ZEHNER, DAVID v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JORDAN-ELBRID, GE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRIC ( 2012 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    161
    CA 11-01659
    PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, SCONIERS, GORSKI, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
    IN THE MATTER OF DAVID ZEHNER,
    PETITIONER-PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JORDAN-ELBRIDGE CENTRAL
    SCHOOL DISTRICT, RESPONDENT-DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    THE LAW FIRM OF FRANK W. MILLER, EAST SYRACUSE (FRANK W. MILLER OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    O’HARA, O’CONNELL & CIOTOLI, FAYETTEVILLE (STEPHEN CIOTOLI OF
    COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court,
    Onondaga County (Donald A. Greenwood, J.), entered January 20, 2011 in
    a CPLR article 78 proceeding and a declaratory judgment action. The
    judgment, among other things, adjudged that respondent-defendant
    violated the Open Meetings Law on three separate occasions.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed without costs.
    Memorandum: Petitioner-plaintiff (petitioner) commenced this
    hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action
    alleging that respondent-defendant (respondent) engaged in a pattern
    of violating New York’s Open Meetings Law (Public Officers Law § 100
    et seq.) and seeking reimbursement for his attorney fees. We note at
    the outset that this is properly only a CPLR article 78 proceeding
    inasmuch as petitioner does not “challenge the constitutionality of
    any statutes or regulations” (Matter of Custom Topsoil, Inc. v City of
    Buffalo, 63 AD3d 1511, 1511).
    We reject respondent’s contention that Supreme Court erred in
    determining that it violated the Open Meetings Law on three occasions.
    “Every meeting of a public body shall be open to the general public,
    except that an executive session of such body may be called and
    business transacted thereat in accordance with [section 105]” (Public
    Officers Law § 103 [a]). At such an executive session, i.e., “that
    portion of a meeting not open to the general public” (§ 102 [3]), the
    topics that may be discussed are circumscribed by statute and include
    matters involving public safety, proposed, pending or current
    litigation, collective bargaining, and matters concerning the
    appointment or employment status of a particular person (§ 105 [1]).
    -2-                           161
    CA 11-01659
    The purpose of the Open Meetings Law is to prevent public bodies from
    debating and deciding in private matters that they are required to
    debate and decide in public, i.e., “deliberations and decisions that
    go into the making of public policy” (Matter of Sciolino v Ryan, 81
    AD2d 475; see Matter of Gordon v Village of Monticello, 87 NY2d 124,
    126-127, revg 207 AD2d 55 insofar as appealed from on other grounds).
    In this case, the court properly determined that respondent violated
    the Open Meetings Law on three occasions by merely reciting statutory
    categories for going into executive session without setting forth more
    precise reasons for doing so. Given the overriding purpose of the
    Open Meetings Law, section 105 is to be strictly construed, and the
    real purpose of an executive session will be carefully scrutinized
    “lest the . . . mandate [of the Open Meetings Law] be thwarted by
    thinly veiled references to the areas delineated thereunder” (Daily
    Gazette Co. v Town Bd., Town of Cobleskill, 
    111 Misc 2d 303
    , 304 [Sup
    Ct, Schoharie County 1981]; see e.g. Gordon, 207 AD2d 55).
    We further reject respondent’s contention that the court abused
    its discretion in awarding attorney fees to petitioner. Pursuant to
    the Open Meetings Law, “costs and reasonable attorney fees may be
    awarded by the court, in its discretion, to the successful party”
    (Public Officers Law § 107 [2]). Determining the appropriate remedy
    for respondent’s actions is thus expressly a matter of judicial
    discretion (see Matter of Sanna v Lindenhurst Bd. of Educ., 85 AD2d
    157, 159, affd 58 NY2d 626), and we perceive no abuse of the court’s
    discretion in awarding attorney fees to petitioner (see Matter of
    Goetschius v Board of Educ. of Greenburg Eleven Union Free School
    Dist., 281 AD2d 416, 417).
    Entered:   January 31, 2012                    Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA 11-01659

Filed Date: 1/31/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016