Remoh v. Williams ( 2024 )

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 REMOH GARRY, Case No. 2:23-cv-01766-RFB-NJK 4 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER 5 v. 6 BRIAN WILLIAMS, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 10 Plaintiff Remoh Garry brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress 11 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Lovelock Correctional 12 Center. (ECF No. 7 at 1). The Court filed the screening order on July 25, 2024, and ordered Garry 13 to file an amended complaint by August 24, 2024. (ECF No. 6 at 5). The Court warned Garry that 14 the action could be dismissed if he failed to file an amended complaint by that deadline. (Id. at 6). 15 That deadline expired and Garry did not file an amended complaint, move for an extension, or 16 otherwise respond. 17 I. DISCUSSION 18 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 19 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 20 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may 21 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 22 Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 23 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal 24 Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In 25 determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 26 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 27 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on 28 2 Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 3 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 4 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Garry’s claims. The third 5 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 6 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court 7 or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 8 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 9 the factors favoring dismissal. 10 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 11 to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 12 v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 13 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 14 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 15 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 16 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting 17 of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been 18 “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 19 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 20 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 21 unless Garry files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting 22 another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the 23 inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that 24 this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Garry needs additional time or evidence that he 25 did not receive the screening order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given 26 these circumstances. So, the fifth factor favors dismissal. 27 28 1 || I. CONCLUSION 2 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 3 || favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 4 || Garry’s failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with this Court’s July 25, 2024, 5 || screening order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 6 || No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Garry wishes to pursue his claims, he 7 || must file a complaint in a new case and provide the Court with his current address. 8 It is further ordered that the application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 1, 4) is Q || denied as moot. 10 11 DATED: September 4, 2024 12 AS 13 RICHARD F. BOULWARE, I 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28