Ruesch v. NDOC ( 2024 )

1 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 DALE RUESCH, Case No. 2:23-cv-00800-ART-MDC 3 Plaintiff, ORDER 4 v. 5 NDOC, et al., 6 Defendants. 7 Plaintiff Dale Ruesch brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 8 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated 9 at various Nevada Department of Corrections facilities. (ECF No. 5 at 1.) On 10 November 9, 2023, this Court ordered Ruesch to file an amended complaint by 11 January 26, 2024. (ECF No. 4.) The Court warned Ruesch] that the action could 12 be dismissed if he failed to file an amended complaint by that deadline. (Id. at 9.) 13 That deadline expired and Ruesch did not file an amended complaint, move for 14 an extension, or otherwise respond. 15 DISCUSSION 16 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 17 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 18 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 19 Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 20 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 21 King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 22 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 23 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) 24 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 25 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 26 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 27 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 28 1 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 2 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 3 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 4 Cir. 1987)). 5 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 6 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 7 dismissal of Ruesch’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, 8 also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 9 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 10 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 11 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 12 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 14 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 15 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 16 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 17 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 18 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 19 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 20 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 21 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 22 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 23 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 24 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” 25 Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action 26 cannot realistically proceed until and unless Ruesch files an amended complaint, 27 the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But the 28 reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable and 1 || squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate 2 || that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Ruesch needs additional 3 || time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s screening order. Setting 4 || another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So 5 || the fifth factor favors dismissal. 6 || II. CONCLUSION 7 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 8 || they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 9 || dismissed without prejudice based on Ruesch’s failure to file an amended 10 || complaint in compliance with this Court’s November 9, 2023. The Clerk of Court 11 || is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents 12 || may be filed in this now-closed case. If Ruesch wishes to pursue his claims, he 13 || must file a complaint in a new case. 14 It is further ordered that Ruesch’s application to proceed in forma pauperis 15 || (ECF No. 1) is denied as moot. 16 17 Dated this 20 day of February 2024. 18 19 an 20 Apa Wassd 7 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28