AYLWARD, DIANA SACHS v. CITY OF BUFFALO ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    1353
    CA 12-00328
    PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, VALENTINO, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
    IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION UNDER
    ARTICLE 7 OF THE REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW BY
    DIANA SACHS AYLWARD, JOHN C. CARBONARA,
    GRETCHEN CIRCONE, ROBERT FREEDMAN, MONTE K.
    HOFFMAN, PETER HOGAN, NANCY KARP, JOEL
    LEVIN, NORA SANTIAGO, THOMAS J. SCIME,
    JONATHAN D. WEIR AND PETER ALLEN WEINMANN,
    PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS,
    V                             MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    CITY OF BUFFALO AND ITS ASSESSOR AND BOARD
    OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW, RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS.
    WOLFGANG & WEINMANN, LLP, BUFFALO (JORGE S. DE ROSAS OF COUNSEL), FOR
    PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS.
    BENNETT, DIFILIPPO & KURTZHALTS, LLP, EAST AURORA (JOEL R. KURTZHALTS
    OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS.
    Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Timothy
    J. Walker, A.J.), entered November 18, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant
    to RPTL article 7. The order denied petitioners’ motion to preclude
    an interior inspection of their homes.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
    unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the matter is
    remitted to Supreme Court, Erie County, for further proceedings in
    accordance with the following Memorandum: Petitioners commenced these
    proceedings seeking review of their residential real property tax
    assessments pursuant to RPTL article 7. They appeal from four orders
    denying their motions to preclude respondents from conducting interior
    inspections of their homes in order to prepare a defense to the
    petitions. Petitioners contend that Supreme Court erred in requiring
    them to move to preclude those inspections rather than requiring
    respondents to move to allow the inspections. We agree.
    Discovery in RPTL article 7 proceedings is governed by CPLR 408,
    which requires a court’s leave to obtain formal disclosure beyond a
    notice to admit (see Matter of Wendy’s Rests., LLC v Assessor, Town of
    Henrietta, 74 AD3d 1916, 1917). Here, the court failed to comply with
    CPLR 408 in ordering petitioners either to move to preclude the
    demanded inspections or to have any objection thereto deemed waived.
    The court’s error significantly altered the proof required on this
    -2-                          1353
    CA 12-00328
    issue and thereby enabled respondents to access the interior of
    petitioners’ homes without having to show its need for such access.
    Indeed, respondents opposed the motions to preclude by submitting only
    an affidavit in which their attorney asserted that petitioners had
    presumptively consented to the interior inspections by having
    challenged their tax assessments and that the publicly available
    information about the properties was insufficient to prepare an
    effective defense to the petitions. The attorney, however, did not
    acknowledge that the interior details of the subject homes could have
    just as easily been obtained by way of a notice to admit (see CPLR
    408; CPLR 3123), a procedure that would not have required the leave of
    a court.
    In sum, by proceeding in contravention of CPLR 408, the court
    improperly relieved respondents of their burden to make the required
    showing, such as by way of an appraiser’s affidavit, that interior
    inspections were necessary to prepare their defense (see generally
    Matter of Wendy’s Rests., 74 AD3d at 1917). Moreover, by erroneously
    requiring petitioners to move to preclude, the court did not properly
    evaluate the reasonableness of the inspections sought by respondents,
    i.e., the court did not conduct the necessary Fourth Amendment
    analysis balancing respondents’ need for interior inspections against
    the invasion of petitioners’ privacy interests that such inspections
    would entail (see Matter of Yee v Town of Orangetown, 76 AD3d 104,
    111-113, citing Schlesinger v Town of Ramapo, 
    11 Misc 3d 697
    , 699-700;
    see generally Camara v Municipal Court of City & County of San
    Francisco, 
    387 US 523
    ). Under these circumstances, we reverse the
    orders and remit the matters to Supreme Court for further proceedings
    not inconsistent with our decision herein.
    Entered:   December 28, 2012                    Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA 12-00328

Filed Date: 12/28/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016