Knight v. City of Elko ( 2024 )

2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 WADE ALAN KNIGHT, Case No. 3:22-cv-00384-MMD-CSD 7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 CITY OF ELKO, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Pro se Plaintiff Wade Alan Knight brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 13 Defendants Officers Andrew Cunningham and Bartolo Ortiz for alleged wrongful arrest 14 and Sergeant Melanie Edgmond for alleged wrongful booking in violation of his Fourth 15 Amendment rights. (ECF Nos. 11, 18.) Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for 16 summary judgment (ECF No. 56 (“Motion”)).1 As explained below, because the Court 17 finds no genuine disputes of material fact and no Fourth Amendment violation, the Court 18 grants Defendants’ Motion.2 19 II. BACKGROUND3 20 After screening, the Court allowed Knight to proceed with his Fourth Amendment 21 claims against Cunningham, Ortiz, and Edgmond. (ECF No. 18.) During the relevant time 22 23 1Knight responded (ECF No. 63), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 66). 24 2The Court also denies Knight’s pending motion for status check (ECF No. 71) as 25 moot because the granting of Defendants’ Motion closes this case and because the documents that Knight requests in the motion for status check consist of the notice of 26 change of address he himself filed (ECF No. 69) and a court order (ECF No. 68) notifying Knight of his deadline to oppose Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to provide 27 current address (ECF No. 67), which the Court had already denied with no need for a response from Knight (ECF No. 72). 28 3The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. The Court only 2 Department, and Edgmond was a sergeant with the Elko County Sheriff’s Office. 3 On March 10, 2022, responding to two separate calls for welfare checks, 4 Cunningham pulled over two individuals walking down a sidewalk. (ECF No. 56-3 at 2-3 5 (Cunningham’s declaration); ECF No. 63 at 2 (Knight’s response brief).) One of them 6 Cunningham assumed to be the subject of the calls, and the other was Knight, whom 7 Cunningham recognized but at the time could not remember his name. (ECF No. 56-3 at 8 3.) After making inquiries of the individual who was the subject of the welfare check calls, 9 Cunningham asked Knight for his name and to provide him with identification. (ECF No. 10 56-3 at 3; ECF No. 63 at 2.) Knight declined to share his name or provide identification. 11 (ECF No. 56-3 at 3; ECF No. 63 at 2.) Cunningham then left and drove away. (ECF No. 12 56-3 at 3; ECF No. 63 at 2.) 13 Shortly after, Cunningham remembered Knight’s name. (ECF No. 56-3 at 3.) 14 Cunningham knew Knight as a “habitual criminal” that he had previously encountered 15 multiple times. (Id.) Cunningham ran a warrant check using his in-car computer and 16 noticed that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Knight. (Id.) The misdemeanor 17 bench warrant had been issued on February 28, 2022 by a court in Lander County. (ECF 18 No. 56-6.) 19 Cunningham then pulled up for a second time on the two individuals, including 20 Knight. (ECF No. 56-3 at 3; ECF No. 63 at 2.) Ortiz arrived on the scene shortly thereafter. 21 (ECF No. 56-3 at 3; ECF No. 63 at 2-3.) Cunningham and Ortiz detained Knight in 22 handcuffs based on the warrant, pending confirmation of the warrant by dispatch. (ECF 23 No. 56-3 at 3; ECF No. 63 at 3.) Dispatch eventually confirmed the existence of the 24 outstanding arrest warrant to the officers, and Knight was transported to Elko County Jail. 25 (ECF No. 56-3 at 4; ECF No. 63 at 3.)4 Once there, Edgmond booked and processed 26 Knight into custody. (ECF No. 63 at 9.) 27 4Cunningham’s body camera footage (ECF Nos. 56-4, 57 (manually filed with the 28 Court)) corroborates the sequence of events from when Cunningham pulled up on Knight 2 A plaintiff may bring a claim for false arrest or false imprisonment under § 1983 by 3 alleging a violation of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure 4 of their person. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 923-25 5 (9th Cir. 2001). “A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of 6 the Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was made without probable cause or other 7 justification.” Dubner v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2001) 8 (citation omitted). The Court first addresses the claim against Cunningham and Ortiz, then 9 the claim against Edgmond. Because the parties do not appear to dispute any material 10 facts but simply argue about what those facts demonstrate under the law, summary 11 judgment is appropriate here. See Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 12 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary 13 trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court.”). 14 A. Cunningham and Ortiz 15 The Court analyzes the sequence of events involving Knight’s encounters with 16 Cunningham and Ortiz in chronological order to determine whether there was any Fourth 17 Amendment violation. 18 1. Initial Encounter 19 As to the initial encounter, Knight appears to argue that Cunningham lacked 20 reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop him and ask him for his identity. (ECF 21 No. 63 at 5.) To the extent Knight is arguing that the first encounter with Cunningham 22 constituted a stop or seizure, the Court disagrees. “[A] seizure does not occur simply 23 because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.” Fla. v. 24 Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). “[T]he appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable 25 person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the 26 encounter.” Id. at 436. “So long as a reasonable person would feel free ‘to disregard the 27 police and go about his business,’ . . . no reasonable suspicion is required.” Id. at 434 28 (internal citation omitted). “[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular 2 individual’s identification . . . as long as the police do not convey a message that 3 compliance with their requests is required.” Id. at 434-35 (internal citations omitted). 