PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. FRISCO MARKETING OF NY LLC ( 2012 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    397
    CA 11-01982
    PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, AND SCONIERS, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, BY ERIC
    SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
    NEW YORK, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    FRISCO MARKETING OF NY LLC, DOING BUSINESS AS
    SMARTBUY AND SMARTBUY COMPUTERS AND ELECTRONICS,
    ET AL., DEFENDANTS,
    STUART L. JORDAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CHAIRMAN
    AND/OR CEO OF FRISCO MARKETING OF NY LLC AND AS
    AN OFFICER AND/OR DIRECTOR OF INTEGRITY FINANCIAL
    OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC., AND OF BRITLEE, INC.,
    REBECCA WIRT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN OFFICER
    AND/OR DIRECTOR OF INTEGRITY FINANCIAL OF NORTH
    CAROLINA, INC., AND OF BRITLEE, INC., AND JOHN
    PAUL JORDAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN OFFICER
    AND/OR DIRECTOR OF INTEGRITY FINANCIAL OF NORTH
    CAROLINA, INC., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
    ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (ZAINAB A. CHAUDHRY OF
    COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.
    HISCOCK & BARCLAY, LLP, SYRACUSE (MARK MCNAMARA OF COUNSEL), FOR
    DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
    Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Jefferson County (Hugh
    A. Gilbert, J.), entered November 17, 2010. The order granted the
    amended motions of defendants Stuart L. Jordan, individually and as
    chairman and/or CEO of Frisco Marketing of NY LLC and as an officer
    and/or director of Integrity Financial of North Carolina, Inc., and of
    Britlee, Inc., Rebecca Wirt, individually and as an officer and/or
    director of Integrity Financial of North Carolina, Inc., and of
    Britlee, Inc., and John Paul Jordan, individually and as an officer
    and/or director of Integrity Financial of North Carolina, Inc., to
    dismiss plaintiff’s complaint against them.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
    unanimously modified on the law by denying the amended motions and
    reinstating the complaint against defendants Stuart L. Jordan, Rebecca
    Wirt and John Paul Jordan, individually and in their corporate
    capacities, and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.
    Memorandum:   In this action seeking, inter alia, to enjoin
    -2-                           397
    CA 11-01982
    allegedly fraudulent business conduct, plaintiff appeals from an order
    that granted the amended motions of defendants Stuart L. Jordan,
    Rebecca Wirt and John Paul Jordan, individually and in their corporate
    capacities (collectively, the individual defendants), to dismiss the
    complaint against them on the ground that Supreme Court lacked
    personal jurisdiction over them. We agree with plaintiff that the
    court erred in granting the motions. We therefore modify the order by
    denying the motions and reinstating the complaint against the
    individual defendants. In addition, we note that plaintiff cross-
    moved to dismiss the affirmative defenses of lack of personal
    jurisdiction, and that the court’s failure to rule on the cross motion
    is deemed a denial thereof (see Brown v U.S. Vanadium Corp., 198 AD2d
    863, 864). Inasmuch as plaintiff does not address the denial of the
    cross motion in its brief on appeal, we conclude that it has abandoned
    any contentions with respect to that issue (see Ciesinski v Town of
    Aurora, 202 AD2d 984, 984).
    Pursuant to the New York long-arm statute, “a court may exercise
    personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or
    through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state or
    contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” (CPLR 302
    [a] [1]). “As the party seeking to assert personal jurisdiction, the
    plaintiff bears the burden of proof on [that] issue” (Castillo v Star
    Leasing Co., 69 AD3d 551, 551; see Joseph v Siebtechnik, G.M.B.H., 172
    AD2d 1056) but, “[i]n order to defeat a motion to dismiss based upon
    lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that
    facts may exist to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
    defendant[s]” (Tucker v Sanders, 75 AD3d 1096, 1096 [internal
    quotation marks omitted], see Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463,
    467; Castillo, 69 AD3d at 552).
    Here, we conclude that plaintiff “demonstrate[d] that facts may
    exist to exercise personal jurisdiction over the [individual]
    defendant[s]” (Tucker, 75 AD3d at 1096 [internal quotation marks
    omitted]). In opposition to the motions, plaintiff submitted
    documents establishing that the individual defendants were three
    siblings who controlled the businesses at issue. They signed the
    leases for the stores where the allegedly fraudulent sales took place,
    they were officers of the corporations that made those sales, and they
    were also officers of the corporations that financed those sales at
    deceptive and usurious rates. Furthermore, the complaint alleges that
    the stores did not make any legitimate sales, but rather the sole
    purpose of the stores was to engage in deceptive, usurious and
    fraudulent sales to members of the armed services. Considering all of
    the evidence and accepting the allegations in the complaint as true,
    as we must on a motion to dismiss (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83,
    87-88; Tucker, 75 AD3d at 1097), we conclude that “CPLR 302 (a) (1)
    jurisdiction is proper ‘even though the [individual] defendant[s]
    never enter[ed] New York, [inasmuch as their] activities here were
    purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the
    transaction[s] and the claim[s] asserted’ ” (Fischbarg v Doucet, 9
    NY3d 375, 380, quoting Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of
    Invs., 7 NY3d 65, 71, cert denied 
    549 US 1095
    ; cf. SPCA of Upstate
    N.Y., Inc. v American Working Collie Assn., ___ NY3d ___, ___ [Feb. 9,
    -3-                           397
    CA 11-01982
    2012]).
    In addition, “[s]o long as a party avails itself of the benefits
    of the forum, has sufficient minimum contacts with it, and should
    reasonably expect to defend its actions there, due process is not
    offended if that party is subjected to jurisdiction even if not
    ‘present’ in that State” (Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460,
    466). Based upon the aforementioned contacts that the individual
    defendants had with New York, we agree with plaintiff that due process
    is not offended by subjecting the individual defendants to the
    jurisdiction of the New York courts.
    Entered:   March 23, 2012                       Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA 11-01982

Filed Date: 3/23/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016