Hymon v. Clark County Detention Center ( 2024 )

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 RODERICK L. HYMON, Case No.: 2:23-cv-01918-APG-MDC 4 Plaintiff Order 5 v. 6 CLARK COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, et al., 7 Defendants 8 9 10 Plaintiff Roderick L. Hymon brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 11 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Clark County 12 Detention Center. ECF No. 1-1. On August 21, 2024, the Magistrate Judge ordered Hymon to 13 update his address by September 25, 2024. ECF No. 5. That deadline expired without an 14 updated address from Hymon, and his mail from the court is being returned as undeliverable. See 15 ECF No. 7. 16 I. Discussion 17 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 18 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 19 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may 20 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 21 Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 22 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 23 Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court 1 order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider: (1) 2 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its 3 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 4 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 5 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone 6 v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). 7 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 8 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Hymon’s claims. The 9 third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a 10 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading 11 ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th 12 Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is 13 greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 14 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 15 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 16 v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 17 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 18 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 19 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 20 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial 21 granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have 22 been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 23 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed without the ability for the court and the defendants to send Hymon case-related documents, 3|| filings, and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Hymon is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the court’s 6} finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 8] II. Conclusion 9 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 10|| dismissal. I therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Hymon’s 11|| failure to file an updated address in compliance with this court’s August 21, 2024, order. The 12|| Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents 13|| may be filed in this now-closed case. If Hymon wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a 14|| complaint in a new case and provide the court with his current address. 15 I order that Hymon’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) is denied as moot. 17 18 Dated: October 15, 2024 19 Ca. Chief U.S. District Judge 20 21 22 23