WYANT, MAXWELL CHARLES, PEOPLE v ( 2012 )


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  •          SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    945.1
    KA 12-00928
    PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND SCONIERS, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, APPELLANT,
    V                                MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    MAXWELL CHARLES WYANT, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
    SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (GEOFFREY KAEUPER OF
    COUNSEL), FOR APPELLANT.
    JAMES NOBLES, ROCHESTER, FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from an amended order of the Monroe County Court (Douglas
    A. Randall, J.), entered May 14, 2012. The amended order reduced the
    sole count of the indictment from murder in the second degree to
    assault in the first degree.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the amended order so appealed from is
    unanimously reversed on the law, that part of defendant’s omnibus
    motion seeking to dismiss or reduce the sole count of the indictment
    is denied, that count of the indictment is reinstated, and the matter
    is remitted to Monroe County Court for further proceedings on the
    indictment.
    Memorandum: The People appeal from an amended order that granted
    that part of defendant’s omnibus motion seeking to dismiss or reduce
    the sole count of the indictment based on the alleged legal
    insufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury by reducing that
    count from murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]
    [intentional murder]) to assault in the first degree (§ 120.10 [1]).
    Initially, we note that County Court erred in reducing the count to
    assault in the first degree inasmuch as assault in the first degree is
    not a lesser included offense of intentional murder (see CPL 210.20
    [1-a]; People v Alvarez, 38 AD3d 930, 934, lv denied 8 NY3d 981; see
    generally People v Glover, 57 NY2d 61, 63-65).
    In any event, we agree with the People that the evidence is
    legally sufficient to support the count of intentional murder in the
    second degree. The grand jury “must have before it evidence legally
    sufficient to establish a prima facie case, including all the elements
    of the crime, and reasonable cause to believe that the accused
    committed the offense to be charged” (People v Jensen, 86 NY2d 248,
    251-252). Legally sufficient evidence is defined as “ ‘competent
    evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of
    an offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof’ ” (People v
    -2-                           945.1
    KA 12-00928
    Swamp, 84 NY2d 725, 730, quoting CPL 70.10 [1]). The court “must
    consider whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if
    unexplained and uncontradicted . . . would warrant conviction” (id.;
    see Jensen, 86 NY2d at 251).
    Here, the People called as a grand jury witness a physician
    employed by the Monroe County Medical Examiner’s Office to render an
    opinion as to the cause of the victim’s death. In determining that
    the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that defendant
    caused the victim’s death, the court concluded that the People did not
    properly qualify the witness as an expert. That was error. The
    witness’s testimony establishes that she was qualified to provide
    expert opinion testimony (see People v Stabell, 270 AD2d 894, 895, lv
    denied 95 NY2d 804). It certainly may be inferred from her testimony
    that she was a licensed physician with the requisite training to
    render her qualified to testify as a forensic pathologist. Even
    assuming, arguendo, that those inferences could not be drawn from her
    testimony, we note that the witness further testified that she has
    conducted “just less than five hundred” autopsies. An “expert should
    be possessed of the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge or
    experience from which it can be assumed that the information imparted
    or the opinion rendered is reliable” (Matott v Ward, 48 NY2d 455, 459
    [emphasis added]; see People v McKinley, 72 AD2d 470, 476). Indeed,
    “[p]ractical experience may properly substitute for academic training
    in determining whether an individual has acquired the training
    necessary to be qualified as an expert” (People v Owens, 70 AD3d 1469,
    1470, lv denied 14 NY3d 890 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see
    People v Hamilton, 96 AD3d 1518, 1519; see also People v Burt, 270
    AD2d 516, 518). Thus, the fact that the witness conducted almost 500
    autopsies qualified her to give expert medical opinion as to the cause
    of the victim’s death (see People v Morehouse, 5 AD3d 925, 928-929, lv
    denied 3 NY3d 644).
    Entered:   September 28, 2012                   Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 12-00928

Filed Date: 9/28/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016