The Matter of the Honorable Alan M. Simon a Justice of the Spring Valley Village Court and the Ramapo Town Court, Rockland County ( 2016 )


Menu:
  • This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
    publication in the New York Reports.
    -----------------------------------------------------------------
    No. 135
    In the Matter of the Honorable
    Alan M. Simon, a Justice of the
    Spring Valley Village Court and
    the Ramapo Town Court, Rockland
    County,
    Petitioner,
    State Commission on Judicial
    Conduct,
    Respondent.
    Lawrence A. Mandelker, for petitioner.
    Edward Lindner, for respondent.
    PER CURIAM:
    At the request of petitioner, Alan M. Simon, we review
    a determination of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct
    (Commission), which sustained six charges of misconduct against
    petitioner and recommended that he be removed from his judicial
    offices.   Petitioner has been a Justice of the Spring Valley
    - 1 -
    - 2 -                         No. 135
    Village Court since 2005 and a Justice of the Ramapo Town Court
    since 2011.   He also was appointed an Acting Justice of the
    Hillburn Village Court in 2016.
    In seeking review, petitioner "concedes his
    misconduct," but he challenges the Commission's recommendation
    that he be removed (see Judiciary Law § 44 [7]).   Specifically,
    petitioner contends that, in lieu of removal, we should direct
    that he be censured and restored to his judicial offices.     We
    reject that contention and accept the determined sanction of
    removal.
    In matters involving judicial misconduct we have broad
    statutory and constitutional authority to determine the
    appropriate sanction (see Matter of Aldrich v State Commn. on
    Jud. Conduct, 58 NY2d 279, 282 [1983], rearg denied 59 NY2d 967
    [1983]).   Judicial misconduct cases involve "institutional and
    collective judgment calls based on assessment of their individual
    facts, in relation to prevailing standards of judicial behavior
    and the prospect of future misconduct and continued judicial
    service" (Matter of Roberts, 91 NY2d 93, 97 [1997]).     "[W]e have
    long defined the purpose of a judicial disciplinary proceeding
    not in terms of punishment for its own sake, 'but [for] the
    imposition of sanctions where necessary to safeguard the Bench
    from unfit incumbents'" (Matter of Restaino [State Commn. on Jud.
    Conduct], 10 NY3d 577, 589 [2008], quoting Matter of Duckman, 92
    NY2d 141, 152 [1998]).
    - 2 -
    - 3 -                         No. 135
    The ultimate sanction of removal typically is "reserved
    for 'truly egregious circumstances' that extend beyond the limits
    of 'even extremely poor judgment'" (Restaino, 10 NY3d at 589,
    quoting Matter of Kiley, 74 NY2d 364, 369, 370 [1989]), but it
    must also be kept in mind "that the 'truly egregious' standard is
    measured with due regard to the higher standard of conduct to
    which judges are held" (Restaino, 10 NY3d at 589-590 [some
    internal quotation marks omitted]).    Removal thus is warranted
    when a judge exhibits "a pattern of injudicious behavior . . .
    which cannot be viewed as acceptable conduct by one holding
    judicial office" (Matter of VonderHeide [State Commn. on Jud.
    Conduct], 72 NY2d 658, 660 [1988]) or an "abuse[] [of] the power
    of his [or her] office in a manner that . . . has irredeemably
    damaged public confidence in the integrity of his [or her] court"
    (Matter of McGee v State Commn. on Jud. Conduct, 59 NY2d 870, 871
    [1983]).
    Here, the Commission held, and petitioner concedes,
    that he violated these Rules Governing Judicial Conduct:
    22 NYCRR 100.1 (entitled, "A judge shall
    uphold the integrity and independence of the
    judiciary");
    22 NYCRR 100.2 (A) ("A judge shall respect
    and comply with the law and shall act at all
    times in a manner that promotes public
    confidence in the integrity and impartiality
    of the judiciary");
    22 NYCRR 100.2 (C) ("A judge shall not lend
    the prestige of judicial office to advance
    the private interests of . . . others");
    - 3 -
    - 4 -                       No. 135
    22 NYCRR 100.3 (B) (1) ("A judge shall be
    faithful to the law and maintain professional
    competence in it. A judge shall not be
    swayed by partisan interests, public clamor
    or fear of criticism");
    22 NYCRR 100.3 (B) (3) ("A judge shall be
    patient, dignified and courteous to
    litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and
    others with whom the judge deals in an
    official capacity . . . .");
    22 NYCRR 100.3 (B) (6) ("A judge shall accord
    to every person who has a legal interest in a
    proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the
    right to be heard according to law. . . .");
    22 NYCRR 100.3 (C) (1) ("A judge shall
    diligently discharge the judge's