4 First, the initial encounter with Knight and his acquaintance was generally justified 5 because Cunningham had received two calls for welfare checks regarding Knight’s 6 acquaintance who had purportedly been seen vomiting at a crosswalk and banging his 7 head on the concrete ground. (ECF No. 56-3 at 2-3, 7, 10.) It was therefore reasonable 8 for Cunningham to approach the acquaintance and Knight—who happened to be there 9 when Cunningham arrived—and to ask them questions and for identification to assess 10 the situation. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35. Second, as far as Knight was concerned, 11 the encounter did not constitute a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment because he 12 was evidently not the subject of the calls and a reasonable person in that situation would 13 feel free to “disregard the police and go about his business.” See id. at 434. In fact, Knight 14 apparently felt free to decline and indeed declined Cunningham’s request for his name 15 and identification, and Cunningham accepted the response and did not require 16 compliance. See id. at 434-36; United States v. Ingram, 151 F. App’x 597, 599 (9th Cir. 17 2005) (“The appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person in [their] position would 18 feel free to ignore the officer’s order.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Cunningham’s 19 initial encounter with Knight was reasonable, did not constitute a stop or seizure requiring 20 reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and therefore did not violate the Fourth 21 Amendment.5 22 23 24 25 26 5To the extent Knight takes issue with the fact that Cunningham would not have eventually discovered the arrest warrant had he not initially encountered Knight that day, 27 while that may be true, there is ultimately no Fourth Amendment violation that led to Cunningham recognizing Knight during this encounter and later remembering his name. 28 Cunningham did not even learn of Knight’s identity through the initial encounter itself but 2 Knight’s main argument appears to be that Cunningham did not have probable 3 cause or reasonable suspicion to run his name for a warrant check.6 (ECF No. 63 at 3- 4 5.) Defendants counter that the Fourth Amendment did not require Cunningham and Ortiz 5 to demonstrate probable cause or reasonable suspicion to search for outstanding 6 warrants. (ECF No. 56 at 6.) As explained below, the Court does not agree with 7 Defendants to the extent they contend law enforcement officers never need reasonable 8 suspicion to run a warrant check but ultimately finds that the warrant check here did not 9 constitute a search or seizure requiring justification under the Fourth Amendment. 10 Defendants primarily rely on Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 (2016), to argue that the 11 discovery of the valid arrest warrant “attenuat[ed] any hypothetical illegality of the initial 12 stop” or warrant check. (ECF No. 56 at 7.) Strieff does not squarely apply here because 13 it concerns the attenuation doctrine, which goes toward whether evidence is admissible 14 despite unconstitutional police conduct.7 Here, the Court is concerned only with whether 15 there was any unconstitutional conduct, not with whether such conduct was sufficiently 16 attenuated to warrant not suppressing any evidence obtained. In § 1983 cases, “police 17 officers cannot retroactively justify a suspicionless search and arrest on the basis of an 18 after-the-fact discovery of an arrest warrant.” Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 19 2005). 20 Fourth Amendment cases involving warrant checks typically involve a warrant 21 check conducted during a stop or seizure. For instance, courts have required at least 22 reasonable suspicion to detain someone for the purpose of running a warrant check, see 23 24 6Knight also argues that he did not consent to having his name run through the criminal history database. (ECF No. 63 at 3, 4.) The Court rejects that argument because 25 the Fourth Amendment does not require that officers obtain an individual’s consent to run a warrant check. 26 7Under the attenuation doctrine, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection 27 between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the 28 constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of 2 “for the purpose of running a warrant check” to be unreasonable because the police “had 3 no reasonable grounds to be suspicious that there might be a warrant outstanding against 4 him”), and found that warrant checks performed incident to a traffic violation stop are 5 justified by officer safety concerns or the reasonable suspicion tied to the traffic violation, 6 see United States v. Hylton, 30 F.4th 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 7 393 (2022). In other words, a warrant check performed during a stop or seizure must be 8 justified on some reasonable grounds. 9 Here, the warrant check was not conducted during a stop or seizure of Knight. That 10 is, Cunningham conducted the warrant check in his car after he had driven away from 11 Knight after the initial encounter. (ECF No. 56-3 at 3.) The Fourth Amendment only 12 applies to searches and seizures, and the Court is not persuaded that a warrant check in 13 and of itself constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 14 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment 15 provides that the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 16 effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.’”). 