The People v. Oscar Sanders , 26 N.Y.3d 773 ( 2016 )


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  • This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
    publication in the New York Reports.
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    No. 22
    The People &c.,
    Respondent,
    v.
    Oscar Sanders,
    Appellant.
    Rahshanda Sibley, for appellant.
    William H. Branigan, for respondent.
    FAHEY, J.:
    The primary issue on this appeal is whether defendant’s
    constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
    seizures was violated when police took defendant’s clothing,
    which had been placed in a clear hospital bag, without either a
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    - 2 -                        No. 22
    warrant or his consent.    Under the circumstances of this case, we
    conclude that the seizure was unconstitutional, and that the part
    of defendant’s motion seeking to suppress that physical evidence
    should have been granted.
    On August 11, 2010, defendant “walked in” to Jamaica
    Hospital (hospital) in Queens seeking treatment for a gunshot
    wound.   Pursuant to its protocol, and as required by law (Penal
    Law § 265.25), the hospital reported the shooting to the police.
    Defendant told a police officer who responded to the hospital
    that defendant “was shot in [a nearby] [p]ark.”    By the time he
    spoke to that officer, defendant was “wearing hospital clothing.”
    After “dealing with . . . defendant” for “[a] little
    over an hour,” the officer was directed to clothing defendant
    “wore when he came to [the] [h]ospital.”    Those clothes were in a
    clear plastic bag that rested on the floor of a trauma room a
    short distance away from the stretcher on which defendant was
    situated in a hospital hallway.    In the bag the officer observed
    the “jeans that [defendant] was wearing that night, boxers, and
    his sneakers,” and there is no dispute that the officer seized
    that bag.    Likewise, there is no dispute that, as he vouchered
    the clothing, the officer inspected each garment.    Based at least
    in part on observations the officer made with respect to the
    condition of those items during the inventory process,
    authorities believed that defendant had accidentally shot himself
    with a gun he carried in his waistband.
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    - 3 -                           No. 22
    Defendant was subsequently charged with, among other
    things, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree
    (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]) and criminal possession of a weapon in
    the third degree (§ 265.02 [1]).    Before trial, defendant sought
    suppression of the clothes based on what defense counsel
    characterized as the unlawful warrantless seizure of those items.
    The People opposed the motion on the ground that “police can
    seize evidence . . . where the items are in open view and the
    officer[] observe[s] [them] from a lawful vantage point.”      After
    a hearing at which the investigating officer testified
    essentially to the facts noted at the outset of this opinion,
    Supreme Court denied suppression.   According to the hearing
    court, “the clothing in [the] clear bag . . . potentially was
    evidence of a crime,” and “there [was] no violation of any
    [F]ourth [A]mendment rights . . . when th[at] clothing was
    recovered to be examined to see if it had relevance to the
    investigation of a crime of someone being shot.”
    Defendant was eventually convicted of the
    aforementioned crimes following a jury trial at which the People
    supported their contention that defendant criminally possessed a
    loaded firearm outside of his home or place of business through,
    among other things, the admission into evidence of the clothing
    seized at the hospital.1   On appeal, the Appellate Division
    affirmed the judgment and rejected defendant’s challenge to the
    1
    The gun central to this case was never recovered.
    - 3 -
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    suppression ruling (119 AD3d 878 [2d Dept 2014]).   In doing so,
    the Appellate Division reasoned that “[s]ince the defendant’s
    clothing was lying on the floor of a hospital room in a clear
    plastic bag, the clothing was openly visible,” and that “the
    police had probable cause to seize the . . . clothing as evidence
    of a crime of which they believed the defendant had been a
    victim” (id.).    A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to
    appeal (24 NY3d 1088 [2014]), and we now reverse the Appellate
    Division order.
    Our analysis begins with the fundamental precept “that
    warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless
