FAGAN, MICHAEL A., PEOPLE v ( 2012 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    925
    KA 08-01356
    PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND SCONIERS, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    MICHAEL A. FAGAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (TIMOTHY S. DAVIS OF
    COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Dennis F.
    Bender, A.J.), rendered June 23, 2008. The judgment convicted
    defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of a controlled
    substance in the third degree (two counts) and resisting arrest.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed.
    Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
    upon a jury verdict of two counts of criminal possession of a
    controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1],
    [12]) and one count of resisting arrest (§ 205.30). Contrary to
    defendant’s contention, County Court properly refused to suppress the
    bag of cocaine seized by the police when it fell to the ground from
    his pant leg during a pat frisk. The officers lawfully stopped the
    vehicle in which defendant was a passenger because it had excessively
    tinted windows (see People v Estrella, 48 AD3d 1283, 1285, affd 10
    NY3d 945, cert denied 
    555 US 1032
    ), and lawfully directed defendant to
    exit the vehicle (see People v Robinson, 74 NY2d 773, 775, cert denied
    
    493 US 966
    ; People v Henderson, 26 AD3d 444, 445, lv denied 6 NY3d
    895). Based on defendant’s movements both inside and outside the
    vehicle, the officers suspected that defendant was attempting to
    conceal something (see People v Batista, 88 NY2d 650, 654; People v
    Grant, 83 AD3d 862, 863-864, lv denied 17 NY3d 795), and they
    reasonably suspected that defendant was armed and posed a threat to
    their safety because his actions were directed to the area of his
    waistband, which was concealed from their view (see People v Bracy, 91
    AD3d 1296, 1297; People v Nelson, 67 AD3d 486, 487). In addition,
    defendant continued to move his hands toward his waistband despite the
    officers’ repeated requests that he stop doing so (see People v Mack,
    49 AD3d 1291, 1292, lv denied 10 NY3d 866; People v Robinson, 278 AD2d
    808, 809, lv denied 96 NY2d 787). Based upon their reasonable belief
    -2-                           925
    KA 08-01356
    that defendant was armed, the officers lawfully conducted a pat frisk
    (see Henderson, 26 AD3d at 445), and were entitled to use handcuffs to
    ensure their safety while conducting the frisk (see People v Allen, 73
    NY2d 378, 379-380; Henderson, 26 AD3d at 445). Contrary to
    defendant’s contention, the use of handcuffs did not transform his
    detention into an arrest, requiring probable cause (see Allen, 73 NY2d
    at 380; People v Tiribio, 88 AD3d 534, 535, lv denied 18 NY3d 862).
    The officers thereafter acquired probable cause to arrest defendant,
    however, when the bag of cocaine fell to the ground from his pant leg
    (see People v Schell, 261 AD2d 422, 422-423, lv denied 94 NY2d 829).
    Defendant contends that the court failed to exercise its
    discretion in denying defendant’s request to speak to other counsel.
    Defendant previously made that same request to the judge first
    assigned to his case, and the request was denied. Defendant then
    renewed the request on the first day of trial, before a different
    judge, and he contends that the judge who presided over his trial
    mistakenly believed that he was bound by the prior ruling denying his
    request. We reject that contention, inasmuch as “we do not read any
    of the language employed by the court as meaning it misapprehended or
    failed to exercise its discretion” in denying that request (People v
    Quinones, 74 AD3d 494, 494, lv denied 15 NY3d 808). Finally, we
    reject defendant’s contention that his sentence is unduly harsh and
    severe based on the disparity between the sentence imposed after trial
    and the sentence offers made during plea negotiations (see People v
    Smith, 21 AD3d 1277, 1278, lv denied 7 NY3d 763).
    Entered:   September 28, 2012                   Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 08-01356

Filed Date: 9/28/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016