People v. Stedge ( 2016 )

State of New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Third Judicial Department
Decided and Entered: January 21, 2016 106526
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THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK,
Respondent,
v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DAVID E. STEDGE,
Appellant.
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Calendar Date: November 19, 2015
Before: Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Garry, Rose and Clark, JJ.
__________
Margaret McCarthy, Ithaca, for appellant.
Kirk O. Martin, District Attorney, Owego (Cheryl A. Mancini
of counsel), for respondent.
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Clark, J.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Tioga County
(Keene, J.), rendered December 9, 2013, convicting defendant upon
his plea of guilty of the crime of failure to register as a sex
offender.
In 2008, defendant pleaded guilty to the crime of forcible
touching and was required to register under the Sex Offender
Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C [hereinafter SORA]).
In September 2013, the Tioga County Sheriff's office filed a
felony complaint against defendant for failure to register as a
sex offender, stemming from allegations that he did not register
his change of address with the Division of Criminal Justice
Services. Defendant subsequently signed a waiver of indictment,
thus consenting to be prosecuted by superior court information.
-2- 106526
Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty to the crime of failure to
register as a sex offender and was sentenced to 10 months in
jail, to be served concurrently with a sentence from Chemung
County arising from the same violation (People v Stedge, ___ AD3d
___ [appeal No. 106588, decided herewith]). Defendant now
appeals and we affirm.
Under a section entitled "[d]uty to register and verify,"
SORA states that "[a]ny sex offender shall register with the
[D]ivision no later than [10] calendar days after any change of
address" (Correction Law § 168-f [4]). "Any sex offender
required to register or to verify [who fails to do so] in the
manner and within the time periods provided for . . . shall be
guilty of a class E felony" (Correction Law § 168-t). SORA does
not define the word "address" (see Correction Law § 168-a).
For the first time on appeal, defendant contends that SORA
is unconstitutionally vague with respect to transient or homeless
individuals and, as a result, he was denied due process under NY
Constitution, article I, § 6 and the 14th Amendment of the US
Constitution.1 While defendant's constitutional claim does
indeed survive his guilty plea (see People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227,
231 n 2 [2000]; People v Lee, 58 NY2d 491, 494 [1983]), because
he did not raise this issue before County Court, it has not been
properly preserved for our review (see People v Snyder, 91 AD3d
1206, 1207 n 2 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 968 [2012], cert denied
___ US ___, 133 S Ct 791 [2012]; People v Riddick, 34 AD3d 923,
925 [2006], lv denied 9 NY3d 868 [2007]), and we decline to
exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction (see CPL 470.15 [6]
[a], [b]). In any event, were we to address the merits of
defendant's contentions, we would nonetheless find them to be
without merit.
Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Garry and Rose, JJ., concur.
1
Defendant contends that he should be regarded as
transient or homeless inasmuch as he resided in a pop-up camp
trailer.
-3- 106526
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
ENTER:
Robert D. Mayberger
Clerk of the Court