Shahrokhi’s opposition is filled with “inconsistencies and inaccuracies.” Id. 7 at 5. Defendants maintain that they are entitled to immunity, argue that Shahrokhi failed to 8 support any of his constitutional violation claims, and finally note that the opposition violates 9 Local Rule 7-3(b), which limits the number of pages for oppositions to motions (other than 10 those for summary judgment) to 24 pages. Id. at 7 (citing LR 7-3(b)). 11 V. Shahrokhi violated Local Rule 7-3(b). 12 As a threshold matter, the court addresses Shahrokhi’s violation of Local Rule 7-3(b), 13 which provides that all responses to non-summary judgment motions are limited to 24 pages. 14 LR 7-3(b). Shahrokhi attempts to justify his violation by arguing that he was responding to a 15 motion to summary judgment, which under the local rules provides for a 30-page response. ECF 16 No. 66 at 30; see LR 7-3(a). Defendants correctly respond that Shahrokhi was responding to a 17 motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 68 at 7. Shahrokhi has already 18 been declared vexatious in another case filed in this district, and he has been cautioned about 19 the consequences of violating or failing to abide by the local rules. See e.g., Shahrokhi v. Throne, 2022 20 WL 2080090, at *2 (D. Nev. June 9, 2022), aff’d sub nom. Shahrokhi on behalf of B. E. S. v. Throne, 2023 21 WL 6826753 (9th Cir. Oct. 17, 2023) (citing the local rule that deems failing to oppose a motion 22 as consent to granting of the motion); id. at n.11 (cautioned the parties, including Shahrokhi, that 23 they must comply with the local rules). His violation alone could be grounds to strike 24 Shahrokhi’s opposition. But given it is only six-pages oversized, and for purposes of judicial 25 efficiency, I decline to do so at this time. Shahrokhi is yet again cautioned that he must follow all 26 rules and orders of the court, including the local rules. Failure to do so may result in sanctions, 1 including dismissal of the case. See United States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1979) 2 (holding that failure to follow a district court’s local rules is a proper ground for dismissal); 3 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (May 22, 1992) (holding that a 4 district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the court.). 5 VI. The Abstention Doctrine applies in this case. 6 As a court of limited jurisdiction,9 I first address defendants’ argument that the Younger 7 abstention doctrine deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction, because if applicable, 8 dismissal is required. ECF No. 62 at 12–13; see Beltran v. State of Cal., 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 9 1988) (holding that if applicable, the “Younger abstention doctrine requires dismissal of the federal 10 action.”). The Younger doctrine requires federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction 11 over claims that implicate ongoing state proceedings. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971); 12 Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013). Younger abstention concerns “equitable 13 principles, and on the ‘more vital consideration’ of the proper respect for the fundamental role of 14 [s]tates in our federal system.” Ohio C.R. Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626–27 15 (1986) (quoting Younger 401 U.S. at 43–44). 16 Younger abstention in favor of a state proceeding is appropriate if three criteria are met: 17 (1) ongoing state proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) 18 the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to litigate the plaintiff’s federal 19 constitutional claims. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 20 (1982); Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 331–32 (9th Cir. 1992). The doctrine reflects “a strong 21 federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent 22 extraordinary circumstances.” Middlesex County Ethics Committee, 457 U.S. at 423. 23 24 25 26 9 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004). 1 A. All three requirements are satisfied here. 2 3 With limited exception,10 all of Shahrokhi’s claims involve the ongoing state child 4 custody case, and related child support enforcement proceedings. Shahrokhi concedes this in his 5 amended complaint, pleading that this action arises out of a “highly contested child custody 6 battle” that “is still ongoing,” including a battle regarding the child support order. SAC, ECF No. 7 59 at 5–9. At the motion to dismiss stage, the court must take the complaint’s allegations as true. 8 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (“[F]aced with a Rule 12(b)(6) 9 motion to dismiss . . . courts must . . . accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true.”); In 10 re Quality Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 865 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We take as true the complaint’s 11 plausible and properly pleaded allegations[.]”). Thus, this fact is accepted as true.11 12 13 The Ninth Circuit has long held that domestic cases, including child support cases, are 14 important state proceedings. