B., SAMAJ, MTR. OF ( 2012 )


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  •          SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    1055
    CAF 11-01399
    PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, FAHEY, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
    IN THE MATTER OF SAMAJ B.
    -------------------------------------------
    MONROE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,      MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    PETITIONER-RESPONDENT;
    TOWANDA H.-B., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT,
    AND WADE B., RESPONDENT.
    TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (DAVID R. JUERGENS OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
    WILLIAM K. TAYLOR, COUNTY ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (CAROL L. EISENMAN OF
    COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.
    KIMBERLY WHITE WEISBECK, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, ROCHESTER, FOR SAMAJ
    B.
    Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Monroe County (Gail A.
    Donofrio, J.), entered June 30, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to
    Family Court Act article 10. The order, among other things, adjudged
    that respondent Towanda H.-B. had neglected the subject child.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed without costs.
    Memorandum: Respondent mother appeals from an order adjudging
    her child to be neglected. We reject the mother’s contention that
    petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
    subject child was neglected. Pursuant to Family Court Act § 1046 (a)
    (iii), “proof that a person repeatedly misuses a drug or drugs or
    alcoholic beverages, to the extent that it has or would ordinarily
    have the effect of producing in the user thereof a substantial state
    of stupor, unconsciousness, intoxication, hallucination,
    disorientation, or incompetence, or a substantial impairment of
    judgment, or a substantial manifestation of irrationality, shall be
    prima facie evidence that a child of or who is the legal
    responsibility of such person is a neglected child except that such
    drug or alcoholic beverage misuse shall not be prima facie evidence of
    neglect when such person is voluntarily and regularly participating in
    a recognized rehabilitative program.” Thus, “neglect may in some
    circumstances be presumed if the parent chronically and persistently
    misuses alcohol and drugs which, in turn, substantially impairs his or
    her judgment while [the] child is entrusted to his or her care”
    (Matter of Chassidy CC. [Andrew CC.], 84 AD3d 1448, 1449; see Matter
    -2-                          1055
    CAF 11-01399
    of Arthur S. [Rose S.], 68 AD3d 1123, 1123-1124). “In other words,
    ‘[t]he presumption contained in Family [Court] Act § 1046 (a) (iii)
    operates to eliminate a requirement of specific parental conduct
    vis-a-vis the child and neither actual impairment nor specific risk of
    impairment need be established’ ” (Matter of Paolo W., 56 AD3d 966,
    967, lv dismissed 12 NY3d 747).
    Here, petitioner met its burden of proof by establishing that the
    mother admittedly used the drug Suboxone on numerous occasions; that
    she purchased the drug on the street whenever she was able; and that
    she was prostituting herself in order to obtain money to purchase the
    drug. Additionally, the mother failed to rebut the presumption
    created by Family Court Act § 1046 (a) (iii). Although the mother
    contends that petitioner failed to establish that Suboxone is a “drug”
    within the meaning of section 1012 (d), “[t]hat contention . . . is
    not preserved for our review inasmuch as the [mother] failed to move
    to dismiss the petition on that ground” (Matter of Lydia C. [Albert
    C.], 89 AD3d 1434, 1435-1436).
    Based on our determination, we see no need to address the
    mother’s remaining challenges to the sufficiency of petitioner’s
    proof. We reject the mother’s final contention that Family Court
    erred by admitting in evidence an intake report filed with the Office
    of Children and Family Services. That report was admissible pursuant
    to Family Court Act § 1046 (a) (v) inasmuch as the person making the
    report was a police officer, who is a mandated reporter under Social
    Services Law § 413 (1) (a) (see Matter of Lauryn H. [William A.], 73
    AD3d 1175, 1177; Matter of Michael G., 300 AD2d 1144, 1145; Matter of
    Shawn P., 266 AD2d 907, 908, lv denied 94 NY2d 760).
    Entered:   September 28, 2012                   Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CAF 11-01399

Filed Date: 9/28/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016