Valenzuela v. Alvandi ( 2024 )

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 RODOLFO VALENZUELA, 4 Plaintiff, Case No.: 2:24-cv-00760-GMN-BNW 5 vs. ORDER GRANTING 6 FRANCOIS ALVANDI, et al., MOTION TO DISMISS 7 Defendants. 8 9 Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 23), filed by Defendants 10 Francois Alvandi, Shawn Denard, Marie Price, and Ramona Thomas. Plaintiff Rodolfo 11 Valenzuela did not file a response, and the time to do so has passed. For the reasons discussed 12 below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss but gives Plaintiff leave to amend the parties. 13 14 I. BACKGROUND 15 This case arises from Defendants’ alleged discrimination and retaliation against Plaintiff 16 while he was employed at AMPM Gas Station in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 17 of 1964 and several state law causes of action. (See generally First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF 18 No. 20). Defendants are individual employees and supervisors at AMPM Gas Station. (Id.). 19 AMPM Gas Station was named as a defendant in Plaintiff’s original Complaint but was 20 removed from this lawsuit in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. (Compare Compl., Ex A to 21 Pet. Removal, ECF No. 1-1 with FAC). Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC, 22 arguing Title VII does not allow for individuals to be held personally liable for discrimination. 23 (See generally Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 23). 24 25 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) where a pleader fails to state a claim upon 3 which relief can be granted. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 12(b)(6); Bell 4 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A pleading must give fair notice of a legally 5 cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests, and although a court must take all factual 6 allegations as true, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are insufficient. Twombly, 7 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, Rule 12(b)(6) requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a 8 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. “To survive a motion 9 to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 10 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 11 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 12 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 13 misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 14 has acted unlawfully.” Id. Moreover, pursuant to Rule 15(a), the court should “freely” give 15 leave to amend “when justice so requires,” and in the absence of a reason such as “undue delay, 16 bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 17 amendments previously allowed undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance 18 of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff failed to respond to the Motion to Dismiss. 21 Under Nevada Local Rule 7-2(d): “The failure of an opposing party to file points and 22 authorities in response to any motion, except a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 or a motion for 23 attorney’s fees, constitutes a consent to the granting of the motion.” “On its own, Plaintiff’s 24 failure to file points and authorities in opposition to a motion constitutes consent that the 25 motion be granted.” Gonzalez v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 2:13-cv-00460, 2013 WL 3877708, at 1 *2 (D. Nev. July 24, 2013) (citing Local Rule 7-2(d)). Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ failure to 2 oppose the Motion, the Court addresses the merits of Defendants’ request to dismiss Plaintiff’s 3 case. 4 As stated, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot sue the individual employees for 5 employment discrimination. (See generally Mot. Dismiss). Title VII prohibits employers from 6 engaging in discriminatory employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. It is well settled 7 that individual employees cannot be held personally liable for violations of Title VII of the 8 Civil Rights Act. See Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993); Holly D. 9 v. California Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We have consistently held 10 that Title VII does not provide a cause of action for damages against supervisors or fellow 11 employees.”). Thus, individual employees, including supervisors, are not construed as 12 employers for purposes of the statute and may not be sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights 13 Act. Sherez v. State of Hawaii Dept. of Educ., 396 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1145 (D. Haw. 2005). 14 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is DISMISSED with prejudice against Defendant 15 employees because he cannot sue individual employees/manager under the statute. However, 16 the Court gives Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to reallege his discrimination claim 17 against AMPM Gas Station because he named AMPM Gas Station in his first complaint. 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 1 CONCLUSION 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 23), is 3 GRANTED. Plaintiff's Title VII claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to the 4 || individual employees, but Plaintiff is granted leave to amend to reallege his discrimination 5 claim against employer AMPM Gas Station. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have until November 15, 2024, to file 7 || his Second Amended Complaint identifying the parties he wishes to sue. 8 DATED this 28 _ day of October, 2024. Gloria M. Raaro, District Judge UNITED SPATES DISTRICT COURT 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Page 4 of 4