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*1529 Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (John J. Brunetti, A.J.), rendered January 30, 2009. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal contempt in the second degree (four counts) and stalking in the fourth degree.It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of one count of stalking in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 120.45 [2]) and four counts of criminal contempt in the second degree (§ 215.50 [3]). Contrary to defendant’s contention, he was not denied due process based on Supreme Court’s failure, sua sponte, to conduct a competency hearing pursuant to CPL 730.30 (2) (see People v Chicherchia, 86 AD3d 953, 954 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 952 [2011]). “A defendant is presumed competent. . . , and the court is under no obligation to issue an order of examination . . . unless it has ‘reasonable ground ... to believe that the defendant [is] an incapacitated person’ ” (People v Morgan, 87 NY2d 878, 880 [1995]). Where the court has “ ‘reasonable ground for believing that a defendant is in such state of idiocy, imbecility, or insanity that he [or she] is incapable of understanding the charge, indictment or proceedings or of making his [or her] defense,’ ” it must direct that the defendant be examined (People v Tortorici, 92 NY2d 757, 765 [1999], cert denied 528 US 834 [1999]). “[T]he decision to order a competency examination . . . lies within the sound discretion of the trial court” (People v Williams, 35 AD3d 1273, 1274 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 928 [2007]). There is no indication in the record that the court “ ‘receive[d] information which, objectively considered, should reasonably have raised a doubt about defendant’s competency and alerted [the court] to the possibility that the defendant could neither understand the proceedings or appreciate their significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in his defense’ ” so as to warrant a competency examination, much less a competency hearing (People v Arnold, 113 AD2d 101, 103 [1985]).
We reject the further contention of defendant that he was denied effective assistance of counsel (see generally People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]; People v Tuszynski, 71 AD3d 1407, 1408 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 810 [2010]; People v Lewis, 67 AD3d 1396, 1396-1397 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 772 [2010]). Also without merit is defendant’s contention that the court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s repeated
*1530 requests for new counsel during the trial. “The right of an indigent criminal defendant to the services of a court-appointed lawyer does not encompass a right to appointment of successive lawyers at defendant’s option” (People v Sides, 75 NY2d 822, 824 [1990]; see People v Kirkland, 177 AD2d 946, 946-947 [1991], lv denied 79 NY2d 859 [1992]). Rather, defendant must demonstrate good cause for the substitution, “such as a conflict of interest or other irreconcilable conflict with counsel” (Sides, 75 NY2d at 824; see People v Medina, 44 NY2d 199, 207-208 [1978]). Prior to trial, the court twice granted defendant’s request for new counsel. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s mid-trial requests for the appointment of new trial counsel inasmuch as defendant failed to demonstrate good cause for the substitution (see People v Sawyer, 57 NY2d 12, 19 [1982], rearg dismissed 57 NY2d 776 [1982], cert denied 459 US 1178 [1983]). Present — Smith, J.P., Fahey, Sconiers, Valentino and Whalen, JJ.
Document Info
Citation Numbers: 100 A.D.3d 1528, 954 N.Y.S.2d 341
Filed Date: 11/16/2012
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024