Ball v. County of Clark ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 7 SHAWN MICHAEL BALL, Case No. 2:24-cv-01352-APG-NJK 8 Plaintiff(s), ORDER 9 v. 10 COUNTY OF CLARK, et al., 11 Defendant(s). 12 Plaintiff has been granted in forma pauperis status in an order issued concurrently 13 herewith, so the Court screens his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 14 I. STANDARDS 15 Federal courts are given the authority to dismiss a case if the action is legally “frivolous or 16 malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from 17 a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 18 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a complaint 19 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is 20 essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 21 (9th Cir. 2000). A properly pled complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the claim 22 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 23 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, 24 it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 25 of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 26 286 (1986)). The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations contained in the 27 complaint, but the same requirement does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 28 Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory allegations, do 1 not suffice. Id. at 678. Secondly, where the claims in the complaint have not crossed the line from 2 conceivable to plausible, the complaint should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 3 Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 4 by lawyers. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal 5 construction of pro se pleadings is required after Twombly and Iqbal). 6 When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915, the plaintiff should be given leave to 7 amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of 8 the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 9 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 II. ANALYSIS 11 Plaintiff brings a § 1983 case based on the allegations that he is innocent of the crimes on 12 which he was convicted, Docket No. 1-1 at 8, that his public defender provided inadequate legal 13 representation, see id. at 3, 6-7, that the prosecutor failed to properly investigate the case, see id., 14 that the public defender and prosecutor worked together improperly, see id., and that Plaintiff 15 agreed to plead guilty as a result of unfair pressure, see id. 16 A § 1983 action cannot be used to collaterally attack a criminal conviction unless the 17 conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared 18 invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a 19 federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994). 20 In determining whether a claim is barred by Heck, the critical question is whether finding in the 21 plaintiff’s favor on a § 1983 claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or 22 sentence. Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 611 (9th Cir. 2011). Claims arising out of 23 alleged ineffective assistance by defense counsel, for malicious prosecution by the prosecutor, or 24 challenging the voluntariness of a plea agreement are all barred under Heck. See, e.g., Guerrero 25 v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 2006); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th 26 Cir. 1995); Mathis v. Amburgey, 2023 WL 5052046, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 7, 2023). 27 In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations clearly imply the invalidity of his conviction, arguing 28 that he is actually innocent, that his lawyer was ineffective, that the Government proceeded against 1} him without an evidentiary basis, and that his agreement to plead guilty resulted from improper 2|| pressure. Plaintiff has not, however, shown that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, 3] declared invalid, or called into question. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot proceed with his claims in 4] this civil action.! 5 Although it is not clear that the above deficiencies can be cured, the Court will afford 6| Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint if he believes they can be. 7| TI. CONCLUSION 8 For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiff will have until September 23, 2024, to file an amended complaint, if the noted 10] deficiencies can be corrected. If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff is informed 11] that the Court cannot refer to a prior pleading (1.e., the original complaint) in order to make the amended complaint complete. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes 13] the original complaint. Local Rule 15-1(a) requires that an amended complaint be complete in 14] itself without reference to any prior pleading. Once a plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, 16] as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each Defendant must be sufficiently 17] alleged. 18 Failure to file an amended complaint by the deadline set above may result in dismissal 19] of this case. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: August 23, 2024 2 ZENZA Nancy J. Koppe\ 23 United States Magistrate Judge 24) ' Although the Court focuses herein on the Heck bar, there appear to be other potential obstacles to Plaintiff’s claims, including that prosecutors are protected by immunity for their actions associated with their prosecutorial functions, e.g., Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 975- 26] 76 (9th Cir. 2005), that public defenders are not generally considered state actors for purposes of § 1983, e.g., Miranda v. Clark Cnty., Nev., 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), and that 27! municipal bodies are not liable for constitutional violations unless they result from their policy, practice, or custom, or a decision-making official directed or ratified the identified conduct. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).