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 767 (2013) (“The whole 15 subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of 16 the States and not to the laws of the United States”) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 17 (1890))); H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] state has a vital 18 interest in protecting the authority of the judicial system, so that its orders and judgments are 19 not rendered nugatory. This is a particularly appropriate admonition in the field of domestic 20 relations, over which federal courts have no general jurisdiction, and in which the state courts 21 10 See infra Section VI.C. 22 11 The court also independently finds that the state’s enforcement of the child support order is “ongoing” 23 for purposes of Younger abstention because such orders necessarily require the continued involvement of state courts, which are “charged with monitoring, enforcing and modifying the child support 24 obligations.” Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2003). Indeed, child support orders “endure for many years and require continual state involvement,” and the fact that “state courts continually monitor, 25 enforce and modify child support orders makes these particular procedures unique.” Id. at 419 n.9. For purposes of this Younger analysis, the enforcement of the child support order (rather than the related 26 custody battle) is the relevant ongoing state proceeding. 1 have a special expertise and experience.”); see also Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 2 1983) (noting the “strong state interest in domestic relations matters” and “the superior 3 competence of state courts in settling family disputes because regulation and supervision of 4 domestic relations within their borders is entrusted to the states”); Matter of Reynolds, 726 F.2d 5 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The obligation of parents to support their children is a matter of 6 paramount social concern.”). The state also has an important interest in enforcing child support. 7 See Duranceau v. Wallace, 743 F.2d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1984) (“It is hard to imagine a more compelling 8 state interest than the support of its children.”); Cnty. of San Bernardino v. McClain, 2018 WL 9 4694042, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2018) (finding that the Younger abstention applied and 10 precluded federal court jurisdiction over ongoing child support action because of the important 11 state interest in child support matters); Agustin v. Cnty. of Alameda, 234 F. App’x 521, 522 (9th Cir. 12 2007) (affirming the district court’s sua sponte order of dismissal based on Younger abstention, in 13 part, because of the county’s ongoing efforts to collect child support payments.) 14 15 16 State courts are generally presumed to provide a sufficient opportunity to raise 17 constitutional challenges unless state law “clearly bars” them. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 18 15 (1987) (“[A] federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate 19 remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.”). In other words, the third 20 Younger element is satisfied if a plaintiff has “the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by 21 a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved.” Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973). 22 Shahrokhi has that opportunity here; in fact, he has already demonstrated that he is 23 aware of avenues for appeals and petitions within the state court proceedings. See e.g., ECF No. 24 62-3 (Nevada Supreme Court Order re Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus); cf. H.C. ex rel. Gordon, 25 203 F.3d at 613 (applying Younger where plaintiffs raised their due process claim before 26 California appellate courts). Furthermore, there is nothing that precludes Shahrokhi from 1 litigating his federal claims in the state court action. See Phillips v. Ochoa, 2021 WL 2446169, at *1 2 (D. Nev. June 15, 2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 3644874 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2022) (finding opportunity to 3 litigate federal constitutional claims in ongoing state custody dispute litigation).12 And 4 Shahrokhi not raising such claims in the state proceedings does not mean that such proceedings 5 were inadequate. Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] federal plaintiff’s 6 failure to avail himself of that opportunity does not mean that the state procedures are 7 inadequate.”) (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977)). 8 What Shahrokhi really seeks here is “wholesale federal intervention into an ongoing 9 state domestic dispute.” Mezzano v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133748, at *20 10 (D. Nev. July 31, 2023). Indeed, apart from his excessive force claims, his claims are largely 11 predicated on a challenge to the validity of the child support order and/or underlying state 12 processes which produced and enforced that order and cumulated in his arrest in March 2023. 13 These kinds of claims are precisely what Younger abstention compels us to avoid entertaining. 