Lerner v. Shah , 152 A.D.3d 504 ( 2017 )

Lerner v Shah (2017 NY Slip Op 05428)

Lerner v Shah

2017 NY Slip Op 05428

Decided on July 5, 2017

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on July 5, 2017 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P.
LEONARD B. AUSTIN
SHERI S. ROMAN
SYLVIA O. HINDS-RADIX
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, JJ.

2016-02519
(Index No. 4532/14)

[*1]Sheryl P. Lerner, appellant,

v

Vijaykumar R. Shah, respondent.

The Law Offices of Edmond C. Chakmakian, P.C., Hauppauge, NY, for appellant.

Lewis Johs Avallone Aviles, LLP, Islandia, NY (Robert A. Lifson of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Murphy, J.), dated January 4, 2016, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The papers submitted by the defendant failed to adequately address the plaintiff's claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969; Rouach v Betts, 71 AD3d 977). Since the defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d at 969).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

RIVERA, J.P., AUSTIN, ROMAN, HINDS-RADIX and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court