NIAGARA FALLS WATER BOARD v. CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS ( 2011 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    649
    CA 11-00331
    PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, LINDLEY, GREEN, AND GORSKI, JJ.
    NIAGARA FALLS WATER BOARD, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    JAECKLE FLEISCHMANN & MUGEL, LLP, BUFFALO (HEATH J. SZYMCZAK OF
    COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    HISCOCK & BARCLAY, LLP, BUFFALO (JAMES P. DOMAGALSKI OF COUNSEL), FOR
    PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Niagara County
    (Richard C. Kloch, Sr., A.J.), entered May 5, 2010. The order, among
    other things, granted plaintiff’s motion to compel and denied
    defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
    unanimously reversed on the law without costs, defendant’s motion for
    summary judgment dismissing the second amended complaint is granted
    and plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery is denied.
    Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking, inter alia,
    to recover funds allegedly owed to it pursuant to the terms of
    Resolution No. 2003-90 (Resolution), adopted by defendant’s City
    Council, and pursuant to an Acquisition Agreement between the parties.
    The Acquisition Agreement provided that, inter alia, plaintiff was to
    purchase from defendant certain assets, including “all accounts
    receivable of [defendant] . . . in connection with its water,
    wastewater and stormwater related accounts.” On a prior appeal and
    cross appeal, we modified an order granting in part defendant’s pre-
    answer motion to dismiss the complaint and plaintiff’s cross motion
    seeking leave to amend the complaint (Niagara Falls Water Bd. v City
    of Niagara Falls, 64 AD3d 1142). We concluded that Supreme Court
    should have denied the motion and granted the cross motion with
    respect to the first cause of action, for breach of contract.
    Accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true and according
    plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference (Daley v County of
    Erie, 59 AD3d 1087), we agreed with plaintiff that it had alleged a
    cognizable breach of contract cause of action (Niagara Falls Water
    Bd., 64 AD3d at 1143). We further concluded, however, that the
    remaining causes of action were either properly dismissed or should
    have been dismissed (id. at 1143-1144). Plaintiff subsequently filed
    and served a second amended complaint asserting a nearly identical
    -2-                           649
    CA 11-00331
    breach of contract cause of action.
    Defendant appeals from an order that, inter alia, denied its
    motion for summary judgment dismissing the second amended complaint.
    Inasmuch as we are no longer constrained to accept plaintiff’s
    allegations as true (cf. CPLR 3211; Daley, 59 AD3d 1087), we reverse.
    The Resolution, adopted prior to the date on which defendant assigned
    all accounts receivable to plaintiff, approved a grant to be paid from
    defendant’s future revenue in satisfaction of the unpaid water bills
    of non-party Niagara Falls Memorial Medical Center (Memorial). Even
    assuming, arguendo, that the Resolution does not violate the
    constitutional prohibition against gifts to private entities (see NY
    Const, art VIII, § 1), we conclude that there is nothing in the
    Acquisition Agreement that requires defendant to pay all or part of
    Memorial’s unpaid water bills. We reject plaintiff’s contention that
    the Resolution created an encumbrance to the transfer of assets and
    accounts receivable required by the Acquisition Agreement. Indeed,
    there appears to be nothing in either the Acquisition Agreement or the
    Resolution that would prohibit plaintiff from seeking payment from
    Memorial for any unpaid water bills. Further, plaintiff failed to
    establish, beyond mere speculation, that further discovery was
    necessary (see generally CPLR 3212 [f]; Heritage Hills Socy., Ltd. v
    Heritage Dev. Group, Inc., 56 AD3d 426, 427).
    In view of our determination, plaintiff’s motion to compel
    defendant to reply to its discovery demands is denied as academic.
    Entered:   June 17, 2011                        Patricia L. Morgan
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA 11-00331

Filed Date: 6/17/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016