Sotelo v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ( 2024 )

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 Jose Sotelo, Case No. 2:23-cv-01541-MMD-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 Order v. 8 State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 Before the Court is the parties’ stipulated protective order (ECF No. 28). The parties 12 request that the Court enter a protective order to govern their exchange of confidential 13 information. However, the parties fail to state the governing standard for filing documents under 14 seal with the Court. This order reminds counsel that there is a presumption of public access to 15 judicial files and records. A party seeking to file a confidential document under seal must file a 16 motion to seal and must comply with the Ninth Circuit’s directives in Kamakana v. City and 17 County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006) and Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, 18 LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016). 19 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parties’ stipulated protective order (ECF No. 20 28) is granted subject to the following modifications: 21 • The Court has adopted electronic filing procedures. Attorneys must file 22 documents under seal using the Court’s electronic filing procedures. See Local 23 Rule IA 10-5. Papers filed with the Court under seal must be accompanied with a 24 concurrently-filed motion for leave to file those documents under seal. See Local 25 Rule IA 10-5(a). 26 • The Court has approved the instant protective order to facilitate discovery 27 exchanges, but there has been no showing, and the Court has not found, that any 1 specific facts supported by declarations or concrete examples to establish that a 2 protective order is required to protect any specific trade secret or other confidential 3 information pursuant to Rule 26(c) or that disclosure would cause an identifiable 4 and significant harm. 5 • All motions to seal shall address the standard articulated in Ctr. for Auto Safety 6 and explain why that standard has been met. 809 F.3d at 1097. 7 • Specifically, a party seeking to seal judicial records bears the burden of meeting 8 the “compelling reasons” standard, as previously articulated in Kamakana. 447 9 F.3d 1172. Under the compelling reasons standard, “a court may seal records only 10 when it finds ‘a compelling reason and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling, 11 without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 12 1097. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). “The court must then 13 ‘conscientiously balance[ ] the competing interests of the public and the party who 14 seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 15 1097. 16 • There is an exception to the compelling reasons standard where a party may satisfy 17 the less exacting “good cause” standard for sealed materials attached to a 18 discovery motion unrelated to the merits of the case. Id. “The good cause 19 language comes from Rule 26(c)(1), which governs the issuance of protective 20 orders in the discovery process: ‘The court may, for good cause, issue an order to 21 protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 22 burden or expense.’” Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)). “For good cause to exist, the 23 party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm 24 will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips v. General Motors, 307 F.3d 25 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002). 26 • The labels of “dispositive” and “nondispositive” will not be the determinative 27 factor for deciding which test to apply because the focal consideration is “whether 1 the motion is more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” Ctr. for Auto 2 Safety, 809 F.3d at 1101. 3 • The fact that the Court has entered the instant stipulated protective order and that a 4 party has designated a document as confidential pursuant to that protective order 5 does not, standing alone, establish sufficient grounds to seal a filed document. See 6 Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003); see 7 also Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). If 8 the sole ground for a motion to seal is that the opposing party (or non-party) has 9 designated a document as confidential, the designator shall file (within seven days 10 of the filing of the motion to seal) either (1) a declaration establishing sufficient 11 justification for sealing each document at issue or (2) a notice of withdrawal of the 12 designation(s) and consent to unsealing. If neither filing is made, the Court may 13 order the document(s) unsealed without further notice. 14 • To the extent any aspect of the stipulated protective order may conflict with this 15 order or Local Rule IA 10-5, that aspect of the stipulated protective order is hereby 16 superseded with this order. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 DATED: July 11, 2024 19 DANIEL J. ALBREGTS 20 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27