Jackson v. NDOC Medical ( 2024 )

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 RAYMOND JACKSON, Case No.: 2:23-cv-01112-APG-MDC 4 Plaintiff Order 5 v. 6 NDOC MEDICAL, et al., 7 Defendants 8 9 Plaintiff Raymond Jackson brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 10 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at High Desert 11 State Prison. ECF No. 18. On June 2, 2024, I ordered Jackson to file an amended complaint by 12 August 30, 2024. ECF No. 17. That deadline expired and Jackson did not file an amended 13 complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. Furthermore, my order came back as 14 undeliverable to the address that Jackson provided to the Court, and Jackson has not filed an 15 updated address with the Court. ECF No. 19. 16 I. Discussion 17 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 18 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 19 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may 20 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 21 Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 22 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 23 Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider: (1) 1 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its 2 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 3 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 4 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone 5 v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 7 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Jackson’s claims. The 8 third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a 9 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading 10 ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th 11 Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is 12 greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 14 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 15 v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 16 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 17 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 18 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 19 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial 20 granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have 21 been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 22 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. 23 Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Jackson files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only 3|| delays the inevitable and squanders the court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: my previous order came back as undeliverable, and Jackson has not filed an updated address, making it unlikely that a second order setting another deadline would even reach Jackson. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative 7\| given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. IT. Conclusion 9 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 10|| dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 11||Jackson’s failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with my June 2, 2024, order. The 12|| Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other 13|| documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Jackson wishes to pursue his claims, he must 14|| file a complaint in a new case. 15 It is further ordered that Jackson’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 11) is denied as moot. 17 18 Dated: September 20, 2024 Z, 19 U.S. District Judge 20 21 22 23