JOHNSON, JOSHUA v. DEL VALLE, JORGE ( 2012 )


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  •          SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    987
    CA 12-00576
    PRESENT: FAHEY, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, AND SCONIERS, JJ.
    JOSHUA JOHNSON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
    V                             MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    JORGE DEL VALLE, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
    THE MATHEWS LAW FIRM, SYRACUSE (DANIEL F. MATHEWS, III, OF COUNSEL),
    FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.
    SMITH, SOVIK, KENDRICK & SUGNET, P.C., SYRACUSE (ROBERT P. CAHALAN OF
    COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (John
    C. Cherundolo, A.J.), entered November 3, 2011 in a personal injury
    action. The order granted the motion of defendant for summary
    judgment and dismissed the complaint.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
    unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is denied
    and the complaint is reinstated.
    Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for
    injuries he sustained at work when defendant, plaintiff’s coemployee,
    allegedly threw a baseball that struck plaintiff’s face. Defendant
    moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that
    workers’ compensation is plaintiff’s exclusive remedy, and Supreme
    Court granted the motion. We reverse. Workers’ compensation is the
    exclusive remedy of an employee injured “by the negligence or wrong of
    another in the same employ” (Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 [6]).
    “[T]he words ‘in the same employ’ as used in the Workers’ Compensation
    Law are not satisfied simply because both plaintiff and defendant have
    the same employer; a defendant, to have the protection of the
    exclusivity provision, must . . . have been acting within the scope of
    his [or her] employment and not have been engaged in a willful or
    intentional tort” (Maines v Cronomer Val. Fire Dept., 50 NY2d 535,
    543). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant met his initial burden
    on the motion, we conclude that plaintiff raised a triable issue of
    fact with respect thereto (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York,
    49 NY2d 557, 562). Here, plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact
    “whether the actions of defendant were within the scope of his
    employment by submitting evidence that defendant’s conduct was neither
    common nor condoned” in their workplace (Cloutier v Longo, 288 AD2d
    942, 942; see Maines, 50 NY2d at 544-545; Shumway v Kelley, 60 AD3d
    1457, 1459; cf. generally Lowe v Kinn, 199 AD2d 743, 744-745, lv
    -2-                  987
    CA 12-00576
    denied 83 NY2d 753).
    Entered:   September 28, 2012         Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA 12-00576

Filed Date: 9/28/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016