Ellerbe v. Tuscan Highlands Apartments ( 2024 )

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 Sydney Ellerbe Case No. 2:24-cv-00554-APG-DJA 6 doing business as Wall Street World Inc., 7 Order Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 Tuscan Highlands Apartments, 10 Defendant. 11 12 13 Pro se Plaintiff Sydney Ellerbe dba Wall Street World Inc.1 submitted initiating 14 documents to the Court which include an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a 15 complaint. (ECF Nos. 1-1, 4). Because Plaintiff’s application is complete, the Court grants it and 16 screens Plaintiff’s complaint. Because Plaintiff’s complaint states certain claims that are not 17 18 1 It is unclear if Plaintiff is bringing his claims on behalf of himself and Wall Street World Inc., or just on his own behalf. Because non-lawyers cannot generally represent companies pro se, and 19 because Plaintiff does not inform the Court about whether Wall Street World fits an exception to this general rule, the Court construes Plaintiff as bringing his claims on his own behalf. If 20 Plaintiff wishes to bring his claims on behalf of Wall Street World, he must explain whether the company is a corporation, unincorporated association, sole proprietorship, or some other entity. 21 This is because while parties may represent themselves, corporations, partnerships, and 22 associations must appear in federal court through an attorney. See Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993) (citations omitted) (“courts have uniformly held that 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1654, providing that ‘parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel,’ does not allow corporations, partnerships, or associations to appear in federal court otherwise than 24 through a licensed attorney.”). So, Wall Street World Inc. must retain counsel to proceed in this action if it is a corporation. See Reading Intern., Inc. v. Malulani Group, Ltd., 814 F.3d 1046, 25 1053 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that corporations must be represented by counsel). On the other 26 hand, if Wall Street World is a sole proprietorship, Plaintiff may be able to litigate its claims. See Pullos v. All. Laundry Sys., LLC, No. 3:07-cv-00169-LRH-RAM, 2009 WL 10708625, at *1 n.2 27 (D. Nev. July 29, 2009), aff’d, 424 F. App’x 663 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that “numerous courts have recognized that because a sole proprietorship has no separate legal existence apart from the 1 cognizable, but others that are, the Court dismisses some claims without prejudice and allows 2 others to proceed. Because it is possible that Plaintiff may be able to adequately allege those 3 claims, if sufficient facts exist, the Court will grant leave to amend the pleading deficiencies. 4 I. In forma pauperis application. 5 Plaintiff filed the forms required to proceed in forma pauperis (without paying the filing 6 fee). (ECF No. 4). Plaintiff has shown an inability to prepay fees and costs or give security for 7 them. Accordingly, the application to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted under 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1915(a). The Court will now screen Plaintiff’s complaint. 9 II. Legal standard for screening. 10 Upon granting an application to proceed in forma pauperis, courts additionally screen the 11 complaint under § 1915(e). Federal courts are given the authority to dismiss a case if the action is 12 legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 13 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 14 When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915, the plaintiff should be given leave to amend 15 the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the 16 complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 17 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 18 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a 19 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Review under Rule 20 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 21 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). A properly pled complaint must provide a short and plain statement of 22 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. 23 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual 24 allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the 25 elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. 26 Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations 27 contained in the complaint, but the same requirement does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 1 allegations, do not suffice. Id. at 678. Where the claims in the complaint have not crossed the 2 line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 3 Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 4 drafted by lawyers. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal 5 construction of pro se pleadings is required after Twombly and Iqbal). 6 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that power authorized by 7 the Constitution and statute. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004). Under 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1331, federal courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the 9 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Cases “arise under” federal law either when 10 federal law creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right under state law 11 necessarily turns on the construction of federal law. Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 12 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether federal-question jurisdiction exists is based on the 13 “well-pleaded complaint rule,” which provides that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a 14 federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” 15 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), federal 16 district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions in diversity cases “where the matter in 17 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000” and where the matter is between “citizens of 18 different states.” Diversity jurisdiction exists only where there is “complete diversity” among the 19 parties; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than each of the defendants. 20 Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). 21 III. Screening Plaintiff’s complaint. 22 Plaintiff sues Defendant Tuscan Highland Apartments for damages and injunctive relief, 23 alleging four causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) wrongful eviction under Nevada law; 24 (3) disparate treatment under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”); and 25 (4) defamation per se under Nevada law.2 Plaintiff’s claims arise out of his eviction from his 26 27 2 Plaintiff asserts that his complaint is “for racial discrimination & defamation of character.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 1). Later in his complaint, he asserts that he is bringing a claim against 1 home in the Tuscan Highland Apartments following two instances in which Becca’s Restaurant & 2 Lounge dba Scotty’s Restaurant & Lounge3 —a private restaurant located within the Tuscan 3 community—removed him from the premises in racially motivated incidents. Plaintiff asserts 4 that Tuscan evicted him—citing a false reason—to cover up the racially motivated events. 5 Plaintiff—an African American man—alleges that a Becca’s employee removed him on 6 two separate instances while Plaintiff was dining. During the first incident, Plaintiff claims that a 7 Becca’s employee asked him to leave because a white female patron was jealous of Plaintiff 8 dining with another woman. During the second incident, a Becca’s employee removed Plaintiff 9 from the restaurant following an altercation in which another white patron threatened Plaintiff and 10 made racist remarks. Plaintiff asserts that, despite him not being the aggressor in either incident, 11 he was the person removed from the premises. 12 Plaintiff argues that these racial incidents are the true cause of his subsequent eviction 13 from Tuscan’s property. Three days after the second incident, Tuscan’s office manager served 14 Plaintiff with a three-day notice to quit for nuisance based on an allegation from another 15 community member—Josh4—that Plaintiff had assaulted him. Plaintiff asserts that Josh’s 16 allegation was false, and that Tuscan should have known it was false, but instead Tuscan used the 17 allegation as an excuse to evict him to cover up the racial incidents that occurred at Becca’s. 18 Plaintiff asserts that Josh provided no evidence of the assault, never called the police, never 19 20 Plaintiff’s complaint as alleging negligence under Nevada law, defamation per se under Nevada law, wrongful eviction under Nevada law, and disparate treatment under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) of 21 the Fair Housing Act. 22 3 Plaintiff filed a separate lawsuit against Becca’s alleging the same facts but does not name Becca’s as a defendant here. See Ellerbe v. Becca’s Restaurant & Sports Lounge dba Scotty’s 23 Restaurant & Lounge, 2:24-cv-00555-JAD-DJA (D. Nev.). Becca’s is a private restaurant located within the property with which Plaintiff alleges Tuscan contracts for catering and resident 24 events. (ECF No. 1-3 Ex. A). Plaintiff asserts that tenants’ rent payments to Tuscan include a 25 monthly lifestyle fee for Becca’s. (ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiff also alleges that Tuscan and Becca’s are owned by the same entity—Schulman Properties—and includes an attachment purporting to 26 show that ownership. (ECF No. 1-3 at 18). However, given the fact that Plaintiff has sued Becca’s and Tuscan separately and only briefly raises the issue of their alleged joint ownership, 27 the Court does not construe Becca’s and Tuscan to be the same entity. 1 received medical attention, never filed charges, and had a known history of mental health 2 problems that made him an unreliable source. Worse, Plaintiff later witnessed another 3 community member being arrested for domestic violence, but when Plaintiff asked the Tuscan 4 leasing manager if that community member would be evicted, the manager said, “[t]hat’s a 5 criminal offense, and has nothing to do with Tuscan Highland’s Apartments.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 6 4). Plaintiff also compares Tuscan’s quick and extreme response to Josh’s unsupported 7 allegations with Tuscan’s slow or nonexistent response to his complaints—the latter of which was 8 supported by witnesses—about Becca’s choice to remove him from the restaurant. Finally, 9 Plaintiff alleges that, after the racial incidents, Tuscan raised his rent and attempted to collect a 10 past due balance despite Tuscan and Plaintiff’s former agreement that Plaintiff would pay a lower 11 rate if he paid in advance. Plaintiff asserts that his eviction has resulted in him losing business 12 clients because many of his clients were also Tuscan residents and heard that Plaintiff was evicted 13 for an alleged assault. 