Davis v. State of Nevada ( 2023 )

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 AERON DAVIS, Case No.: 2:23-cv-01082-APG-VCF 4 Plaintiff Order 5 v. 6 STATE OF NEVADA, et al., 7 Defendants 8 9 Plaintiff Aeron Davis brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress 10 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated. ECF Nos. 6, 8. On 11 November 2, 2023, the magistrate judge ordered Davis to update his address and file an 12 application to proceed in forma pauperis for a non-prisoner (“non-prisoner IFP”) by November 13 30, 2023. ECF No. 13. That deadline expired without an updated address or non-prisoner IFP 14 from Davis, and his mail from the court is being returned as undeliverable. See ECF No. 14. 15 I. Discussion 16 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 17 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 18 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may 19 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 20 Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 21 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 22 Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court 23 order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its 1 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 2 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 3 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone 4 v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). 5 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 6 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Davis’s claims. The third 7 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption 8 of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the 9 court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The 10 fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly 11 outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 12 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 13 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 14 v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 15 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 16 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 17 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 18 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial 19 granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have 20 been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 21 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. 22 Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed 23 without the ability for the court and the defendants to send Davis case-related documents, filings, and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Davis is low, so issuing a 3) second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the court’s finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth 5|| factor favors dismissal. 6) II. Conclusion 7 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 8|| dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Davis’s 9}| failure to file an updated address and file a non-prisoner IFP in compliance with this court’s 10|| November 2, 2023, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close 11|| this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Davis wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and provide the court with his current address. 13 14 Dated: December 8, 2023 15 ( Lo __ U.S. District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23