MERCER, JACOB J., PEOPLE v ( 2011 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    485
    KA 10-02133
    PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, APPELLANT,
    V                             MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    JACOB J. MERCER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
    FRANK A. SEDITA, III, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (DONNA A. MILLING OF
    COUNSEL), FOR APPELLANT.
    THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (ROBERT B. HALLBORG,
    JR., OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from an order of the Erie County Court (Michael F.
    Pietruszka, J.), dated July 21, 2010. The order granted, without
    prejudice, the motion of defendant to dismiss the indictment.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
    unanimously reversed on the law, that part of the omnibus motion
    seeking to dismiss the indictment is denied, the indictment is
    reinstated and the matter is remitted to Erie County Court for further
    proceedings on the indictment.
    Memorandum: The People appeal from an order granting that part
    of defendant’s omnibus motion seeking to dismiss the indictment
    charging him with robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15
    [3]). County Court concluded that the People presented legally
    insufficient evidence with respect to the identity of the perpetrator.
    We agree with the People that reversal is required.
    “In the context of a motion to dismiss an indictment, the
    sufficiency of the People’s presentation ‘is properly determined by
    inquiring whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to
    the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted, would warrant
    conviction by a petit jury’ ” (People v Galatro, 84 NY2d 160, 163).
    The People must establish “that the accused committed the crime
    charged by presenting legally sufficient evidence establishing all of
    the elements of the crime . . .[,] and the court is not to weigh the
    proof or examine its adequacy” (id. at 164).
    “A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when he [or
    she] forcibly steals property and when, in the course of the
    commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or [she]
    . . . [u]ses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument”
    (Penal Law § 160.15 [3]). Here, the evidence before the grand jury
    -2-                           485
    KA 10-02133
    established that a man stole condoms from a grocery store and
    brandished a knife at two store employees while fleeing the crime
    scene. Based on the robbery report and description of the perpetrator
    from the two store employees, the police located defendant shortly
    after the robbery in the vicinity of the store. The officers arrested
    him and seized the condoms from his person. A knife matching the
    description provided by one of the store employees was found in
    proximity to the location where defendant was apprehended. At the
    police station, defendant admitted robbing the store, and one of the
    store employees identified the knife recovered by the police as the
    knife that was used in the robbery. Although the store employees
    never identified defendant as the perpetrator, the circumstantial
    evidence, when viewed as a whole, was sufficient for the grand jury to
    infer that defendant was the perpetrator and that the store employees
    and the police officers were testifying with respect to the same
    individual (see People v Ngor Yip, 118 AD2d 472, 473-474). We
    therefore conclude that the evidence before the grand jury was legally
    sufficient to support a prima facie case of robbery in the first
    degree (see People v Woelfle, 64 AD3d 1166, 1167-1168, lv denied 14
    NY3d 846; Ngor Yip, 118 AD2d at 473-474).
    Entered:   April 29, 2011                      Patricia L. Morgan
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 10-02133

Filed Date: 4/29/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016