Lynch v. Hernandez ( 2024 )

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 Tommy Lynch as Administrator for the Case No. 2:21-cv-01981-ART-DJA 6 Estate of Tammy Lynch; and Tommy Lynch and April Black, individually as 7 heirs of Tammy Lynch, Order 8 Plaintiffs, 9 v. 10 Samir Adrian Hernandez, individually; Lizbeth Barragan, individually; Laughlin Watercraft 11 Rentals, LLC, individually; et al., 12 Defendants. 13 14 This civil action arises out of Tammy Lynch’s death following a jet ski collision. 15 Defendant Lizbeth Barragan rented the jet ski that caused the collision from Defendant Laughlin 16 Watercraft Rentals, LLC (“LWR”) and then allowed Defendant Samir Adrian Hernandez—who 17 was under the influence of cocaine and alcohol—to operate it. Hernandez collided with another 18 jet ski on which Tammy was a passenger, resulting in her death. 19 Plaintiffs brought the instant case on October 28, 2021. On June 10, 2022, LWR initiated 20 a separate case by filing a Complaint for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability (“LOLA 21 Complaint”). See In re Complaint of Laughlin Watercraft Rentals, LLC, No. 2:22-cv-00940- 22 ART-DJA at ECF No. 1. The LOLA Complaint invoked the Shipowners Limitation of Liability 23 Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq. and asked the Court to find that, because LWR maintained the jet 24 ski in a reasonable manner and did not give Barragan permission to lend the jet ski to Hernandez, 25 LWR is exonerated from liability. This case and the In re Complaint of Laughlin Watercraft 26 Rentals, LLC case were consolidated on July 26, 2022. 27 Plaintiffs now move on an emergency basis to reopen discovery and extend the dispositive 1 led them to believe that LWR had withdrawn its LOLA Complaint and that, when LWR raised 2 exoneration as a defense in its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs were caught by surprise. 3 (Id. at 3-7). Plaintiffs assert that, based on their belief that the LOLA Complaint was withdrawn, 4 they had decided not to pursue the depositions of Bill Treese—LWR’s registered agent—and his 5 wife, Christina Treese. (Id.). Plaintiffs ask the Court to reopen discovery so that they may 6 depose Chrstina and/or Bill and ask the Court to extend the dispositive motion deadline so that 7 they may move for summary judgment on the exoneration issue.1 (Id. at 15). 8 LWR responds and points out that withdrawing its LOLA Complaint2 did not impact its 9 ability to raise an exoneration defense because LWR raised it as an affirmative defense in 10 answering Plaintiffs’ complaint. (ECF No. 123 at 7-9). LWR does not oppose Plaintiffs’ request 11 to extend discovery and points out that the parties recently stipulated to an extension of deadlines 12 that accommodates Plaintiffs’ wish to address LWR’s exoneration defense in summary judgment. 13 (Id. at 4, 7). LWR’s counsel notes that “Plaintiffs’ counsel has affirmed to me that they now wish 14 to depose Stan Jablonski,3 not Bill or Christina Treese as they stated in their motion,” which 15 change LWR does not oppose. (Id. at 3). LWR asks the Court, however, to limit the scope of the 16 depositions to LWR’s LOLA defenses and, specifically, the Honorable District Judge Anne R. 17 Traum’s prior ruling on that issue. (Id. at 7). 18 Plaintiffs reply and object to LWR’s attempt to limit the deposition topics and to limit 19 Plaintiffs to only deposing “one owner and/or former owner of Defendant LWR”—Jablonski. 20 (ECF No. 125 at 3). Plaintiffs assert that they “are specifically asking the opportunity to depose 21 the owner, and/or owners of Defendant LWR at the time of the subject incident who had 22 23 1 Plaintiffs also argue that LWR is judicially estopped from asserting an exoneration defense, 24 which argument LWR opposes in response. These arguments are better brought through the parties’ dispositive motion practice and not through the instant emergency motion to reopen 25 discovery. The Court declines to address them here and issues no finding one way or the other regarding judicial estoppel. 26 2 LWR filed a notice of withdrawal of its LOLA Complaint on November 1, 2024. (ECF No. 27 122). 1 knowledge, or a lack thereof, of Defendant LWR’s rental process including the safety instructions 2 provided in said rental process of the subject jet[]ski.” (Id. at 5). Plaintiffs reiterate their desire to 3 file a new motion for summary judgment in their reply. (Id. at 7). 4 I. Discussion. 5 A request to extend unexpired deadlines in the scheduling order must be premised on a 6 showing of good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); Local Rule 26-3. On the other hand, a request 7 for relief from a case management deadline that has already passed requires an additional 8 showing of excusable neglect. Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. DMSI, LLC, 871 F.3d 751, 764-65 9 (9th Cir. 2017) (addressing former Local Rule 26-4); see also Local Rule 26-3. The excusable 10 neglect analysis is guided by factors that include (1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing 11 party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the 12 delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. Branch Banking, 871 F.3d at 765. 13 Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown good cause and excusable neglect to 14 reopen the discovery deadline for the limited purpose of taking depositions relevant to LWR’s 15 exoneration argument. The Court declines to set limits on the scope of those depositions or 16 dictate who the proper deponent or deponents may be. This is because the parties’ arguments on 17 these issues arose primarily in response and reply briefs and did not address Federal Rule of Civil 18 Procedure 26(b). Instead, the Court will direct the parties to meet and confer on the issue of who 19 to depose and the scope of those depositions. 20 The Court also finds that Plaintiffs have shown good cause and excusable neglect to 21 reopen the dispositive motion deadline. Although LWR points out that the parties have stipulated 22 to extend certain briefing schedules, that stipulation does not reopen the deadline to submit any 23 new dispositive motions as Plaintiffs have requested in their emergency motion. So, the Court 24 reopens this deadline as well. 25 26 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ emergency motion to reopen the 27 discovery and dispositive motions deadlines (ECF No. 119) is granted in part and denied in 1 deadline for them to conduct depositions and their request that the Court reopen the dispositive 2 motions deadline. It is denied in all other respects. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall have until December 9, 2024 to 4 complete limited discovery. The dispositive motion deadline shall be January 8, 2025. 5 6 DATED: November 7, 2024 7 8 DANIEL J. ALBREGTS 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27