14 See, e.g., Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 100, 106 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that Younger abstention was 15 appropriate in § 1983 action alleging that a state court judge violated plaintiff’s due process 16 rights in custody battle). Indeed, if Shahrokhi seeks a judgment declaring the state court 17 proceedings unconstitutional or voiding the child support order, he will have to direct such 18 requests to the state currently enforcing that order.13 19 20 21 12 The court notes that even if Shahrokhi could somehow establish that he was precluded from litigating 22 his federal claims alleged in claims 5 and 10, those claims would still be dismissed because defendants are 23 entitled to immunity. See infra, Section VII. 13 Further, if this is indeed the relief Shahrokhi seeks, this court would be deprived of jurisdiction over 24 this action pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a “relatively straightforward principle that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to hear de facto appeals 25 from state-court judgments.” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 26 1219 (2011) (citing Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003)). A lawsuit constitutes a forbidden de facto appeal when “a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and then seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). 1 B. bad faith exception does not apply here. 2 Liberally construing the SAC and opposition to the motion to dismiss, Shahrokhi 3 appears to claim that defendants acted in bad faith, which could exempt this case from applying 4 the abstention doctrine. See Kenneally, 967 F.2d 332 (discussing exception to abstention if the 5 state proceedings involve “bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstances” 6 that would make application of the doctrine inappropriate.) “Bad faith” has been found in cases 7 where there was “repeat harassment by enforcement authorities with no intention of securing a 8 conclusive resolution” or where there is evidence of “pecuniary bias by the tribunal.” See 9 Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d 852, 861–62 (9th Cir. 1992). Shahrokhi carries the burden of 10 demonstrating “bad faith.” Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Lara, 530 F. Supp. 3d 914, 937 (E.D. Cal. 11 2021) (A “plaintiff who seeks to head off Younger abstention bears the burden of establishing 12 that one of the exceptions applies”). Shahrokhi fails to carry his burden here; there is nothing in 13 the record before the court indicating bad faith, harassment, or that extraordinary 14 circumstances exist that would warrant application of the exception. Thus, I find abstention 15 under the Younger doctrine applies. 16 C. The court dismisses claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 because they 17 implicate and absolute and/or qualified immunity applies. 18 Normally, when applying Younger, claims for injunctive relief are dismissed without 19 prejudice, whereas claims for damages are stayed. See Gilbertson, 381 F.3d 979–82; ScripsAmerica, Inc. 20 v. Ironridge Glob. LLC, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 2014). In the amended complaint, 21 Shahrokhi broadly14 seeks damages for each claim, which would normally trigger a stay. But 22 because the defendants are entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity for each of the 23 claims, I therefore dismiss them. 24 25 26 14 In each claim for relief, Shahrokhi seeks monetary damages. In his prayer for relief, Shahrokhi generally seeks monetary damages (general, consequential, special, and punitive) (see ECF No. 59 at 38–29). But he also seeks specific, injunctive relief. Id. at 39–40. All injunctive relief is denied pursuant to Younger. 1 . 2 In claim one, Shahrokhi alleges that all defendants subjected him to unreasonable search 3 and seizure in violation of the Nevada Constitution. ECF No. 59 at 18–19. Even if the court 4 considered exercising supplemental jurisdiction,15 which it does not here, these allegations call 5 into question the validity of the warrant for Shahrokhi’s arrest, which is an indirect challenge to 6 the child support enforcement action, therefore implicating Younger. 7 In claim three, Shahrokhi alleges that defendants Inskeep and Cliffe violated his due 8 process rights under both the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1 9 section 8 of the Nevada Constitution by operating on a warrant produced in what Shahrokhi 10 alleges was “kangaroo court[.]” Id. at 20–22. These allegations directly challenge the child 11 support enforcement action proceedings, therefore implicating Younger. 12 In claim four, Shahrokhi alleges a violation of Article 3, section I of Nevada’s 13 Constitution. Id. at 22–23, To support this claim, he claims that defendants Inskeep and Cliffe 14 improperly changed, issued, or modified court calendars related to the child support 15 enforcement action. This is another challenge to the child support enforcement action, which 16 implicates Younger. Further, the court also declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 17 this claim. 18 In claim eight, Shahrokhi alleges that all defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment 19 rights to equal protection under the law. Id. at 27–28. These allegations challenge the underlying 20 child support order proceedings, therefore implicating Younger. 