Hymon v. Holthus ( 2024 )

2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 RODERICK L. HYMON, Case No. 2:23-cv-01764-MMD-BNW 7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 MARY K. HOLTHUS, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 12 Plaintiff Roderick L. Hymon brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 13 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Clark 14 County Detention Center. (ECF No. 3.) On August 21, 2024, the Court ordered Hymon to 15 update his address by September 20, 2024. (ECF No. 6.) That deadline expired without 16 an updated address from Hymon, and his mail from the Court is being returned as 17 undeliverable. (ECF No. 7.) 18 I. DISCUSSION 19 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 20 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 21 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 22 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 23 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 24 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 25 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 26 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 27 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider (1) the public’s 28 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 2 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 3 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 4 Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). 5 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 6 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Hymon’s 7 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 8 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 9 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 10 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 11 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 12 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 13 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 14 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 15 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 16 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 17 Cir. 2002) (explaining that Yourish “eroded” “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit 18 cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of 19 the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” like the “initial granting of leave to amend 20 coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply”). Courts “need not exhaust 21 every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore 22 possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th 23 Cir. 1986). 24 Because this action cannot realistically proceed without the ability for the Court 25 and the defendants to send Hymon case-related documents, filings, and orders, the only 26 alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But without an updated 27 address, the likelihood that the second order would reach Hymon is low, so issuing a 28 second order will delay the inevitable and further squander the Court’s finite resources. 1 || Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances, so 2 || the fifth factor favors dismissal. 3 || Ul. CONCLUSION 4 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 5 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 6 || prejudice based on Hymon’s failure to file an updated address in compliance with the 7 || Court's August 21, 2024, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment 8 || accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed 9 || case. If Hymon wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and 10 || provide the Court with his current address. 11 It is further ordered that Hymon’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 12 || No. 3) is denied as moot. 13 DATED THIS 4" Day of October 2024. 14 16 MIRANDAM.DU- i ssses—‘—sS 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28