People v. Stedge , 24 N.Y.S.3d 775 ( 2016 )


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  •                           State of New York
    Supreme Court, Appellate Division
    Third Judicial Department
    Decided and Entered: January 21, 2016                   106588
    ________________________________
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
    NEW YORK,
    Respondent,
    v                                     MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    DAVID E. STEDGE SR.,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________
    Calendar Date:   November 19, 2015
    Before:   Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Garry, Rose and Clark, JJ.
    __________
    Margaret McCarthy, Ithaca, for appellant.
    Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (Susan Rider-
    Ulacco of counsel), for respondent.
    __________
    Clark, J.
    Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung
    County (Hayden, J.), rendered December 2, 2013, convicting
    defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of failure to
    register as a sex offender.
    In 2008, defendant pleaded guilty to the crime of forcible
    touching and was required to register under the Sex Offender
    Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C). A February 2013
    indictment charged defendant with the crime of failure to
    register as a sex offender (see Correction Law § 168-t), arising
    from allegations that he moved from his registered address in
    Chemung County without reporting his change of address to the
    Division of Criminal Justice Services. Defendant moved to
    dismiss the indictment on the ground that the County Court of
    -2-                106588
    Chemung County lacked geographical jurisdiction over him since he
    moved to another county; County Court denied the motion.
    Defendant then filed a CPL article 440 motion seeking to vacate
    the underlying forcible touching conviction arguing, among other
    things, that he was not provided with the effective assistance of
    counsel by his former attorney, a Chemung County Public Defender.
    Subsequently, defendant requested new representation, contending
    that the motion created an actual conflict of interest in the
    instant matter.1 A few days later, defendant withdrew his
    request for new counsel. Defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to
    failure to register as a sex offender and was subsequently
    sentenced to nine months in jail. Defendant appeals, arguing
    primarily that County Court erred in denying his motion to
    dismiss.
    We affirm. "A person may be convicted in . . . criminal
    court of a particular county . . . when . . . [e]ven though none
    of the conduct constituting such offense may have occurred within
    such county[,] . . . [s]uch conduct had, or was likely to have, a
    particular effect upon such county" (CPL 20.40 [2] [c]; see
    Matter of Steingut v Gold, 42 NY2d 311, 317 [1977]; see also
    People v Fea, 47 NY2d 70, 75-76 [1979]). "Particular effect of
    an offense" is defined as "[w]hen conduct constituting an offense
    produces consequences which, though not necessarily amounting to
    a result or element of such offense, have a materially harmful
    impact upon the governmental processes or community welfare of a
    particular jurisdiction" (CPL 20.10 [4]). CPL 20.40 also
    provides a criminal court with geographical jurisdiction when
    "[t]he offense committed was one of omission to perform a duty
    imposed by law, which duty either was required to be or could
    properly have been performed in such county. In such case, it is
    immaterial whether such person was within or outside such county
    at the time of the omission" (CPL 20.40 [3]).
    Initially, defendant's guilty plea does not waive a
    geographical jurisdiction challenge (see People v Kellerman, 102
    1
    Although once again represented by the Chemung County
    Public Defender's office, defendant was not represented by the
    same Public Defender in the instant matter.
    -3-                106588
    AD2d 629, 631 [1984]). Turning to the merits, we find that
    Chemung County had a statutory basis for the prosecution of
    defendant's failure to register as a sex offender pursuant to CPL
    20.40 (2) (c). As the county with the last known address for
    defendant, Chemung County had a continuing interest and duty to
    protect its residents by enforcing the terms and requirements of
    the Sex Offender Registration Act and, as argued by the People,
    defendant's failure to register his new address hindered Chemung
    County law enforcement's efforts to protect its community. Thus,
    we find that defendant's failure to report his change of address
    had, or was likely to have, a materially harmful impact on the
    Chemung County community, as well as Chemung County's
    governmental processes (see CPL 20.10 [4]; 20.40 [2] [c]; see
    generally People v Patterson, 
    185 Misc 2d 519
    , 520-521 [Crim Ct,
    Bronx County 2000]; People v Olivera, 
    184 Misc 2d 327
    , 328-332
    [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2000]) and, as such, County Court did not
    err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.2
    We also find that defendant's representation here was
    conflict free. Contrary to defendant's contention, the filing of
    a CPL article 440 motion in a prior action seeking vacatur upon
    allegations of ineffective assistance3 did not give rise to an
    actual conflict of interest in the instant action (see People v
    Solomon, 20 NY3d 91, 98 [2012]; People v Perez, 70 NY2d 773, 774
    [1987]; People v Lynch, 104 AD3d 1062, 1062-1063 [2013]; People v
    Smith, 271 AD2d 752, 753 [2000]). Further, under the particular
    circumstances here – namely, defendant's withdrawal of his
    request for new counsel – additional inquiry by County Court was
    not required to protect the right of defendant to effective
    assistance of counsel (compare People v McDonald, 68 NY2d 1, 8-9
    [1986]).
    2
    Alternatively, contrary to defendant's contention, based
    on the plain language of the statute, geographical jurisdiction
    over defendant may have been obtained pursuant to CPL 20.40 (3).
    3
    In support of his CPL article 440 motion, defendant
    alleged that he pleaded guilty to forcible touching because his
    previous attorney "would not even prepare or discuss a defense."
    -4-                  106588
    Defendant's remaining contentions have been considered and
    have been found to be without merit.
    Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Garry and Rose, JJ., concur.
    ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
    ENTER:
    Robert D. Mayberger
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 106588

Citation Numbers: 135 A.D.3d 1174, 24 N.Y.S.3d 775

Judges: Clark

Filed Date: 1/21/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/1/2024