Matter of Spence v. Shah , 26 N.Y.S.3d 613 ( 2016 )


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  •                           State of New York
    Supreme Court, Appellate Division
    Third Judicial Department
    Decided and Entered: February 25, 2016                   520977
    ________________________________
    In the Matter of WAYNE SPENCE,
    as President of New York
    State Public Employees
    Federation, AFL-CIO, et al.,
    Appellants,
    v                                     MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    NIRAV R. SHAH, as Commissioner
    of Health, et al.,
    Respondents.
    ________________________________
    Calendar Date:   January 12, 2016
    Before:   Peters, P.J., McCarthy, Rose and Lynch, JJ.
    __________
    Lisa M. King, New York State Public Employees Federation,
    AFL-CIO, Albany (Katherine J. Vorwald of counsel), for
    appellants.
    Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Allyson B.
    Levine of counsel), for respondents.
    __________
    Lynch, J.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Hard, J.),
    entered June 10, 2014 in Albany County, which dismissed
    petitioners' application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR
    article 78, to review certain regulations promulgated by
    respondent Commissioner of Health.
    In 2013, respondent Department of Health (hereinafter DOH)
    adopted a regulation, together with conforming regulatory
    amendments, that required health care personnel who had not been
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    vaccinated for influenza to wear a surgical or procedural mask
    during influenza season when in areas where patients or residents
    may be present (see 10 NYCRR 2.59; see also 10 NYCRR 405.3,
    415.19, 751.6, 763.13, 766.11, 793.5).1 Petitioners, the
    President of the Public Employees Federation and four registered
    nurses represented by that union, commenced this proceeding
    seeking to annul 10 NYCRR 2.59 and the conforming regulatory
    amendments. They asserted that when promulgating the regulation,
    DOH acted in an arbitrary, capricious and irrational manner, and
    also that DOH exceeded its authority and violated the separation
    of powers doctrine.2 Supreme Court dismissed the petition and
    petitioners appeal.
    Initially, we find that, although minor amendments were
    made to 10 NYCRR 2.59 in November 2014 when this appeal was
    pending, those amendments do not render the appeal moot. Indeed,
    both parties urged in their appellate briefs that the amendments
    did not impact the appeal; however, petitioners changed their
    position and argued mootness in their reply brief. Since
    mootness can be raised at any time (see Gabriel v Prime, 30 AD3d
    955, 956 [2006]), we briefly address such argument. "Where the
    case presents a live controversy and enduring consequences
    potentially flow from the [judgment] appealed from, the appeal is
    not moot" (Matter of New York State Commn. on Jud. Conduct v
    Rubenstein, 23 NY3d 570, 576 [2014] [citations omitted]; see
    Matter of Veronica P. v Radcliff A., 24 NY3d 668, 671 [2015]).
    The 2014 amendments narrowed slightly the applicability of the
    1
    The regulation was proposed by respondent Public Health
    and Health Planning Council pursuant to its authority under
    Public Health Law § 225, and it was approved by respondent
    Commissioner of Health. The Council and Commissioner are part of
    DOH, and we will herein reference DOH rather than each of these
    separate respondents.
    2
    Inasmuch as petitioners raised a facial challenge to the
    constitutionality of a regulation, we convert their CPLR article
    78 proceeding to a combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and action
    for declaratory judgment (see Matter of Carney v New York State
    Dept. of Motor Vehs., 133 AD3d 1150, 1151 n 1 [2015]).
    -3-                520977
    mask-wearing requirement from an area where patients "may be
    present" to where they are "typically present," and also carved a
    few exceptions, such as for personnel providing speech therapy or
    working with a patient who lip reads. The amendments did not
    otherwise meaningfully change the mask-wearing requirement for
    non-vaccinated personnel, and the amendments do not in any way
    adversely affect or change the basis of petitioners' challenge to
    the regulatory requirement. If petitioners prevail in their
    challenge to the original regulation, personnel to whom the
    current regulation applies will be affected (see Kerwick v New
    York State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 117 AD2d 65, 67-68
    [1986]). The fact that DOH also clarified that local health care
    facilities could adopt more stringent policies has no bearing on
    this challenge to the merits of the requirements set forth in
    DOH's regulation. The appeal is not moot since "the rights of
    the parties will be directly affected by the determination of the
    appeal" (Matter of Veronica P. v Radcliff A., 24 NY3d at 671
    [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of
    Town of Amsterdam v Amsterdam Indus. Dev. Agency, 95 AD3d 1539,
    1540-1541 [2012]; cf. Matter of Law Enforcement Officers Union,
    Dist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v State of New York, 229 AD2d
    286, 289-290 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 807 [1997] [appeal moot
    where regulation superceded an emergency regulation and contained
    consequential changes]).
    Next, we consider petitioners' contention that DOH acted
    beyond its delegated power and violated the separation of powers
    doctrine. "The issues of delegation of power and separation of
    powers overlap and are often considered together. This makes
    sense because, if an agency was not delegated the authority to
    enact certain rules, then it would usurp authority of the
    legislative branch by enacting those rules" (Greater N.Y. Taxi
    Assn. v New York City Taxi & Limousine Commn., 25 NY3d 600, 608
    [2015] [internal citation omitted]). Analysis of the delegation
    of power implicates the four "coalescing circumstances" set forth
    in Boreali v Axelrod (71 NY2d 1, 11 [1987]), which are "non-
    mandatory, somewhat-intertwined factors for courts to consider
    when determining whether an agency has crossed the hazy 'line
