Morga v. Jones ( 2024 )

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 RAMON MORGA, Case No. 2:23-cv-02021-ART-MDC 6 Plaintiff, ORDER 7 v. 8 JONES, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 Plaintiff Ramon Morga brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 12 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while 13 incarcerated at High Desert State Prison. ECF No. 6. On September 5, 2024, this 14 Court screened Morga’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) and granted Morga leave 15 to amend certain claims. ECF No. 8. Morga, however, did not file a second 16 amended complaint (“SAC”). 17 In the order screening the FAC, the Court found that Morga alleged a 18 colorable Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 19 claim, but his only colorable claim was asserted against a Doe Defendant. ECF 20 No. 8 at 11. The Court instructed Morga that if he chose not to file a SAC, this 21 action would proceed on the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious 22 medical needs claim against Doe Defendant only when Morga learns the identity 23 of Doe Defendant and files a motion to substitute the Doe Defendant with his or 24 her true name by November 4, 2024. Id. at 12. The Court warned Morga that the 25 action could be dismissed if he failed to file a motion to substitute or a timely 26 motion to extend by that deadline. Id. at 14. That deadline expired and Morga did 27 not file motion to substitute, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. 28 // 1 I. DISCUSSION 2 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 3 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 4 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 5 Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action 6 based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 7 Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for 8 failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court 9 apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 10 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether 11 to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 12 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 13 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public 14 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of 15 less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 16 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 17 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 18 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 19 dismissing Morga’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also 20 weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 21 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 22 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 23 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 24 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 25 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 26 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 27 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 28 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 1 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 2 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 3 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 4 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 5 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 6 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 7 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 8 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful 9 alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). 10 Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Morga files a 11 motion to substitute Doe Defendants, the only alternative is to enter a second 12 order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is 13 that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite 14 resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an 15 exception: there is no hint that Morga needs additional time or evidence that he 16 did not receive the Court’s screening order. Setting another deadline is not a 17 meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors 18 dismissal. 19 II. CONCLUSION 20 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds 21 that they weigh in favor of dismissal. 22 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice 23 based on Morga’s failure to file a motion to substitute Doe Defendant in 24 compliance with this Court’s September 5, 2024, order. The Clerk of Court is 25 directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 26 No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Morga wishes 27 to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 28 It is further ordered that Morga’s applications to proceed in forma 1 || pauperis (ECF Nos. 5, 7) is denied as moot. 2 3 Dated this 19t* day of November, 2024. 4 5 Ans losed Jer 6 ANNE R. TRAUM 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28