WILSON, NJERA A., PEOPLE v ( 2013 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    1179
    KA 10-02347
    PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, SCONIERS, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    NJERA A. WILSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (ROBERT L. KEMP OF
    COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    NJERA A. WILSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.
    FRANK A. SEDITA, III, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (MATTHEW B. POWERS OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Michael L.
    D’Amico, J.), rendered November 23, 2010. The judgment convicted
    defendant, upon a jury verdict, of burglary in the second degree.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed.
    Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him,
    upon a jury verdict, of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law §
    140.25 [2]). The general motion by defendant for a trial order of
    dismissal is insufficient to preserve for our review his contention
    that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence (see
    People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19). In any event, we reject defendant’s
    contention. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we conclude that there
    is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences to support the
    jury’s finding that defendant committed the crime of which he was
    convicted based upon the evidence at trial (see generally People v
    Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). We therefore further conclude that
    defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel based on
    defense counsel’s failure to move for a trial order of dismissal on
    more specific grounds. It is well settled that “ ‘[a] defendant is
    not denied effective assistance of trial counsel [where defense]
    counsel does not make a motion or argument that has little or no
    chance of success’ ” (People v March, 89 AD3d 1496, 1497, lv denied 18
    NY3d 926, quoting People v Stultz, 2 NY3d 277, 287, rearg denied 3
    NY3d 702).
    Defendant further contends that the verdict is against the weight
    of the evidence because the testimony of the victim was not credible.
    -2-                          1179
    KA 10-02347
    The credibility issues identified by defendant on appeal were placed
    before the jury, and “[w]e accord great deference to the [jury’s]
    resolution of [those] credibility issues . . . ‘because those who see
    and hear the witnesses can assess their credibility and reliability in
    a manner that is far superior to that of reviewing judges who must
    rely on the printed record’ ” (People v Ange, 37 AD3d 1143, 1144, lv
    denied 9 NY3d 839, quoting People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 890). Viewing
    the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the
    jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we conclude that the
    verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally
    Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495).
    Contrary to defendant’s contention, the showup identification
    procedure was not unduly suggestive, and County Court properly
    permitted the in-court identification of defendant. Although showup
    procedures are generally disfavored (see People v Ortiz, 90 NY2d 533,
    537), “such procedures are permitted ‘where [they are] reasonable
    under the circumstances—that is, when conducted in close geographic
    and temporal proximity to the crime—and the procedure used was not
    unduly suggestive’ ” (People v Woodard, 83 AD3d 1440, 1441, lv denied
    17 NY3d 803, quoting People v Brisco, 99 NY2d 596, 597). Here,
    defendant was apprehended one block from the scene of the crime and
    within minutes of its occurrence. Also contrary to defendant’s
    contention, the showup procedure was not rendered unduly suggestive by
    the fact that defendant was handcuffed and in a patrol car when he was
    returned to the scene of the crime (see People v Duuvon, 77 NY2d 541,
    545; People v Santiago, 83 AD3d 1471, 1471, lv denied 17 NY3d 800;
    People v Stoneham, 50 AD3d 1575, 1576, lv denied 10 NY3d 940).
    By failing to object to the court’s ultimate Sandoval ruling,
    defendant failed to preserve for our review his present challenge to
    that ruling (see People v Miller, 59 AD3d 1124, 1125, lv denied 12
    NY3d 819; People v Caito, 23 AD3d 1135, 1136). In any event, that
    contention is without merit (see generally People v Hayes, 97 NY2d
    203, 207-208).
    Finally, the contentions of defendant in his pro se supplemental
    brief do not warrant reversal or modification of the judgment.
    Specifically, the prosecutor’s comments during summation were “either
    a fair response to defense counsel’s summation or fair comment on the
    evidence” (People v McEathron, 86 AD3d 915, 916 [internal quotation
    marks omitted], lv denied 19 NY3d 975). Similarly, the court’s Allen
    charge and its instructions on interested witnesses and the failure to
    testify were proper (see People v Alvarez, 86 NY2d 761, 763; see
    generally People v Bell, 38 NY2d 116, 120). We therefore also
    conclude that defendant’s ineffective assistance contention as it
    relates to defense counsel’s failure to object to those comments and
    charges is without merit (see Stultz, 2 NY3d at 287).
    Entered:   March 15, 2013                       Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 10-02347

Filed Date: 3/15/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016