Harris v. Dreesen ( 2024 )

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Ammar Harris, Case No.: 2:22-cv-01231-JAD-EJY 5 Plaintiff Order Denying Motion to Amend 6 v. Judgment 7 F. Dreesen, et al., [ECF No. 89] 8 Defendants 9 10 In May 2024, the court granted summary judgment to Richard Cody Adams and Carol 11 Gardner on plaintiff Ammar Harris’s sole First Amendment retaliation claim, closing Harris’s 12 case against these Ely State Prison correctional officers.1 Harris moves to alter or amend that 13 judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 52(b) and 59, arguing that the court 14 discounted his declaration as evidence on summary judgment.2 He repeats the same series of 15 events that he recounted in his summary-judgment briefs, contending that it was clear error to 16 disregard the facts as he experienced them.3 The defendants respond that the court may 17 disregard his declaration because his statements are merely conclusory.4 Because Harris has not 18 shown that granting summary judgment for the defendants was clear error, I deny his motion. 19 20 21 1 ECF No. 87. 22 2 ECF No. 89 at 1–2. 23 3 ECF No. 91 at 2–3. 4 ECF No. 90 at 3. 1 Discussion5 2 A. Reconsideration standard 3 FRCP 52(b) permits a court to “amend its findings—or make additional findings—and [] 4 amend the judgment accordingly.”6 Similarly, FRCP 59(e) allows a court to alter or amend a 5 judgment but in very limited circumstances.7 The Ninth Circuit has cautioned against the 6 frequent use of such reconsideration motions, explaining that they “should not be granted, absent 7 highly unusual circumstances.”8 Reconsideration is only “appropriate under [FRCP] 59(e) if (1) 8 the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) the district court committed 9 clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an intervening 10 change in controlling law.”9 This rule does not give parties a chance to relitigate previously 11 decided issues or “raise arguments or present evidence for the first time” that “could reasonably 12 have been raised earlier in the litigation.”10 13 14 15 16 17 5 The parties are familiar with the facts of this case, so I don’t repeat them here. I instead incorporate herein the factual overview contained in my prior order resolving the cross motions 18 for summary judgment in favor of the defendants. See ECF No. 87 at 2–3. 19 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b). 7 Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). 20 8 Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 389 Orange 21 Street Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)). 9 Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 22 Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)). 10 Carroll, 342 F.3d at 945; see Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 23 Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d. Cir. 1998)) (explaining that “the purpose of Rule 59” is not to give parties a “forbidden ‘second bite at the apple’”). 1 B. Harris has not shown that the court clearly erred in granting summary judgment 2 for the defendants. 3 Harris argues that the court committed clear error because it failed to consider his 4 declaration when granting summary judgment in the defendants’ favor.11 He contends that the 5 court must “decide a motion for summary judgment based on the facts” before it, and his 6 declaration contained “facts stated on personal knowledge.”12 On a motion for summary 7 judgment, a court must treat an affidavit by an individual with personal knowledge as a fact that 8 is genuinely disputed.13 But “[i]f the affidavit stated only conclusions, . . . then it would be too 9 conclusory to be cognizable.”14 10 Harris points to his accounts of two interactions with Adams and Gardner that he argues 11 the court disregarded. The first is a conversation while Harris was still in the infirmary in which 12 he told Adams and Gardner that he would file, or had already filed, grievances about his lost 13 property.15 The second is the moving-day exchange when Gardner pushed his property into the 14 trash and Harris said, “What are you doing those are my grievances.”16 Upon Harris’s threat to 15 sue them, Gardner responded, “All you scumbags say that, have fun.”17 Adams then added, 16 “Over property? You won’t win.”18 17 18 11 ECF No. 89 at 2. 19 12 Id. 20 13 United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 1999). 21 14 Id. 15 ECF No. 91 at 2 (citing ECF No. 72 at 6). 22 16 Id. (citing ECF No. 72 at 7). 23 17 Id. (citing ECF No. 72 at 7). 18 Id. (citing ECF No. 72 at 7). ] Critically, this rendition of events was not included in Harris’s declaration; it was merely 2|| argued in Harris’s briefing. So this court didn’t discount or ignore his declaration as evidence. But even liberally construing Harris’s account of these exchanges as evidence doesn’t change the analysis or outcome. The central failure of Harris’s claim was the lack of evidence “that Adams or Gardner’s destruction of Harris’s property was fueled by a retaliatory motive.””? And these exchanges that Harris highlights are not evidence that Adams or Gardner destroyed his property 7\\ in retaliation for the grievances that he filed. At most, these statements are evidence that Adams and Gardner were aware that Harris was filing grievances before Gardner pushed his property 9}| into the trash. But as I explained in my previous order, timing isn’t enough.”! A retaliation 10]| claim cannot rest on the “logical fallacy” that because the adverse action occurred after the 11|| protected conduct there must be a causal connection.”* So this court did not discount or ignore 12|| Harris’s evidence of a material fact; Harris’s two interactions alerting Adams and Gardner to his 13]| grievances are not evidence that the destruction of his property was fueled by a retaliatory 14] motive. 15 Conclusion 16 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff Ammar Harris’s motion to amend the 17||judgment [ECF No. 89] is DENIED. 18 PLAINLY : AoA —— 19 US. District Ju ge Jen ffer)s Dorsey Dated: July 29, 2024 20} 19 Compare ECF No. 72 at 6—7 (reply to Harris’s motion for summary judgment and response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment) with ECF No. 53 at 4 (Harris’s declaration). 0 ECF No. 87 at 17 (summary-judgment order). Id. 3 2 See Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the “logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, literally [means] ‘after this, therefore because of this’”) (cleaned up).