KALB, CHRISTOPHER, PEOPLE v ( 2012 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    1402
    KA 10-01131
    PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND GORSKI, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    CHRISTOPHER KALB, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (ALAN WILLIAMS OF
    COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    FRANK A. SEDITA, III, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (MATTHEW B. POWERS OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Thomas P.
    Franczyk, J.), rendered April 14, 2010. The judgment convicted
    defendant, upon a jury verdict, of burglary in the second degree,
    criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, criminal contempt
    in the first degree and intimidating a victim or witness in the third
    degree.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously modified as a matter of discretion in the interest of
    justice and on the law by providing that the order of protection shall
    expire on March 9, 2029, and as modified the judgment is affirmed.
    Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
    upon a jury verdict of, inter alia, burglary in the second degree
    (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]). Defendant contends that County Court’s
    handling of a jury note violated the requirements set forth in CPL
    310.30 and People v O’Rama (78 NY2d 270), inasmuch as he was denied
    the opportunity to have meaningful input or time to fashion an
    appropriate response to the note. We conclude that defendant failed
    to preserve his contention for our review. The record establishes
    that defendant, defense counsel and the prosecutor knew the contents
    of the brief note, which only requested additional instructions on the
    elements of the charged offenses. Further, it is apparent from the
    record that defendant and defense counsel were present throughout the
    proceedings and that no objection or request was made with respect to
    the content of the note or the manner in which the court responded to
    it. Thus, unlike O’Rama (78 NY2d at 278-279), this is not a case
    where there was “a failure to provide [defense] counsel with
    meaningful notice of the contents of the jury note or an opportunity
    to respond” (People v Kadarko, 14 NY3d 426, 429), and defendant
    therefore was required to preserve his contention for our review (see
    People v Starling, 85 NY2d 509, 516).
    -2-                          1402
    KA 10-01131
    Defendant further contends that the court erred in fixing the
    duration of the order of protection. Although defendant failed to
    preserve that contention for our review (see People v Nieves, 2 NY3d
    310, 315-317), we nevertheless exercise our power to review it as a
    matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6]
    [a]). The court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of
    imprisonment of 12 years for burglary in the second degree and to
    indeterminate terms of imprisonment of 2 to 4 years for criminal
    contempt in the first degree (Penal Law § 215.51 [b] [iii]) and
    intimidating a victim or witness in the third degree (§ 215.15 [1]).
    The order of protection expires on March 9, 2033, which is eight years
    after the expiration of the determinate sentence and the indeterminate
    sentences, which were to run concurrently to each other and
    consecutively to the determinate sentence. The version of CPL 530.13
    (4) (A) (ii) in effect at the time the judgment was rendered provided
    that the duration of an order of protection entered with respect to a
    felony conviction shall not exceed “eight years from the date of the
    expiration of the maximum term of an indeterminate or the term of a
    determinate sentence of imprisonment actually imposed . . . ”
    (emphasis added). Thus, the statute permits the order of protection
    to run, at most, eight years from the end of the term of the longest
    sentence imposed for the counts upon which the order of protection was
    based, i.e., the determinate term imposed for the burglary count (see
    People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1699, lv denied 17 NY3d 817). We
    therefore modify the judgment by providing that the order of
    protection shall expire on March 9, 2029 (see People v Cameron, 87
    AD3d 1366).
    Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contentions
    concerning an exhibit that was inadvertently provided to the jury, one
    of his statements that was not included in the People’s CPL 710.30
    notice and alleged prosecutorial misconduct (see CPL 470.05 [2]). We
    decline to exercise our power to review them as a matter of discretion
    in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). We have reviewed
    defendant’s remaining contentions and conclude that they are without
    merit.
    Entered:   January 31, 2012                    Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 10-01131

Filed Date: 1/31/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016