Jackson v. Clark County Detention Center ( 2024 )

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Taijah Jackson, Case No. 2:23-cv-01795-CDS-EJY 5 Plaintiff Order Dismissing Complaint, Denying Motion for Compensation, and Closing 6 v. Case 7 Clark County Detention Center, et al., [ECF Nos. 1-2, 2] 8 Defendants 9 10 Plaintiff Taijah Jackson brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress 11 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated. ECF No. 1-2. On January 12 23, 2024, the magistrate judge ordered Jackson to update his address by February 22, 2024. ECF 13 No. 3. That deadline expired without an updated address from Jackson, and his mail from the 14 court is being returned as undeliverable. See ECF No. 4. 15 I. Discussion 16 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 17 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 18 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss 19 an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 20 King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local 21 rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 22 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining 23 whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the court must consider: (1) the public’s 24 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the 25 risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 26 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. 27 Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 128). 28 2 the court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of plaintiff’s claims. The 3 third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a 4 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading 5 ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air W., Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th 6 Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is 7 greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 8 The fifth factor requires the court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be 9 used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See 10 Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less 11 drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 12 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force 13 of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to 14 disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of 15 leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” 16 by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 17 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 18 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed without the ability for the 19 court and the defendants to send Jackson case-related documents, filings, and orders, the only 20 alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But without an updated address, 21 the likelihood that the second order would even reach Jackson is low, so issuing a second order 22 will only delay the inevitable and further squander the court’s finite resources. Setting another 23 deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So, the fifth factor favors 24 dismissal. 25 II. Conclusion 26 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 27 dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 28 Jackson’s failure to file an updated address in compliance with this court’s January 23, 2024, 1 |] order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other 2 || documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Jackson wishes to pursue his claims, he must 3 || file a complaint in a new case and provide the Court with his current address. 4 It is further ordered that Jackson’s motion for compensation [ECF No. 2] is denied as 5 |} moot. 6 Dated: February 26, 2024 J, Lh g omeiiiam 9 ly 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28