INMAN, EMANUEL B., PEOPLE v ( 2015 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    1328
    KA 12-00608
    PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, VALENTINO, WHALEN, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    EMANUEL B. INMAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (DAVID R. JUERGENS OF
    COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (SCOTT MYLES OF COUNSEL),
    FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (John L.
    DeMarco, J.), rendered January 18, 2012. The judgment convicted
    defendant, upon a jury verdict, of robbery in the first degree (two
    counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two
    counts) and reckless endangerment in the first degree.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed.
    Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury
    verdict of, inter alia, two counts each of robbery in the first degree
    (Penal Law § 160.15 [2], [4]) and criminal possession of a weapon in
    the second degree (§ 265.03 [1] [b]; [3]), defendant contends that he
    was denied effective assistance of counsel. We reject that
    contention. Viewing defendant’s representation in its entirety, we
    conclude that defendant was afforded meaningful representation (see
    generally People v Schulz, 4 NY3d 521, 530-531). “[I]t is well
    settled that disagreement over trial strategy is not a basis for a
    determination of ineffective assistance of counsel” (People v
    Dombrowski, 94 AD3d 1416, 1417, lv denied 19 NY3d 959). In this case,
    the alleged instances of ineffective assistance “are based largely on
    his hindsight disagreements with defense counsel’s trial strategies,
    and defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing the absence of
    any legitimate explanations for those strategies” (People v Morrison,
    48 AD3d 1044, 1045, lv denied 10 NY3d 867). To the extent that
    defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
    object to the prosecutor’s remarks during summation, that contention
    is without merit inasmuch as the prosecutor’s comments were fair
    comment on the evidence and did not constitute prosecutorial
    misconduct (see People v Martinez, 114 AD3d 1173, 1174, lv denied 22
    NY3d 1200; People v Goupil, 104 AD3d 1215, 1217, lv denied 21 NY3d
    943).
    -2-                         1328
    KA 12-00608
    Contrary to defendant’s further contention, County Court did not
    err in admitting in evidence a hat found at the crime scene and the
    results of DNA testing of the hat, based on a gap in the chain of
    custody. “ ‘The People provided sufficient assurances of the identity
    and unchanged condition of the [hat] . . . , and any alleged gaps in
    the chain of custody went to the weight of the evidence and not its
    admissibility’ ” (People v Jefferson, 125 AD3d 1463, 1464, lv denied
    25 NY3d 990; see People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 494).
    Finally, we reject defendant’s contention that the court erred in
    admitting in evidence a photograph of a vehicle parked in the driveway
    of defendant’s home. “In New York, the general rule is that all
    relevant evidence is admissible unless its admission violates some
    exclusionary rule . . . Evidence is relevant if it has a tendency in
    reason to prove the existence of any material fact” (People v Scarola,
    71 NY2d 769, 777). Nevertheless, relevant evidence may be determined
    to be inadmissible if its “probative value is substantially outweighed
    by the danger that it will unfairly prejudice the other side or
    mislead the jury” (id.). Here, a witness testified that the
    perpetrator of the crime fled the scene in a vehicle that was similar
    to the one depicted in the photograph, and we conclude that “the
    probative value of the [photograph] far outweighs any unfair prejudice
    inasmuch as it was relevant to the issue of the [perpetrator’s]
    identity” (People v McCullough, 117 AD3d 1415, 1416, lv denied 23 NY3d
    1040). In any event, any error in the admission of the photograph is
    harmless (see generally People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242).
    Entered:   December 23, 2015                   Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 12-00608

Filed Date: 12/23/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/7/2016