    they fall within one of the acknowledged exceptions to the Fourth
    Amendment's warrant requirement” (People v Diaz, 81 NY2d 106, 109
    [1993], abrogated on other grounds by Minnesota v Dickerson, 
    508 U.S. 366
    [1993]).   “Where a warrant has not been obtained, it is
    the People who have the burden of overcoming th[e] presumption”
    of unreasonableness (People v Hodge, 44 NY2d 553, 557 [1978]).
    Of the “ ‘jealously and carefully drawn’ exceptions to
    the warrant-preference rule” (Matter of Caruso v Ward, 72 NY2d
    432, 443 [1988] [Kaye and Titone, JJ., dissenting], quoting Jones
    v United States, 
    357 U.S. 493
    , 499 [1958]), at issue here is the
    exclusion in which probable cause exists for the seizure of an
    object or objects in plain view.
    “Under the plain view doctrine, if the sight
    of an object gives the police probable cause
    to believe that it is the instrumentality of
    a crime, the object may be seized without a
    - 4 -
    - 5 -                          No. 22
    warrant if three conditions are met: (1) the
    police are lawfully in the position from
    which the object is viewed; (2) the police
    have lawful access to the object; and (3) the
    object's incriminating nature is immediately
    apparent” (Diaz, 81 NY2d at 110; see People v
    Brown, 96 NY2d 80, 89 [2001]).
    Against this backdrop we conclude that the hearing
    court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the clothes
    seized by police.2   There was evidence adduced at the suppression
    hearing that the officer who seized the clothes knew defendant to
    have been shot, and that defendant awaited treatment at the
    hospital while dressed in clothes different from those he wore at
    the time of the shooting.   More important, however, is what the
    evidence presented at the suppression hearing does not establish.
    That evidence does not show that, before the seizure, the
    testifying officer knew that entry and exit wounds were located
    on an area of defendant’s body that would have been covered by
    the clothes defendant wore at the time of the shooting.
    Similarly, the record of that proceeding contains no other
    indicium that could have given rise to a reasonable belief that
    the shooting had affected defendant’s clothes.   To that end,
    there is no record support for the lower courts’ conclusion that
    2
    Defendant also contends that the Appellate Division’s
    ruling that the search was permissible under the plain view
    doctrine violates People v LaFontaine (92 NY2d 470, 474 [1998])
    inasmuch as the plain view exception was not at issue before the
    hearing court. Here, however, the People invoked the plain view
    doctrine before the hearing court, and the issue was decided
    adversely to defendant when that court denied suppression.
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    the investigating officer had probable cause to believe that
    defendant’s clothes were the instrumentality of a crime (see
    generally People v Cook, 85 NY2d 928, 931 [1995]; cf. generally
    People v Salvodon, 127 AD3d 1239, 1240-1241 [2d Dept 2015]).
    Consequently, for the foregoing reasons we conclude
    that the seizure was illegal and the items seized were improperly
    admitted into evidence at trial.        In view of our determination
    that defendant’s motion to suppress the physical evidence should
    have been granted, we do not address defendant’s remaining
    contentions.3
    Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
    be reversed, defendant’s motion insofar as it sought to suppress
    the physical evidence granted, the judgment vacated, and the case
    remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance
    with this opinion.
    *   *    *     *   *   *   *   *    *      *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
    Order reversed, defendant's motion insofar as it sought to
    suppress the physical evidence granted, judgment vacated and case
    remitted to Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings
    in accordance with the opinion herein. Opinion by Judge Fahey.
    Judges Pigott, Rivera, Abdus-Salaam and Stein concur. Chief
    Judge DiFiore and Judge Garcia took no part.
    Decided February 23, 2016
    3
    Specifically, we note that, given our conclusion that
    the seizure is unconstitutional, we have no occasion to consider
    defendant's contention with respect to the validity of the
    search.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 22

Citation Numbers: 26 N.Y.3d 773, 47 N.E.3d 770, 27 N.Y.S.3d 491

Judges: Abdus-Salaam, DiFiore, Fahey, Garcia, Pigott, Rivera, Stein

Filed Date: 2/23/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/12/2024