    between administrative rule-making and legislative policy-
    making'" (Greater N.Y. Taxi Assn. v New York City Taxi &
    Limousine Commn., 25 NY3d at 610, quoting Boreali v Axelrod, 71
    -4-                520977
    NY2d at 11; see Matter of New York Statewide Coalition of
    Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v New York City Dept. of Health &
    Mental Hygiene, 23 NY3d 681, 696 [2014]; Matter of NYC
    C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v New York State Off. of Parks, Recreation &
    Historic Preserv., 125 AD3d 105, 108 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d
    963 [2015]). Those factors include "whether the agency: (1)
    operated outside of its proper sphere of authority by balancing
    competing social concerns in reliance solely on its own ideas of
    sound public policy; (2) engaged in typical, interstitial
    rulemaking or wrote on a clean slate, creating its own
    comprehensive set of rules without the benefit of legislative
    guidance; (3) acted in an area in which the Legislature has
    repeatedly tried – and failed – to reach agreement in the face of
    substantial public debate and vigorous lobbying by a variety of
    interested factions; and (4) applied its special expertise or
    technical competence to develop the challenged regulations"
    (Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 132
    AD3d 112, 119 [2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and
    citations omitted]; accord Boreali v Axelrod, 71 NY2d at 12-14).
    Here, the Legislature delegated broad authority to DOH to
    consider and implement regulations regarding the preservation and
    improvement of public health, as well as establishing standards
    in health care facilities that serve to foster the prevention and
    treatment of human disease (see Public Health Law §§ 225, 2800,
    2803, 3612, 4010). Addressing and attempting to minimize the
    risk of patient exposure to influenza during influenza season
    falls comfortably within the intent of the underlying
    legislation. DOH did not operate outside its sphere of authority
    or without the benefit of legislative guidance. The regulation
    offers the options of being vaccinated or, if not, wearing a
    mask. It thus affords workers options while advancing the
    closely tailored goal of attempting to minimize an unwarranted
    and unnecessary public health risk from the spread of influenza.
    Although there had ostensibly been a prior effort by the
    Legislature to address mandatory influenza vaccinations for
    health care personnel, it had died in committee, and there is not
    a record of repeated efforts to legislatively address the issue
    with concomitant substantial public debate and lobbying.
    Preventing or reducing the spread of influenza implicated
    scientific and medical issues within DOH's expertise. The agency
    -5-                520977
    had its director of the Bureau of Healthcare Associated
    Infections, Emily C. Lutterloh – a medical doctor and expert in
    the field – conduct an extensive study and analysis regarding
    influenza transmission in health care facilities and effective
    ways to address this serious issue. Upon considering the Boreali
    factors, as well as other circumstances relevant to whether DOH
    acted beyond its power, we are unpersuaded that DOH crossed into
    the legislative sphere.
    Petitioners further argue that the challenged regulation
    (and its conforming regulatory amendments) was arbitrary,
    capricious, irrational and contrary to law. "An administrative
    agency's exercise of its rule-making powers is accorded a high
    degree of judicial deference, especially when the agency acts in
    the area of its particular expertise" (Matter of Consolation
    Nursing Home v Commissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of Health, 85
    NY2d 326, 331 [1995] [citations omitted]; see Matter of
    Reconstruction Home & Health Care Ctr., Inc. v Daines, 65 AD3d
    786, 787 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 706 [2010]). "'[T]he party
    seeking to nullify such a regulation has the heavy burden of
    showing that the regulation is unreasonable and unsupported by
    any evidence'" (Matter of Big Apple Food Vendors' Assn. v Street
    Vendor Review Panel, 90 NY2d 402, 408 [1997], quoting Matter of
    Consolation Nursing Home v Commissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of
    Health, 85 NY2d at 331-332). Contrary to petitioners'
    contention, the record contains sufficient scientific and factual
    evidence to support the regulation. Information reviewed by DOH
    when considering the regulation included, among others, studies
    and recommendations by the Centers for Disease Control and
    Prevention, the United States Food and Drug Administration, the
    Infectious Disease Society of America, as well as various journal
    articles from experts in the field. Lutterloh submitted a
    detailed affidavit discussing at length various pertinent issues
    that were considered when formulating the regulation, including
    the serious and potentially widespread health risk posed by
    influenza in health care facilities, data and studies relevant to
    the spread of influenza, various approaches to the problem
    considered by experts in the field, potential concerns and
    consequences implicated by assorted methods of attempting to
    minimize the influenza risks, and the reasons for the approach
    recommended and ultimately taken in the regulation. Petitioners
    -6-                  520977
    failed to show that the regulation (and its conforming regulatory
    amendments) was unreasonable or unsupported by evidence in the
    record.
    Peters, P.J., McCarthy and Rose, JJ., concur.
    ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, without
    costs, by partially converting the matter to a declaratory
    judgment action; it is declared that petitioners have not shown
    10 NYCRR 2.59 (and its conforming regulatory amendments as cited
    herein) to be invalid; and, as so modified, affirmed.
    ENTER:
    Robert D. Mayberger
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 520977

Citation Numbers: 136 A.D.3d 1242, 26 N.Y.S.3d 613

Judges: Lynch, Peters, McCarthy, Rose

Filed Date: 2/25/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/1/2024