17 “A ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 18 consider reasonable is infringed.” Id. (citations omitted). “A ‘seizure’ of property occurs 19 when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in 20 that property,” id. (citations omitted), and a “seizure” of a person occurs when “police 21 conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free 22 to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter,” Bostick, 501 U.S. 23 at 439. Knight had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information that he had an 24 outstanding arrest warrant contained in the criminal history database, which exists 25 primarily for law enforcement use and access as part of their operations. Nor could the 26 warrant check itself constitute a seizure of property or person. Accordingly, Cunningham’s 27 28 2 not itself constitute a search or seizure, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.8 3 3. Second Encounter and Arrest 4 Because Knight does not dispute or challenge the validity of the February 28, 2022 5 arrest warrant (ECF No. 63 at 17; ECF No. 56-1 at 11), the Court finds that Cunningham 6 and Ortiz’s stop, arrest, and detainment of Knight during the second encounter based on 7 the warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment. “[T]he facts upon which the 8 reasonableness of a search or seizure depends, whether it be an outstanding arrest 9 warrant . . . or any other fact, must be known to the officer at the time the search or seizure 10 is conducted.” Moreno, 431 F.3d at 642. “A person arrested under a warrant would have 11 received a prior judicial determination of probable cause.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 12 103, 116 n.18 (1975). 13 Here, before and at the time of the arrest, Cunningham knew of Knight’s identity, 14 and Cunningham and Ortiz knew of the outstanding arrest warrant for Knight. The warrant 15 supplied the probable cause for the officers to stop, arrest, detain, and perform a search 16 incident to the arrest9 on Knight. Accordingly, Knight’s arrest did not violate the Fourth 17 Amendment.10 18 To the extent Knight argues that Cunningham and Ortiz’s conduct from the warrant 19 check to the arrest violated certain Nevada statutes, national and state law enforcement 20 21 8As the reasonable suspicion standard cannot apply where there is no Fourth Amendment search or seizure, the Court therefore need not—and does not—address the 22 parties’ arguments about whether Cunningham had reasonable suspicion to run the warrant check. 23 9“The search-incident-to-arrest exception permits law enforcement officers to 24 conduct a warrantless search of a person who is arrested, and of his surrounding area, when the search is incident to the arrest.” United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 950-51 25 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 26 10To the extent Knight argues that, during this second encounter, the officers did not have the emergency lights on their cars activated and therefore did not have legal 27 authority over him (ECF No. 63 at 8, 19), Knight does not support this contention with any case law, and the Court is not persuaded that this changes the Fourth Amendment 28 analysis. 2 20-21), the Court rejects the argument because under § 1983, the only type of claim 3 proceeding here, the issue is whether a government official violated the Constitution or 4 federal law, not whether they violated state laws, agency standards, or police department 5 policies.11 Officials should of course conform their conduct to applicable statutes and 6 policies, but conduct by a government official that violates some state statutory provision 7 or law enforcement policy does not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment. See Rios 8 v. City of Los Angeles, Case No. 2:21-cv-05341-RGK-MAA, 2022 WL 17219085, at *2 9 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2022) (“[W]hether an officer followed regulations or state law is 10 ‘immaterial as to the question of whether a violation of the federal constitution has been 11 established.’”); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984) (“Officials sued for 12 constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct 13 violates some [state] statutory or administrative provision.”). Even if Cunningham and 14 Ortiz violated any of the provisions Knight identified, as the Court found above, their 15 conduct ultimately did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 16 B. Edgmond 17 Knight argues that Edgmond booked him into jail illegally because the arresting 18 officers did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to arrest him. (ECF No. 63 19 at 18.) As discussed above, the Court finds that Cunningham and Ortiz had probable 20 cause to arrest Knight based on the valid arrest warrant. Accordingly, Edgmond’s booking 21 of Knight into jail, which also relied on the valid arrest warrant, was lawful and did not 22 violate the Fourth Amendment. 23 Knight also argues that Edgmond violated Elko County Sheriff Department policies 24 by for instance not having a “declaration of probable cause sheet” when booking Knight. 25 (Id.) The Court rejects that argument because, as discussed above, violations of internal 26 27 11“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the 28 alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. 1 || police department policies do not alone constitute violations of the Fourth Amendment, 2 || and in any event, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, such a sheet is not necessary 3 || here where the valid warrant provided the probable cause required for Knight’s arrest and 4 || booking. 5 In sum, the Court finds that, based on the undisputed facts of this case, 6 || Cunningham, Ortiz, and Edgmond did not violate Knight’s Fourth Amendment rights and 7 || accordingly grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 8 || IV. CONCLUSION 9 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 10 || cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 11 || determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 12 || motions before the Court. 13 It is therefore ordered that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14 || 56) is granted. 15 It is further ordered that Plaintiff's motion for status check (ECF No. 71) is denied 16 || as moot. 17 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 18 DATED THIS 27" Day of June 2024. 20 MIRANDA M. DU 21 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28