United States v. SEALED ( 2024 )

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 6 USA, Case No. 3:24-cv-270 7 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO PARTIALLY QUASH (ECF NO. 7) 8 v. 9 SEALED, 10 Defendant. 11 12 This case involves a U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division 13 (“WHD”) investigation of RayCo Drywall for violations of the Fair Labor Standards 14 Act (FLSA). In June 2024, U.S. Magistrate Judge Baldwin signed a warrant for 15 the inspection of the establishment, which WHD executed a few days later. (ECF 16 Nos. 4; 7.) RayCo filed a motion requesting that the Court partially quash the 17 warrant or, in the alternative, suppress and return WHD’s review of RayCo’s 18 privileged documents. (ECF No. 7.) WHD opposed the motion. (ECF No. 9.) For 19 the following reasons, the Court denies RayCo’s motion to quash. 20 I. Facts 21 In September 2023, WHD began investigating RayCo for FLSA violations. 22 (ECF No. 9 at 3.) Between September 2023 and February 2024, WHD requested 23 records from RayCo related to the investigation. (Id.) RayCo withheld some of 24 these records and provided redacted or incomplete versions of others. (Id.) In part 25 because of RayCo’s failure to produce documents, WHD applied for a warrant in 26 June 2024, which this Court granted. (Id. at 4; ECF Nos. 3, 4.) 27 The warrant provided that WHD could enter RayCo’s premises to inspect 28 and investigate the workplace for violations of the overtime and recordkeeping 1 sections of the FLSA. (ECF No. 4 at 2.) The warrant provided that methods of 2 inspection would include “transcribing, copying, transferring, recording, and 3 downloading (including removing for all such purposes) all relevant records and 4 data in whatever form maintained” and listed the types of records that would be 5 included as relevant. (Id. at 2-3.) Finally, the warrant provided that the inspection 6 would be completed within five working days. (Id. at 4.) 7 II. Discussion 8 A. The Warrant is Sufficiently Particular. 9 RayCo argues that the warrant should be quashed as overbroad and 10 lacking particularity because it is not sufficiently limited to any date range. (ECF 11 No. 7 at 6.) In its motion, RayCo relies on a single case from the Eastern District 12 of Michigan to support its argument. In re Search of Recs., Info., & Data 13 Associated with 14 Email Addresses Controlled by Google, LLC, 438 F. Supp. 3d 14 771 (E.D. Mich. 2020). But as WHD points out, this case involved a criminal 15 warrant and therefore is not instructive to the Court’s analysis of the 16 administrative warrant in this case. (ECF No. 9 at 8-9.) 17 In its reply, RayCo points to more cases that involved criminal search 18 warrants and fails to explain why these should be persuasive in a case involving 19 an administrative warrant. (ECF No. 10 at 5-8 (discussing United States v. SDI 20 Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Smith, 424 F.3d 21 992 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1995)). In United 22 States v. SDI Future Health, the Ninth Circuit specifically noted that a doctrine 23 applicable to administrative searches did not apply to the criminal search at issue 24 in that case. 568 F.3d at 695. 25 The Fourth Amendment requires warrants to “particularly describe the 26 place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend 27 IV. Administrative search warrants generally fall within the purview of the Fourth 28 Amendment. Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 1 534 (1967). However, administrative warrants do not require the same showing 2 of probable cause as criminal search warrants. Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 3 608 F.2d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 4 320 (1978). “For purposes of an administrative search [], probable cause 5 justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence 6 of an existing violation but also on a showing that ‘reasonable or administrative 7 standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a 8 particular [establishment]’”. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320 (quoting Camara v. 9 Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)). 10 The warrant here is sufficiently particular to satisfy the Fourth 11 Amendment. The warrant was made pursuant to Section 111(a) of the Fair Labor 12 Standards Act, which gives the Department of Labor broad authority to 13 “investigate and gather data regarding the wages, hours, and other conditions 14 and practices of employment in any industry subject to this chapter” and 15 authority to “enter and inspect such places and such records (and make such 16 transcriptions thereof), question such employees, and investigate such facts, 17 conditions, practices, or matters as he may deem necessary or appropriate to 18 determine whether any person has violated any provision of this chapter, or 19 which may aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. 20 § 211(a). The warrant in this case specified the premises to be searched, the types 21 of records to be searched, and the methods of inspection. (ECF No. 4 at 2.) 22 RayCo’s assertions of overbreadth and particularity are insufficient to render the 23 administrative warrant invalid. 24 B. Privilege claims 25 RayCo also claims that the warrant contains insufficient protections to 26 prevent the review of privileged documents, and requests that the Court order 27 WHD to permit RayCo to review the documents and prepare a privilege log of the 28 document seized. (ECF No. 7 at 7-8.) RayCo fails to provide any authority or 1 caselaw in its motion supporting this argument. (Id.) 2 WHD argues that RayCo’s vague claims of attorney-client privilege fail to 3 show that heightened protections beyond those contained in the rules of 4 professional conduct are necessary. (ECF No. 9 at 9.) WHD explains that it gave 5 RayCo the opportunity to provide WHD with a privilege log for the seized 6 electronic records, but RayCo refused to do so. (Id. at 10.) RayCo contends that 7 many of the documents seized were paper documents which it no longer has 8 access to, and that WHD has not provided a link to review those documents. (ECF 9 No. 10 at 8.) 10 The party asserting the privilege is obliged by federal law to establish the 11 privileged nature of the communications, and, if necessary, to segregate the 12 privileged information from the non-privileged information. United States v. 13 Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 609 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under federal law, the attorney-client 14 privilege is strictly construed.” Id. RayCo has not identified with particularity 15 which of the documents in WHD’s possession are within his claim of privilege. 16 Furthermore, WHD has submitted declarations explaining that they gave RayCo 17 multiple opportunities to identify the privileged information and provide a 18 privilege log for the seized records during and after the execution of the search 19 warrant. (ECF Nos. 9 at 10; 9-2 at 5; 9-3 at 2-4.) WHD has agreed to forgo 20 reviewing the evidence obtained during the search warrant while the parties 21 resolve their concerns over privileged information. (ECF No. 9-4 at 2.) The Court 22 therefore finds that RayCo’s concerns over possibly privileged communications 23 may be resolved by the parties and are not sufficient to warrant the relief 24 requested in this motion. 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 III. Conclusion 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES RayCo’s motion to partially 3 || quash (ECF No. 7). 4 5 6 Dated this 2224 day of November 2024. 7 8 Ares pod de 9 10 ANNE R. TRAUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28