Taylor v. Corona ( 2024 )

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Raymond D. Taylor, Jr., Case No. 2:23-cv-01840-CDS-BNW 5 Plaintiff Order Dismissing and Closing Case 6 v. 7 Corona, et al., 8 Defendants 9 10 Plaintiff Raymond Taylor, Jr. brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 11 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at High Desert 12 State Prison. ECF No. 10 at 1. On July 31, 2024, I ordered Taylor to file a second amended 13 complaint by September 3, 2024. ECF No. 9 at 5. I warned Taylor that the action could be 14 dismissed if he failed to file a second amended complaint by that deadline. Id. That deadline 15 expired, and Taylor did not file a second amended complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise 16 respond. 17 I. Discussion 18 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 19 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 20 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an 21 action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 22 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule 23 requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 24 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether 25 to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in 26 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of 27 prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and 28 2 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 3 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and 4 the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissing Taylor’s claims. The third 5 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 6 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 7 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 8 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 9 the factors favoring dismissal. 10 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be 11 used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See 12 Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 13 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 14 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force 15 of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to 16 disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave 17 to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 18 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 19 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 20 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Taylor files a 21 second amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another 22 deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable 23 and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this case 24 will be an exception: there is no hint that Taylor needs additional time or evidence that he did not 25 receive my screening order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 26 circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 27 28 1|{II. Conclusion 2 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 3 || dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Taylor’s 4 failure to file a second amended complaint in compliance with my July 31, 2024 order and for 5 || failing to state a claim. 6 It is further ordered that the application to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 7] is 7 ||denied as moot because Taylor is currently paroled (see ECF No. 11). 8 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and to close this case. No 9 }fother documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Taylor wishes to pursue his claims, he 10 || must file a complaint in a new case. “\ u Dated: October 3, 2024 J, / 12 —— 13 Crigtivia D. Silva wpe States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28