21 Liberally construing the allegations as set forth against all defendants, claim nine alleges 22 an invasion of privacy. Id. at 29–30. It is not clear under which authority Shahrokhi brings this 23 24 25 15 As set forth in this order, I am dismissing the SAC, to include all claims over which this court had original jurisdiction. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed 26 all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725–26 (1966) (“[I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial…the state claims should be dismissed as well.”). 1 claim, but in any event, these allegations directly implicate the validity of the child support 2 order, which implicates Younger. 3 In claim 11, Shahrokhi alleges a Monell violation and a violation of Title 42, United States 4 Code, Section 1983, against all defendants based on an “unconstitutional custom or policy.” Id. at 5 32–36. These allegations challenge the child custody and child support actions, therefore 6 implicating Younger.16 7 In claim 12, Shahrokhi alleges that all defendants are liable for the intentional infliction 8 of emotional distress. Id. at 36–37. As set forth in the SAC, all defendants engaged in “outrageous 9 conduct from the beginning of child support custody enforcement in Shahrokhi’s case[,]” which 10 implicates the state’s proceedings on enforcing its important interest in securing child support. 11 Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Younger is implicated.17 12 In claim 13, Shahrokhi alleges that he was retaliated against for exercising his First 13 Amendment rights. Id. at 37–38. The allegation stems from his alleged “illegal arrest” brought 14 against defendants Boutos and Bourne based on their alleged “unconstitutional entry arrest and 15 search.” Id. at 37. This claim challenges the child support enforcement action, including the 16 issuance of the warrant for Shahrokhi’s arrest, therefore implicating Younger. 17 VII. Defendants are entitled to absolute and/or qualified immunity for claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 18 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13. 19 A. Absolute immunity 20 Both the Supreme Court of Nevada and the Ninth Circuit have recognized that 21 enforcement of child-support orders by a district attorney is an integral part of the judicial 22 process that warrants prosecutorial immunity. See County of Washoe v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 652 P.2d 23 1175, 1176 (Nev. 1982); Cash v. Los Angeles Cnty. Dist. Atty., 50 F.3d 13, 1 (9th Cir. 1995) 24 (unpublished). The purpose behind immunity is to allow prosecutors to “independently” 25 26 16 As pled, this claim also implicates the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it challenges the child custody order. See supra, footnote 14. 17 Like claim 11, this claim as pled also implicates the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it seemingly challenges the child custody order. 1 “perform their public duties free from fear that their actions might give rise to civil liability.” 2 Coverdell v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., State of Wash., 834 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1987). Absolute 3 immunity extends to claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 4 (1988). 5 Clark County District Attorney’s Office Family Support Division, and all defendants, are 6 absolutely immune from damages relating to the enforcement of child support orders, as that 7 function equates to the performance of prosecutorial and quasi-judicial functions. See Fockaert v. 8 Cnty. of Humboldt, 1999 WL 30537, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 1999) (citing Meyers v. Contra Costa Cnty. 9 Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1156–59 (9th Cir. 1987)); Cash, 50 F.3d at *4. Thus, while 10 Shahrokhi seeks monetary damages for claims 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13, which would normally 11 require a stay under Younger, I dismiss them, with prejudice, because the defendants are entitled 12 to absolute immunity for their act relating to their roles in carrying out the judge’s order in the 13 child support enforcement action. 14 In claim 10, Shahrokhi alleges that defendants Boutos and Bourne violated his Fourth 15 Amendment rights by falsely imprisoning him (ECF No. 59 at 30–31) while they were acting to 16 enforce the facially valid child support enforcement bench warrant for him.18 However, 17 defendants are entitled to absolute immunity because they were carrying out a court order by 18 executing a facially valid warrant. See Coverdell, 834 F.2d at 764–65 (persons who “faithfully 19 execute valid court orders are absolutely immune from liability for damages in civil rights 20 actions challenging conduct authorized by the order.”); Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 21 1038 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Matthews v. Densmore, 109 U.S. 216, 218–19 (1883) (“[P]ublic officials 22 who ministerially enforce facially valid court orders are entitled to absolute immunity.”)); 23 Foley v. Graham, 2020 WL 4736457, at *4 (D. Nev. Aug. 14, 2020) (“An officer will therefore be 24 cloaked in quasi-judicial immunity so long as he is carrying out the explicit orders of the court.”) 