Manuel v. Southern Desert Correctional Center ( 2024 )

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 RICKY KALEO MANUEL, Case No. 2:23-cv-00606-RFB-DJA 4 Plaintiff, ORDER 5 v. 6 SOUTHERN DESERT CORRECTIONAL CENTER, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 10 Plaintiff Ricky Kaleo Manuel brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 11 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Southern Desert 12 Correctional Center. (ECF No. 8). On June 3, 2024, this Court ordered Manuel to file an amended 13 complaint by July 3, 2024. (ECF No. 9). The Court warned Manuel that the action could be 14 dismissed if he failed to file an amended complaint by that deadline. (Id. at 6-7). That deadline 15 expired, and Manuel did not file an amended complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise 16 respond. The Court’s order came back as undeliverable with a note that Manuel has been 17 discharged. (ECF No. 10). 18 I. DISCUSSION 19 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 20 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 21 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may 22 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 23 Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 24 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal 25 Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In 26 determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 27 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 28 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on 2 Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 3 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). 4 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 5 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Manuel’s claims. The third 6 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 7 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court 8 or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 9 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 10 the factors favoring dismissal. 11 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 12 to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 13 v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 14 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 15 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 16 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 17 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting 18 of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been 19 “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 20 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 21 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed unless 22 Manuel files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another 23 deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable and 24 squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will 25 be an exception: the Court’s previous order came back as undeliverable, and Manuel has not filed 26 an updated address despite the warning in the Court’s initial advisory letter that Manuel should 27 immediately notify the Court of any change of address. (ECF No. 2 at 1). Setting another deadline 28 is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 1 || UL. CONCLUSION 2 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 3 || favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 4 || Manuel’s failure to file failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with this Court’s June 5 || 3, 2024, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 6 || No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Manuel wishes to pursue his claims, 7 || he must file a complaint in a new case. 8 It is further ordered that Manuel’s application to proceed in form pauperis (ECF No. 4) is Q || denied as moot. 10 DATED: July 23, 2024 11 AS 13 RICHARD F.BOULWARE, 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28