    administrative responsibilities without bias
    or prejudice and maintain professional
    competence in judicial administration, and
    should cooperate with other judges and court
    officials in the administration of court
    business"); and
    22 NYCRR 100.5 (A) (1) (c) and (d) ("Neither
    a sitting judge nor a candidate for public
    election to judicial office shall directly or
    indirectly engage in any political activity.
    . . . Prohibited political activity shall
    include . . . [c] engaging in any partisan
    political activity . . . [and] [d]
    participating in any political campaign for
    any office or permitting his or her name to
    be used in connection with any activity of a
    political organization").
    The misconduct giving rise to that concession
    "qualifies as 'truly egregious'" (Restaino, 10 NY3d at 590).   The
    record reflects that, among other things, petitioner used a
    sanction -- a tool meant to "shield" from frivolous conduct -- as
    a "sword" to punish a legal services organization for a perceived
    slight in an inexcusable and patently improper way (see 22 NYCRR
    - 4 -
    - 5 -                         No. 135
    130-1.1 [a] [authorizing the imposition of sanctions, but
    precluding town and village courts from applying such
    penalties]).   The record is also replete with instances in which
    petitioner used his office and standing as a platform from which
    to bully and to intimidate.   To that end, it is undisputed that
    petitioner engaged in ethnic smearing and name-calling and
    repeatedly displayed poor temperament -- perhaps most
    significantly, by engaging in a physical altercation with a
    student worker.
    Those actions are representative of an even more
    serious problem.   Petitioner -- in what allegedly was a grossly
    misguided attempt to motivate -- repeatedly threatened to hold
    various officials and employees of the Village of Spring Valley
    in contempt without cause or process.   Those threats "exceeded
    all measure of acceptable judicial conduct" (Matter of Blackburne
    [State Commn. on Jud. Conduct], 7 NY3d 213, 221 [2006]), and we
    are particularly troubled by the testimony of one court officer,
    who suggested that petitioner's threats were so common that they
    became "a joke."   The matter may have been a laughing one to that
    officer, but it was not to others.
    Significantly, too, petitioner's hectoring extended
    beyond the courthouse.   In what ostensibly was an attempt to
    undermine a former co-Judge and an apparent political adversary,
    petitioner willfully injected himself into the political process
    involving the election of an office other than his own.   All of
    - 5 -
    - 6 -                         No. 135
    the foregoing actions reflect a pattern of calculated misconduct
    that militates against petitioner's assertion that the
    misbehavior complained of will not be repeated if he is allowed
    to remain on the bench.1   Petitioner's misconduct apparently was
    tempered only by the intervention of the Commission, and at the
    hearing held with respect to this matter he appeared unrepentant
    and evasive, testifying falsely on at least two occasions in an
    attempt to minimize his misconduct -- all of which renders
    suspect his guarantees of better behavior.2
    Accordingly, the determined sanction should be
    accepted, without costs, and Alan M. Simon removed from the
    offices of Justice of the Spring Valley Village Court, Rockland
    County, and Justice of the Ramapo Town Court, Rockland County.
    1
    By operation of the New York State Constitution,
    petitioner is "ineligible to hold other judicial office" (NY
    Const, art VI, § 22 [h]).
    2
    Petitioner also claims that the Commission ignored the
    theory of the case that he presented to it, namely, that he
    acknowledged that his misconduct was not justified, but that "his
    motives were to protect the independence and integrity of the
    court from the undue influence of a corrupt mayor and improve its
    efficiency." Even assuming the truth of that representation, the
    "means" by which petitioner attempted to effectuate those "ends"
    are unacceptable.
    - 6 -
    - 7 -                           No. 135
    *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *    *      *   *   *   *   *   *     *   *
    Determined sanction accepted, without costs, and Alan M. Simon
    removed from the offices of Justice of the Spring Valley Village
    Court, Rockland County, and Justice of the Ramapo Town Court,
    Rockland County. Opinion Per Curiam.    Chief Judge DiFiore and
    Judges Pigott, Rivera, Abdus-Salaam, Stein, Fahey and Garcia
    concur.
    Decided October 20, 2016
    - 7 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 135

Judges: Difiore, Pigott, Rivera, Abdtjs-Salaam, Stein, Fahey, Garcia

Filed Date: 10/20/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/12/2024