25 (citing Brooks v. Clark Cnty., 828 F.3d 910, 919 n.6 (9th Cir. 2016)). 26 18 See Bench Warrant, Defs.’ Ex. A, ECF No. 62-1; Order adopting Report and Recommendation issuing the bench warrant, Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 62-2 at 1. 1 B. Qualified Immunity 2 Further, defendants Boutos and Bourne are entitled to qualified immunity for claims 5 3 and 10. The doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil 4 damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 5 rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 6 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). There is a two-step inquiry when 7 determining whether an official should be granted qualified immunity. A court must determine: 8 (1) whether the defendant violated a federal constitutional or statutory right, and (2) whether 9 that right was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 10 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). “Lower courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs . . . to 11 tackle first.” Id. No matter which prong I evaluate first, the defendants are entitled to qualified 12 immunity19 for claims 5 and 10. While Shahrokhi pleads that the bench warrant was invalid,20 he 13 was arrested on a facially valid warrant. Where someone is arrested on a facially valid warrant, 14 there can be no showing a violation of a constitutional right. See Valdez v. Linder, 2010 WL 378354, 15 at *2 (D. Mont. Feb. 1, 2010) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 (1979) (holding that an 16 arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant does not establish a constitutional violation)). And 17 the Ninth Circuit has held that is no violation of a constitutional or statutory right where an 18 arresting officer has a reasonable, good faith belief that he is acting pursuant to a properly issued 19 warrant. See In re Roberts Litig., 693 F. App’x. 630, 631 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Because the [] Officers did 20 not violate clearly established constitutional law when they arrested [plaintiff] pursuant to a 21 facially valid warrant issued by the tribal court, they are entitled to qualified immunity. The 22 officers’ good faith reliance on the facially valid warrant was not unreasonable.”). Accordingly, 23 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for claims 5 and 10. 24 19 The court is mindful of the Ninth Circuit’s caution that “[d]etermining claims of qualified immunity at 25 the motion-to-dismiss stage raises special problems for legal decision making.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 26 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2004)). Given that Younger is implicated for almost all of Shahrokhi’s claims, the court addresses qualified immunity to explain why a stay would be inappropriate on those claims. 20 See ECF No. 59 at 23 (“[Defendants] had no valid bench warrant.”). 1 Further, Shahrokhi’s arguments that defendants Boutos and Bourne had no right to enter 2 his home are simply incorrect. In United States v. Gooch, the Ninth Circuit held “that a valid arrest 3 warrant issued by a neutral magistrate judge, including a properly issued bench warrant for 4 failure to appear, carries with it the limited authority to enter a residence in order to effectuate 5 the arrest as provided for under Payton.” 506 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added); see 6 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Shahrokhi does not dispute that defendants Boutos and 7 Bourne entered his home to effectuate his arrest. See generally Opp’n, ECF No. 66 at 9–10. Instead, 8 Shahrokhi maintains that defendants unlawfully entered his home based on his belief that the 9 warrant was “invalid,” (id. at 13) and makes unsupported and conclusory arguments that the 10 hearing master was not neutral. This is insufficient to establish a federal constitutional violation 11 or to demonstrate that defendants violated a constitutional or “clearly established” right. 12 Accordingly, I dismiss claims 5 and 10 with prejudice and without leave to amend, as 13 amendment would be futile. 14 C. Claim 2 is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. 15 In claim 2, Shahrokhi alleges that defendants Boutos and Bourne violated his Eighth 16 Amendment right to be free from excessive force.21 But the “Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 17 against the malicious or sadistic use of force (Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)), does not 18 apply “until after conviction and sentence,” (Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 (1989)), so I 19 grant defendant’s motion to dismiss claim 2. 20 Shahrokhi seemingly intends to bring a § 1983 claim alleging excessive force during his 21 arrest, which would be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 22 (holding the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs excessive force claims 23 brought by pre-trial detainees.); see also Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 24 2002) (The Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees from uses of force that amount 25 to punishment.). 26 21 Shahrokhi also alleges a violation of Article 1, § 8 of the Nevada Constitution. