Lee v. DataX, Ltd ( 2024 )

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Bryan Lee, Case No.: 2:22-cv-01209-JAD-NJK 4 Plaintiff Order Dismissing and 5 v. Closing Case 6 DataX, Ltd, 7 Defendant 8 On January 9, 2024, the court advised plaintiff Bryan Lee that this case would be 9 dismissed for want of prosecution if no action was taken by February 8, 2024.1 Because no 10 action has been taken, I dismiss this case. District courts have the inherent power to control their 11 dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 12 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case.2 In determining whether to dismiss an action based on a 13 party’s failure to prosecute,3 the court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious 14 resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the 15 defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the 16 availability of less drastic alternatives.4 17 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 18 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal. The third factor, risk of 19 20 1 ECF No. 15 (notice regarding intent to dismiss for want of prosecution). 2 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). 21 3 Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding dismissal for lack of 22 prosecution and failure to comply with local rules); see also L.R. 41-1 (authorizing dismissal of civil actions pending for “more than 270 days without any proceeding of record having been 23 taken”). 4 Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423–24. 1}| prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises 2|| from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action.> The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors 4 favoring dismissal. 5 The fifth factor requires the court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 6]| to correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal.° Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.”’ Because this action cannot realistically proceed without the plaintiff moving it forward, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting 10]| another deadline. But given that the plaintiff has ignored this case for a year and a half, the 11]| likelihood that a second order would prompt action is low, so issuing a second order will only 12|| delay the inevitable and further squander the court’s finite resources. The fifth factor thus favors 13]| dismissal. 14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without 15]| prejudice for want of prosecution. The Clerk of Court is directed ENTER JUDGMENT 16]| accordingly and to CLOSE THIS CASE. 17 kb) PG U.S. Dis udge Jen iter Dorse 18 April 11, 202 19}, See Anderson y. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). 20||° Yourish y. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic 22|| alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424.