Blake v. Silber ( 2024 )

2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 JAVIS BLAKE, Case 2:24-cv-00200-MMD-DJA 7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 BRANDON SILBER, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Pro se Plaintiff Javis Blake brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 13 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at High 14 Desert State Prison. (ECF No. 1-1.) On February 6, 2024, this Court ordered Blake to file 15 a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP application”) or pay the full 16 $405 filing fee on or before April 8, 2024. (ECF No. 4.) The Court warned Blake the action 17 could be dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete IFP application or pay the full $405 18 filing fee for a civil action by the April 8, 2024, deadline. (Id. at 2.) That deadline expired 19 and Blake did not file a fully complete IFP application, pay the full $405 filing fee, or 20 otherwise respond to the Court’s order. And the Court notes that according to the Nevada 21 Department of Corrections inmate database, Blake is no longer incarcerated, but Blake 22 has not filed his updated address with the Court in compliance with Nevada Local Rule 23 IA 3-1. 24 II. DISCUSSION 25 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 26 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 27 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 28 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 2 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 3 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 4 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss 5 an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in 6 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk 7 of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 8 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine 9 Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 10 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 11 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Blake’s 12 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 13 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 14 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 15 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 16 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 17 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 18 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 19 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 20 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 21 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 22 Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 23 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. 24 Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this Court cannot operate without 25 collecting reasonable fees, and litigation cannot progress without a plaintiff’s compliance 26 with rules and court orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another 27 deadline. But issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander 28 the Court’s finite resources because Blake ignored the first order. And without an updated 1 || address for Blake, the chance that a second order would reach him is low. The fifth factor 2 || thus favors dismissal. Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court 3 || finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal. || Ill. CONCLUSION 5 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 6 || Plaintiff Javis Blake’s failure to file a fully complete IFP application or pay the full $405 7 || filing fee in compliance with this Court’s February 6, 2024, order. 8 It is further ordered that the application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) 9 || is denied as incomplete and moot. 10 Itis further ordered that the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly 11 || and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Javis 12 || Blake wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and either pay 13 || the required filing fee or apply for pauper status. 14 DATED THIS 13*" day of May 2024. 15 17 MIRANDA M. DU 18 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28