14 A. Negligence. 15 “Negligence is failure to exercise that degree of care in a given situation which a 16 reasonable man under similar circumstances would exercise.” Driscoll v. Erreguible, 87 Nev. 97, 17 101 (1971). To prevail on a negligence claim under Nevada law, a plaintiff must establish four 18 elements: “(1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached that 19 duty, (3) the breach was the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury, and (4) the plaintiff suffered 20 damages.” Evans v. Hawes, No. 2:22-cv-02171-JAD-DJA, 2024 WL 810886, at *14 (D. Nev. 21 Feb. 26, 2024). “[L]iability based on negligence does not exist in the absence of a breach of 22 duty.” Bradshaw v. Blystone Equip. Co. of Nev., 79 Nev. 441, 444 (1963). 23 Plaintiff’s negligence claim fails as a matter of law for two reasons. First, Plaintiff fails to 24 establish what duty, if any, Tuscan owes him and second, Plaintiff’s allegations are largely 25 conclusory. Plaintiff alleges that Tuscan’s series of decisions following the racial altercation at 26 Becca’s and leading up to his eviction are negligent and have resulted in substantial business 27 1 decline and damage to his character.5 Although Plaintiff states what damages that he has 2 suffered, his claim fails because he does not articulate how Tuscan’s actions fulfill the other 3 elements necessary to state a claim for negligence. To prevail on his negligence claim, Plaintiff 4 must show for every negligent act alleged that Tuscan owed him a duty of care, that Tuscan 5 breached that duty, that the breach was the legal cause of his injuries, and that he suffered 6 damages. 7 Under Rule 8, the Court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations contained in 8 the complaint, which goes beyond mere labels or conclusions. Here, Plaintiff describes the 9 general sequence of events that are connected to his eviction and professional harm, but he does 10 not identify any specific act or acts that clarify what duty—if any—Tuscan owed Plaintiff and 11 when the moment of breach occurred. As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s assertions amount to a 12 conclusory allegation of negligence from which the Court cannot reasonably infer that Tuscan’s 13 conduct fell below the applicable standard of care. Because Plaintiff could potentially amend his 14 complaint to do so, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice and with leave to 15 amend. 16 B. Wrongful eviction in violation of NRS 118A.390. 17 Plaintiff appears to bring a state claim for wrongful eviction in violation of NRS 18 118A.390. A tenant may recover damages pursuant to NRS 118A.390(1) “[i]f the landlord 19 unlawfully removes the tenant from the premises or excludes the tenant by blocking or attempting 20 to block the tenant’s entry upon the premises, willfully interrupts or causes or permits the 21 interruption of any essential item or service...” Here, Plaintiff states a colorable claim for 22 wrongful eviction under NRS 118A.390. Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully evicted because 23 24 5 Plaintiff alleges that Schulman Properties is the decision-maker for Defendant and Becca’s and asserts that Schulman Properties is responsible for its employee’s negligent management of 25 Becca’s. However, Plaintiff has not named Schulman Properties as a defendant and as outlined above, has not provided sufficient facts for the Court to determine that Schulman owns both 26 companies. This is particularly true because Plaintiff has named both companies in separate 27 lawsuits. To the extent that Plaintiff wishes to bring his negligence claim against Schulman Properties under a respondeat superior theory, Plaintiff must name Schulman Properties as a party 1 Tuscan relied on another tenant’s false allegations to remove him from the property as a cover-up 2 for discriminatory conduct. Plaintiff renewed his lease with Tuscan in February of 2022 and thus 3 had a landlord-tenant relationship with Tuscan when he received an eviction notice on his 4 apartment door in August of 2022. As a result of the eviction notice, Tuscan blocked Plaintiff’s 5 entry upon the premises. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff provides sufficient facts to state 6 a claim for relief under NRS 118A.390. 7 C. Disparate treatment in violation of the FHA. 8 The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s complaint as bringing a disparate treatment claim 9 under the FHA.6 That Act makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, 10 conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities 11 in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 12 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). Because Plaintiff alleges that Tuscan relied on false assault allegations to 13 disguise underlying discrimination as a lawful eviction, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a 14 cognizable legal claim under the FHA. 15 To bring a disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima 16 facie case of discrimination, which a plaintiff may accomplish by one of two methods. See 17 Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that courts analyze 18 FHA discrimination claims in the same way they analyze Title VII discrimination claims); Costa 19 v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); see 20 Pac. Shores Properties, LLC v. City of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir. 2013); 21 McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004). Under the first—the 22 McDonnell Douglas7 framework—a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing that 23 24 6 A plaintiff can establish an FHA discrimination claim under a theory of disparate treatment or disparate impact. Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304–05 (9th Cir. 1997). Under the 25 disparate impact theory, the FHA “forbids actions by private or governmental bodies that create a discriminatory effect upon a protected class or perpetuate housing segregation without any 26 concomitant legitimate reason.” Ave. 6E Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, Ariz., 818 F.3d 493, 503 27 (9th Cir. 2016). 7 This refers to the burden-shifting framework that the Supreme Court articulated in McDonnell 1 “(1) plaintiff’s rights are protected under the FHA; and (2) as a result of the defendant’s 2 discriminatory conduct, plaintiff has suffered a distinct and palpable injury.” Harris v. Itzhaki, 3 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999). Under the second, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie 4 case by showing direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. See Pac. Shores 5 Properties, 730 F.3d at 1158; McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004). 6 Here, under either method, Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disparate 7 treatment under the FHA. Under the first method, Plaintiff alleges that Tuscan intentionally 8 discriminated against him because of his race, which is one of the protected classes under the 9 FHA. Plaintiff also alleges he has suffered a distinct and palpable injury because he claims that 10 he has been evicted, that he has faced reputational harm, and that his business has lost a 11 substantial amount of revenue. 12 Under the second method, Plaintiff has demonstrated that racial animus was a motivating 13 factor behind Tuscan’s actions and offers circumstantial evidence of Tuscan’s discriminatory 14 intent. Plaintiff explains that Tuscan’s proffered reason for evicting him—that Plaintiff assaulted 15 a fellow resident—was false. Plaintiff asserts that this was because the resident who reported the 16 assault lied about it, and Tuscan should have known that the resident was an unreliable source 17 because of the resident’s well known mental health problems. Plaintiff adds that Tuscan lacked 18 any proof for the assault allegations on which it based its eviction decision and when Plaintiff 19 insisted that the allegations were false, the Tuscan office manager with whom he was speaking 20 stated “[i]t doesn’t matter, we want you out [of] our community.” Plaintiff also points out the 21 timing of the assault allegations, arguing that the allegations were not brought to his attention 22 until after Tuscan’s management received reports of the underlying racial altercation at Becca’s. 23 Plaintiff also identifies similarly situated individuals who were treated more favorably 24 than him. For example, Plaintiff compares Tuscan’s delayed response to his reports regarding the 25 racial altercation at Becca’s with Tuscan’s swift response to the false assault allegation. Despite 26 27 prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the defendant’s actions. See id. The burden then shifts 1 Plaintiff’s reports and reports from witnesses, Tuscan did nothing in response to the racial 2 altercations. However, the resident who alleged that Plaintiff assaulted him provided no 3 evidence, never called the police, did not receive medical attention, and did not file criminal 4 charges, yet Tuscan responded by evicting Plaintiff. Plaintiff contrasts this with an incident in 5 which another community member was arrested publicly for assaulting his spouse. When 6 Plaintiff asked if the arrested community member would be evicted, the Tuscan leasing manager 7 stated “[t]hat’s a criminal offense and has nothing to do with Tuscan Highlands Apartments.” 8 (ECF No. 1-1 at 4). Finally, Plaintiff claims that he has a great relationship with other neighbors 9 and tenants. Considering the allegations in the complaint in their entirety, and interpreting all 10 inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court concludes Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a 11 claim of disparate treatment under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) of the FHA. 12 D. Defamation per se. 13 Defamation encompasses both slander (spoken) and libel (written) defamatory statements. 14 Flowers v. Carville, 292 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1232 n.1 (D. Nev. 2003). To state a claim for 15 defamation, Plaintiff must allege the following elements “(1) a false and defamatory statement by 16 [a] defendant concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged publication a third person; (3) fault, 17 amounting to at least negligence; and (4) actual or presumed damages.” Rosen v. Tarkanian, 453 18 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Nev. 2019); see also Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.510(1) (defining libel). Whether a 19 statement is capable of a defamatory construction is a question of law for the court to decide. 20 Branda v. Sanford, 97 Nev. 643, 646 (1981). “A statement is defamatory when, ‘[u]nder any 21 reasonable definition[,] such charges would tend to lower the subject in the estimation of the 22 community and to excite derogatory opinions against him and to hold him up to 23 contempt.’” Posadas v. City of Reno, 109 Nev. 448, 453 (1993) (quoting Las Vegas Sun v. 24 Franklin, 74 Nev. 282, 287 (1958)). “In determining whether a statement is actionable for the 25 purposes of a defamation suit, the court must ask whether a reasonable person would be likely to 26 understand the remark as an expression of the source’s opinion or as a statement of existing 27 fact.” Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 118 Nev. 706, 715 (2002) (internal citations omitted). 1 Some classes of defamatory statements—known as “defamation per se”—are considered 2 so likely to cause serious injury to reputation and pecuniary loss that these statements are 3 actionable without proof of damages. K-Mart Corp. v. Washington, 866 P.2d 274, 284 (Nev. 4 1993) (overruled in part on other grounds). A statement is considered defamation per se, “i.e., 5 actionable without a showing of such special damages only if it falls into one of usually four 6 categories: (1) imputations that plaintiff has committed a crime; (2) imputations that would injure 7 plaintiff’s trade, business or office; (3) imputations that the plaintiff has contracted a loathsome 8 disease; and… (4) imputations of unchastity in a woman.” Branda, 97 Nev. at 646. 9 Plaintiff alleges that Tuscan falsely stated that Plaintiff assaulted another tenant, which 10 would constitute defamation per se because it imputes that Plaintiff committed a crime. 11 However, Plaintiff does not allege that Tuscan made an unprivileged publication of these 12 statements, which is an element of a claim for defamation. Plaintiff does not allege this element 13 because, although he asserts that certain community members heard the false statements, he does 14 not allege that they heard them from Tuscan. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a 15 claim for defamation per se. 16 17 ORDER 18 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma 19 pauperis (ECF No. 1) is granted. Plaintiff shall not be required to pre-pay the filing fee. 20 Plaintiff is permitted to maintain this action to conclusion without the necessity of prepayment of 21 any additional fees or costs or the giving of a security therefor. This order granting leave to 22 proceed in forma pauperis shall not extend to the issuance and/or service of subpoenas at 23 government expense. 24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to file Plaintiff’s 25 complaint (ECF No. 1-1) on the docket and issue summons to Tuscan Highlands Apartments. 26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 27 • Plaintiff’ disparate treatment claim in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) of the FHA 1 • Plaintiff’s wrongful eviction claim in violation of NRS 118A.390 shall proceed 2 against Tuscan Highlands Apartments. 3 • Plaintiff’s negligence claim is dismissed without prejudice. 4 • Plaintiff’s defamation per se claim is dismissed without prejudice. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that service must be accomplished on or before October 6 23, 2024. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to deliver the 8 following to the U.S. Marshals Service: (1) a copy of the complaint (ECF Nos. 1-1, 1-2, 1-3); and 9 (2) a copy of this order. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to send Plaintiff 11 a blank copy of form USM-2858 and a copy of the summons to Tuscan Highlands Apartments. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must complete a USM-285 form for Tuscan 13 Highlands Apartments and provide an address where Tuscan Highlands Apartments can be served 14 with process. Plaintiff must also complete the summons to Tuscan Highlands Apartments. Once 15 completed, Plaintiff must provide the USM-285 form and the summons to the U.S. Marshals 16 Service. Plaintiff shall have until August 15, 2024 in which to furnish the U.S. Marshals Service 17 with the required forms. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon receipt of the issued summonses, the USM-285 19 forms, and the operative complaint—and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3)— 20 the U.S. Marshals Service shall attempt service upon Tuscan Highlands Apartments. 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within twenty-one days after receiving from the U.S. 22 Marshals Service a copy of the form USM-285 showing whether service has been accomplished, 23 Plaintiff must file a notice with the Court identifying whether the Defendant was served. If 24 Plaintiff wishes to have service again attempted on an unserved Defendant, he must file a motion 25 26 27 8 The USM-285 form is also available at: https://www.usmarshals.gov/resources/forms/usm-285- 1 with the Court identifying the unserved Defendant and specifying a more detailed name and/or 2 address for said Defendant or whether some other manner of service should be attempted. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that from this point forward, Plaintiff shall serve upon 4 Defendant, or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon the attorney(s), a copy of every 5 pleading, motion, or other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall 6 include with the original papers submitted for filing a certificate stating the date that a true and 7 correct copy of the document was mailed to Defendants or counsel for Defendants. The Court 8 may disregard any paper received by a District Judge or Magistrate Judge that has not been filed 9 with the Clerk, and any paper received by a District Judge, Magistrate Judge, or the Clerk that 10 fails to include a certificate of service. 11 12 DATED: July 26, 2024 13 DANIEL J. ALBREGTS 14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27