- 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * * 4 TYRONE NOEL NUNN, Case No. 2:24-cv-01373-RFB-DJA 5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v. 7 HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON, et al., 8 Defendants. 9 Plaintiff Tyrone Noel Nunn brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress 10 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at High Desert State Prison. 11 (ECF No. 1-1). On August 7, 2024, this Court ordered Nunn to file an application to proceed in 12 forma pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee on or before October 7, 2024. (ECF No. 3). The 13 Court warned Nunn that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete 14 application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee for a civil action by that 15 deadline. (Id. at 2). That deadline has expired, and Nunn did not file a fully complete application 16 to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the full $405 filing fee, or otherwise respond to the Court’s 17 order. 18 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 19 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 20 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may 21 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 22 Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 23 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal 24 Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In 25 determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) 26 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 27 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 28 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 2 U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). 3 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 4 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Nunn’s claims. The third 5 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 6 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court 7 or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 8 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 9 the factors favoring dismissal. 10 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 11 to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 12 v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 13 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 14 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 15 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 16 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting 17 of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been 18 “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 19 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 20 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 21 unless Nunn either files a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pays the $405 22 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. 23 But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders 24 the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an 25 exception: there is no hint that Nunn needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the 26 Court’s order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. 27 So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 28 1 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 2 || favor of dismissal. 3 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 4 || Nunn’s failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 5 || filing fee in compliance with this Court’s August 7, 2024, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to 6 || enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now- 7 || closed case. If Nunn wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 8 9 DATED: November 7, 2024 10 AS 11 RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Document Info
Docket Number: 2:24-cv-01373
Filed Date: 11/7/2024
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/14/2024