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim. 1 The court is mindful of Shahrokhi’s pro se status. The Ninth Circuit has long instructed 2 that where the complaint has been filed by a pro se plaintiff, like in the case here, courts must 3 “construe the pleadings liberally ... to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. 4 Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Thus, “[a] district court should not 5 dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the 6 deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 7 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per 8 curiam)). Because it is not clear if Shahrokhi can cure the pleading defect in claim 2, I give him 9 leave to amend this claim against defendants Boutos and Bourne only. But because Shahrokhi 10 has already amended his complaint twice,22 Shahrokhi must comply with the instructions 11 regarding filing the amended complaint set forth in the conclusion of this order. 12 D. Claims 6 and 7 fail as a matter of law because there is no private right of action 13 under Title 18 of United States Code. 14 In claims 6, and 7, Shahrokhi alleges all defendants violated Title 18, United States Code, 15 Sections 242 and 241. Both claims fail as a matter of law as the Ninth Circuit has long held that 16 federal criminal statutes do not carry a private right of action. See Dyson v. Utigard, 163 F.3d 607, 17 607 (9th Cir.1998) (criminal offenses under Title 18 of the U.S. Code do not create a private right 18 of action); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (criminal provisions under Title 18 19 of the U.S. Code “provide no basis for civil liability”) (citations omitted); see also Jones v. Harris, 20 665 F. Supp. 2d 384, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ( “Only a prosecutor can file criminal charges against a 21 citizen ....”). Accordingly, claims 6 and 7 fail and are dismissed with prejudice. 22 VIII. Conclusion 23 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended 24 complaint [ECF No. 23] is DENIED as moot. 25 26 22 A “district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989). 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Shahrokhi’s motion for partial summary judgment 2 [ECF No. 29] is DENIED as moot. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Shahrokhi’s motion to strike [ECF No. 30] is 4 DENIED as moot. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Shahrokhi’s motion to dismiss defendant Nguyen is 6 [ECF No. 39] is DENIED as moot. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Shahrokhi’s motions to strike [ECF Nos. 47, 57] are 8 DENIED as moot. 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Shahrokhi’s motion for reconsideration [ECF No. 61] 10 is DENIED as moot. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Shahrokhi’s requests for judicial notice [ECF Nos. 69, 12 72] are DENIED as moot. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended 14 complaint [ECF No. 62] is GRANTED. All claims, except claim 2, are DISMISSED with 15 prejudice. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that claim 2 is dismissed without prejudice and with leave 17 to amend. If Shahrokhi chooses to file a third amended complaint, it must comply with the 18 following instructions: 19 (1) The third amended complaint must be titled Third Amended Complaint and be 20 filed within 14 days of this order; 21 (2) Shahrokhi can only bring the § 1983 claim relating to Shahrokhi’s arrest on the 22 bench warrant; 23 (3) The third amended complaint must comply with Federal Rule of Procedure 8. 24 Rule 8 requires the pleader to set forth his averments in a simple, concise, and 25 direct manner. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (federal rules 26 apply to all litigants, including those lacking access to counsel); 1 (4) The complaint cannot bring any new claims for relief or name any new 2 defendants; 3 (5) The third amended complaint must be complete in and of itself without referring 4 or incorporating by reference any previous complaint; and 5 (6) The complaint cannot challenge, either directly or indirectly, Shahrokhi’s family 6 court custody and child support cases. 7 Failure to follow these instructions may result in dismissal of the third amended complaint. 9 Shahrokhi is reminded that Judge Dorsey’s vexatious litigant order remains in full effect. 10] This means that if Shahrokhi intends to file any new cases in this court that relate in any way to his state-court child-custody matter, he must: 12 (1) Apply to the Chief Judge of this District for leave to file the document by 13 submitting to the clerk’s office an application bearing the title “Application to 14 Chief District Judge Seeking Leave to File” and which must be supported by a 15 declaration from Shahrokhi, made under penalty of perjury, stating that: (1) the 16 matters asserted in the new complaint or papers have never been raised and 17 disposed of on their merits by any court; (2) the claim or claims are not frivolous 18 or made in bad faith; (3) he has conducted a reasonable investigation of the facts 19 and such investigation supports the claim or claims; and 20 (2) Attach a copy of Judge Dorsey’s order to any sue Aplcation. 21 Dated: January 22, 2024 / 22 { ye Cristin Siva 23 Uni od States District Judge 24 l 25 26 20