Mathis v. Director of Accounting NDOC ( 2024 )

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 DONTAE MATHIS, Case No. 2:23-cv-00874-RFB-EJY 4 Plaintiff, ORDER 5 v. 6 DIRECTOR OF ACCOUNTING NDOC, 7 Defendant. 8 9 10 Plaintiff Dontae Mathis brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress 11 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at High Desert State Prison. 12 (ECF No. 7). On December 12, 2023, this Court ordered Mathis to file an amended complaint by 13 February 2, 2024. (ECF No. 6). The Court warned Mathis that the action could be dismissed if he 14 failed to file an amended complaint by that deadline. (Id. at 7). That deadline expired and Mathis 15 did not file an amended complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. 16 I. DISCUSSION 17 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 18 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 19 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may 20 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 21 Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 22 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal 23 Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In 24 determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 25 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 26 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on 27 their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine 28 Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 2 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 3 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Mathis’s claims. The third 4 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 5 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court 6 or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 7 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 8 the factors favoring dismissal. 9 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 10 to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 11 v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 12 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 13 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 14 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 15 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting 16 of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been 17 “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 18 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 19 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 20 unless Mathis files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting 21 another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the 22 inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that 23 this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Mathis needs additional time or evidence that 24 he did not receive the Court’s screening order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful 25 alternative given these circumstances. The fifth factor favors dismissal. 26 However, the Court permits Plaintiff Mathis to file a motion to reopen the action by 27 showing good cause as to why Plaintiff missed the February 2, 2024, deadline to file an amended 28 complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60. 1 || UL. CONCLUSION 2 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 3 || favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 4 || Mathis’s failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with this Court’s December 12, 2023, 5 || order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. If Mathis 6 || wishes to pursue his claims, he must either file a complaint in a new case or a motion to reopen 7 || this action for good cause shown. 8 It is further ordered that Mathis’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 5) is Q || denied as moot. 10 11 DATED: February 29, 2024. 12 AS 13 RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28