- 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * * 4 MARY A. JONES, Case No. 2:24-cv-01914-CDS-EJY 5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v. 7 JHONE EBERT, NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, AL, 8 Defendants. 9 10 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and 11 Complaint alleging age discrimination under 26 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ECF Nos. 1, 1-1. Plaintiff’s 12 IFP application is granted. The Court screens Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). 13 I. Screening the Complaint 14 Upon granting Plaintiff’s IFP application the Court must screen her Complaint under 28 15 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any 16 claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 17 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 18 (2). However, pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 19 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). The standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim is 20 established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). When a court dismisses a complaint under 21 § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions to cure its 22 deficiencies unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies cannot be cured by 23 amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 24 In making this determination, the Court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in 25 the complaint and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Warshaw v. Xoma 26 Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent 27 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). 1 must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 2 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. Additionally, 3 a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more 4 than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 5 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be 6 supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 7 should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement 8 to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context- 9 specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 10 Id. 11 Finally, all or part of a complaint may be dismissed sua sponte if that person’s claims lack 12 an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are 13 untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a 14 legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations 15 (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989); 16 McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 17 II. Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination Claim 18 To pursue a claim in federal court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 19 (“ADEA”), a plaintiff must comply with the administrative exhaustion requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 20 626. As is true in Title VII cases, “substantial compliance with the exhaustion requirement is a 21 jurisdictional pre-requisite ... [and t]he jurisdictional scope of the plaintiff’s court action depends on 22 the scope of the EEOC charge and investigation.” Leong. v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 23 2003). “Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a condition precedent to the filing of an action 24 under the ADEA in federal court.” Parisi v. Boeing Co., 400 F.3d 583, 585 (8th Cir. 2005). 25 Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue from the U.S. Equal 26 Employment Opportunity Commission on July 17, 2024. ECF No. 1-1 at 5. Plaintiff filed her 27 Complaint on October 15, 2024, less than 90 days thereafter. Thus, the Complaint is timely. 42 1 Discrimination and, therefore, the Court does not know who Plaintiff named as a respondent. This 2 precludes the Court from knowing whether Plaintiff exhausted her administrative claims against any 3 defendant named in her Complaint. 4 Moreover, no individual identified in Plaintiff’s Complaint can he held liable for a violation 5 of the ADEA. Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that 6 individuals are not liable in their individual capacities under the ADEA); Padway v. Palches, 665 7 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, the ADEA does not abrogate state sovereign immunity 8 making the State of Nevada immune from lawsuits under the ADEA. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 9 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000). This immunity also shields “arms” of the state such as Nevada Department 10 of Education. Ginter v. State Bar of Nevada, 625 F.2d 829, 830 (9th Cir. 1980). 11 Finally, claims alleging a failure to hire based on age must allege sufficient facts to state a 12 plausible cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain 13 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”) 14 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff states she is 70 years old while the 15 average age of substitute teachers in America is 42. ECF No. 1-1 at 2. Plaintiff then tells a tale that 16 appears to involve proof of a name change, not a denial of a license having anything to do with age. 17 Id. Plaintiff attaches a declaration in an unrelated case to her filing that the Court ignores. See ECF 18 No. 1-1 at 6-8. And, Plaintiff asserts an allegation against Kelly Education Services; however, it is 19 unclear why this is included in a claim against the Nevada Department of Education. 20 All told, Plaintiff fails to allege an ADEA claim against a defendant who is not immune from 21 suit and was named in her Charge of Discrimination. Plaintiff also fails to plead facts tying her age 22 to an adverse employment action. Thus, Plaintiff fails to plead a claim on which she can presently 23 proceed. 24 III. Order 25 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma 26 pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. 27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) is dismissed without 1 must be titled “Amended Complaint.” The amended complaint must contain facts establishing who 2 was named in Plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination (Plaintiff may attach the Charge if she so chooses) 3 and contain short and plain statements of fact establishing the acts or failure to act by the Defendants 4 that demonstrate a violation of the ADEA. 5 Additionally, Plaintiff is advised that if she files an amended complaint, the original 6 Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) no longer serves any function in this case. As such, the amended complaint 7 must be complete in and of itself without reference to prior pleadings or other documents. The Court 8 cannot refer to a prior pleading or other documents to make Plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must file her amended complaint no later than 10 November 20, 2024. Failure to timely comply with this Order may result in a recommendation to 11 dismiss this action in its entirety. 12 Dated this 25th day of October, 2024. 13 14 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH 15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Document Info
Docket Number: 2:24-cv-01914
Filed Date: 10/25/2024
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/2/2024