Welch v. Gittere ( 2024 )

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 KENTRELL D. WELCH, Case No. 3:23-cv-00440-ART-CSD 4 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 5 WILLIAM GITTERE, et al., 6 Defendants. 7 8 Plaintiff Kentrell Welch (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil-rights action under 42 9 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while 10 incarcerated at Ely State Prison (“ESP”). (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) On April 23, 2024, 11 this Court ordered Plaintiff to update his address by May 23, 2024. (ECF No. 6 12 at 1.) That deadline expired without an updated address from Plaintiff, and his 13 mail from the Court is being returned as undeliverable. (See ECF No. 7.) 14 DISCUSSION 15 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 16 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 17 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 18 Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 19 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 20 King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 21 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 22 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) 23 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 24 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 25 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 26 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 27 1 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 2 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 3 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 4 Cir. 1987)). 5 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 6 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 7 dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, 8 also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 9 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 10 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 11 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 12 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 14 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 15 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 16 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 17 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 18 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 19 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 20 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 21 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 22 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 23 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 24 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful 25 alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). 26 Because this action cannot realistically proceed without the ability for the Court 27 and the defendants to send Plaintiff case-related documents, filings, and orders, 1 || the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But 2 || without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even 3 || reach Plaintiff is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and 4 || further squander the Court’s finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a 5 || meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors 6 || dismissal. 7 || II. CONCLUSION 8 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 9 || they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 10 || dismissed without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to file an updated address 11 |} in compliance with this Court’s April 23, 2024, order. The Clerk of Court is 12 || directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents 13 || may be filed in this now-closed case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims, he 14 || must file a complaint in a new case and provide the Court with his current 15 || address. 16 It is further ordered that Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis 17 || (ECF No. 1) is denied as moot. 18 19 DATED THIS 18t# day of June 2024. 20 21 22 Ap “ pad Iden 23 ANNE R. TRAUM 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28