Russell v. Gonzalez ( 2024 )

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 JAMELLE RUSSELL, Case No. 3:24-cv-00030-ART-CSD 4 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 5 M. GONZALEZ, et al., 6 Defendants. 7 8 Plaintiff Jamelle Russell brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 9 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while 10 incarcerated at Lovelock Correctional Center. (ECF No. 1-1). On June 6, 2024, 11 this Court ordered Russell to update his address by July 8, 2024. (ECF No. 3). 12 That deadline expired without an updated address from Russell, and his mail 13 from the Court is being returned as undeliverable. (See ECF No. 4). 14 I. DISCUSSION 15 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 16 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 17 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 18 Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 19 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 20 King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 21 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 22 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) 23 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 24 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 25 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 26 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 27 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 28 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 2 Cir. 1987)). 3 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 4 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 5 dismissal of Russell’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, 6 also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 7 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 8 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 9 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 10 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 11 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 12 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 13 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 14 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 15 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 16 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 17 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 18 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 19 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 20 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 21 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 22 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” 23 Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action 24 cannot realistically proceed without the ability for the Court and the defendants 25 to send Russell case-related documents, filings, and orders, the only alternative 26 is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But without an updated 27 address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Russell is low, so 28 issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the 1 || Court’s finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative 2 || given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 3 || II. CONCLUSION 4 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 5 || they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 6 || dismissed without prejudice based on Russell’s failure to file an updated address 7 || incompliance with this Court’s June 6, 2024, order. The Clerk of Court is directed 8 || to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be 9 || filed in this now-closed case. If Russell wishes to pursue his claims, he must file 10 || acomplaint in a new case and provide the Court with his current address. 11 It is further ordered that Russell’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, 12 || (ECF No. 1) is denied as moot. 13 14 15 DATED THIS 2nd day of August 2024. 16 17 18 Ares jlossd jb 19 ANNER.TRAUM 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28