TYRA, MICHAEL J., PEOPLE v ( 2011 )


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  •          SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    629
    KA 09-01056
    PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND SCONIERS, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                                MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    MICHAEL J. TYRA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    JOHN E. TYO, SHORTSVILLE, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    R. MICHAEL TANTILLO, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CANANDAIGUA (NEAL P.
    MCCLELLAND OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Ontario County Court (Frederick G.
    Reed, A.J.), rendered March 25, 2009. The judgment convicted
    defendant, upon a jury verdict, of driving while intoxicated, a class
    E felony, and aggravated driving while intoxicated, a class E felony.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed.
    Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
    upon a jury verdict of felony driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and
    Traffic Law § 1192 [3]; § 1193 [1] [c] [former (i)]) and felony
    aggravated driving while intoxicated (§ 1192 [2-a]; § 1193 [1] [c]
    [former (i)]). Defendant contends that County Court abused its
    discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after a witness
    testified that defendant was arrested for driving into a house on the
    day before the incident at issue occurred. We reject that contention
    (see generally People v Ortiz, 54 NY2d 288, 292). The court
    instructed the jury to disregard that statement, and “the jury is
    presumed to have followed” the curative instruction (People v Woods,
    60 AD3d 1493, 1494, lv denied 12 NY3d 922; see People v Cruz, 272 AD2d
    922, 923, affd 96 NY2d 857; People v Allen, 78 AD3d 1521). Thus, any
    prejudice resulting from that statement was thereby adequately
    alleviated (see Allen, 78 AD3d 1521; People v Young, 55 AD3d 1234,
    1236, lv denied 11 NY3d 901).
    To the extent that defendant further contends that there is
    legally insufficient evidence to corroborate his admissions to the
    police pursuant to CPL 60.50, that contention is not preserved for our
    review (see People v Prado, 1 AD3d 533, 534, affd 4 NY3d 725, rearg
    denied 4 NY3d 795; People v Mosca, 294 AD2d 938, lv denied 99 NY2d
    538) and, in any event, it is without merit. Defendant’s blood
    alcohol content was .31%, and his truck was parked so that it was in
    contact with another vehicle. Defendant stated that no one else drove
    -2-                           629
    KA 09-01056
    his truck, and he admitted that he parked the truck in the location
    where it was found on the morning of his arrest. Further, defendant
    admitted that he had been drinking both the previous night and that
    morning, denied drinking anything since he parked the vehicle and
    stated that he struck his face “on” his truck. Defendant’s face was
    still bleeding when the police arrived. Thus, defendant’s admissions
    were corroborated by “evidence . . . found in the presence of
    defendant at the scene of the crime, his guilty appearance afterward,
    [and] other circumstances supporting an inference of guilt” (People v
    Booden, 69 NY2d 185, 187; see People v Kestler, 201 AD2d 955, lv
    denied 83 NY2d 854; see generally People v Blake, 5 NY2d 118, 119-120;
    People v Spencer, 289 AD2d 877, 879, lv denied 98 NY2d 655).
    Finally, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the
    crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342,
    349), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the
    evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495).
    Entered:   May 6, 2011                          Patricia L. Morgan
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 09-01056

Filed Date: 5/6/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016